Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons.

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DETERRENCE FAILS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT GUARANTEED TO DETER NON-NUCLEAR STATES IN CRISES

NUCLEAR ADVANTAGES DO NOT PROVIDE A COERCION BENEFIT VIS-À-VIS OTHER NUCLEAR STATES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DO NOT DETER OTHER WMD

ANY ACCIDENTAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BREAK DOWN DETERRENCE

DETERRENCE FAILS DUE TO THE POTENTIAL IRRATIONALITY OF STATE LEADERS

GROUPTHINK MAY COMPROMISE LEADERSHIP RATIONALITY

DETERRENCE FAILS DUE TO THE RISK OF UNAUTHORIZED USE

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STILL ENCOURAGES PHYSICAL COERCION BETWEEN NUCLEAR STATES.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO STOP WAR BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR STATES.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS COUNTERINTUITIVE TO CREATING PEACE.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS BASED UPON THE IMAGE OF ARMAGEDDON EVENTUALLY LEADING US TO DESTRUCTION.

NUKES HAVEN'T BEEN USED BECAUSE OF LACK OF STRATEGICITY AS OPPOSED TO DETERRENCE.

A COMMITMENT TO DETERRENCE IS A COMMITMENT TO PROLIFERATION.

NUKES AREN'T ABLE TO ADEQUATE SECURE A COUNTRY LIKE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES.

NUCLEAR WAR ISN'T IRRATIONAL – IT JUST SEEMS SO BECAUSE THE STAKES ARE SO HIGH.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DECREASE GLOBAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY

DETERRENCE IMMORAL

DETERRENCE IS IMMORAL.

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TERRORISTS COULD EASILY ACQUIRE AND TRANSPORT A NUCLEAR WEAPON.

THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK IS HIGH - SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD GUARANTEE MASSIVE DESTRUCTION.

STOPPING PROLIFERATION IS KEY - THE MORE COUNTRIES WITH NUKEs, THE GREATER THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK.

NOT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SECURE - IT ONLY TAKES ONE TO ALLOW FOR A NUCLEAR ATTACK.

NATIONS LIKE RUSSIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE THE PERFECT CONDITIONS FOR LOOSE NUKEs TO GET INTO THE WRONG HANDS.

PAKISTAN IS A MAJOR SECURITY CONCERN - THE NEW COMMAND SYSTEM, TERRORIST PRESENCE, AND UNCLEAR REGULATIONS MEANS TERRORISTS CAN GET A HOLD OF VALUABLE INFORMATION.

RUSSIA IS VULNERABLE TO THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

UNEMPLOYED NUCLEAR EXPERTS GUARANTEES INFORMATION WILL FALL INTO THE WRONG HANDS.

PROLIFERATION RISKS

UNLESS WE ALL DISARM, EVERY STATE WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

TONS OF KNOWLEDGE ON HOW TO CREATE NUKEs EXISTS - COMBINED WITH TONS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, THERE IS A LARGE LIKELIHOOD OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK.

NEW PROLIFERATION WILL TRIGGER A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

PROLIFERATION MAGNIFIES THE RISK OF EVERY IMPACT.

NUCLEAR SPREAD WILL CAUSE GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR.

PROLIFERATION MEANS THAT EVERY MAJOR CONFLICT WILL INEVITABLY GO NUCLEAR.

PROLIFERATION INCREASES INSTABILITY.

NUCLEAR WAR IMPACTS

A NUCLEAR BOMB WILL FLATTEN A CITY.

A NUCLER BOMB WILL PRODUCE A MASSIVE FIREBALL INCINERATING INHABITANTS OF A CITY.

NUCLEAR WAR WILL DESTROY ALL LIFE.

NUKEs CANNOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS FROM ENEMY COMBATANTS LIKE SOLDIERS CAN.

NUCLEAR WAR WILL KILL 1 BILLION PEOPLE.

NUCLEAR WAR WILL ALTER THE OZONE LAYER.

NUCLEAR FALLOUT WILL STARVE THE PLANET.

THE REMAINING RADIATION WILL BE ENOUGH TO KILL THOSE WHO SURVIVE THE BLAST.

MODERN CIVILIZATION AS WE KNOW IT WOULD BE DESTROYED. PREPARE FOR MASSIVE EPIDEMICS AS THE BODIES BEGIN TO THAW.

NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BLOCK OUT THE SUN.

NUCLEAR WAR WILL ACCELERATE CLIMATE CHANGE.

ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, AND SOCIALLY NUCLEAR WAR WILL UPEND SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF COUNTRIES.

SOME OF THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ARE UNKNOWN; WORSE EFFECTS MAY ARISE FROM THEM.
THE ENVIRONMENT IS KEY TO HUMAN SURVIVAL – NUCLEAR WINTER FINISHES OFF HUMANITY.

A USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TODAY WOULD DEVASTATE DEMOCRACIES

NUCLEAR WAR IMMEDIATELY KILLS 400-500 MILLION PEOPLE.

THE RADIATION AND NUCLEAR WINTER RESULTING FROM NUCLEAR WAR ENDS HUMANITY.

NUCLEAR WAR ESCALATES TOO QUICKLY TO BE STOPPED BEFORE EXTINCTION.

ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON HAS AWFUL IMPACTS ON BIODIVERSITY, THREATENING TO ANNIHILATE THE WORLD

NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE SUCH HORRIBLE EFFECTS, THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO STOP THEM

NUCLEAR WAR IS NEVER ANYTHING LESS THAN GENOCIDE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DO NOT RECOGNIZE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS.

THERE WILL BE A SYSTEMATIC FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY

DEEP CUTS ARE NECESSARY TO ESCAPE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WINTER.

IRAN

WAR IN IRAN WILL GO GLOBAL – PREVENTING ESCALATION IS IMPOSSIBLE.

IRAN IS THE KEY TEST FOR NON-PROLIFERATION - FAILURE MEANS THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST GOES NUCLEAR, ENSURING ESCALATORY REGIONAL WAR

IRAN IS KEY TO NON PROLIFERATION EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

CHINA

CHINA IS A THREAT TO THE ENTIRETY OF ASIA. WILL CATALYZE SOUTHEAST ASIAN PROLIFERATION.

CHINA IS QUICKLY STRIVING TO BECOME A DOMINANT GLOBAL POWER BOTH WITH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

CHINESE READINESS IS HIGH, THEY CAN’T BE DETERRED.

CHINA COULD DESTROY THE UNITED STATES

NPT FAILS

THE NPT IS TOO OLD TO HANDLE THE PERILS OF THE MODERN AGE, IT IS OUTDATED.

THE NPT IS FUELING ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENTS

THE NPT HAS NO CREDIBILITY, IT CAN’T STOP PROLIFERATION

THE NPT INCREASES PROLIFERATION AND UNCERTAINTY.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PROLIFERATION DON’T SOLVE

NPT INCREASES ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPON TECHNOLOGY MEAN AN INCREASE IN PROLIF

THE NPT IS A LOST CAUSE

THE NPT WORSENS PROLIFERATION ABROAD

MISSILE DEFENSE FAILS

BECAUSE OF EXTENSIVE DELAYS, THE BMD IS UNTESTED AND NOT RELIABLE

BECAUSE IT IS UNTESTED, THE BMD HAS NO DETERRENCE VALUE TO POTENTIAL ENEMIES

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE DOES NOT WORK; IT IS NO PROTECTION AGAINST A FIRST-STRIKE

AT DISARMAMENT CREATES NUCLEAR WASTE

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS DETERMINED THAT NUCLEAR WASTE SITES ARE SECURE ENOUGH TO PREVENT ENVIRONMENT OR HEALTH DAMAGES
THE HEALTH AFFECTS ARE MINIMAL GIVEN THE LOW LEVEL OF RADIATION THAT WOULD OCCUR AND WOULD DEVELOP SLOWLY OVER TIME. RESEARCH IS INCONCLUSIVE ON THE AFFECTS OF RADIATION. WE WON’T KNOW THE TRUE CONSEQUENCES FOR YEARS TO COME. DESPITE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT STORAGE FACILITIES, THE TECHNOLOGY IS IMPROVING.

NEW TECHNOLOGY ALLOWS NUCLEAR WASTE TO BE REUSED IN NUCLEAR ENERGY PLANTS THAT WOULD DRASTICALLY REDUCE THE RADIOACTIVE LIFETIME OF THE MATERIALS.

AT DUAL USE

THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS “PEACEFUL” NUKES – ALL USES GIVE INFORMATION ON HOW TO BETTER DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BAD DESTRUCTION HURTS, ALSO EXPLOSIONS MAKE IT A SHOTGUN EFFECT.

THERE ARE NO THREATENING ASTEROIDS, AND NUKES ARE BAD AT DEFLECTING THEM.

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS ARE A RIDICULOUS SOLUTION TO OIL SPILLS.

ASTEROID DESTRUCTION BY NUKES IS DANGEROUS AND IMPractical.

USING NUKES TO STOP OIL SPILLS WOULD EMIT RADIATION INTO THE AIR.

IF ALIENS WANT US DEAD, WE WILL HAVE NO CHANCE. PREPARATION IS A WASTE OF TIME.

IMPERIALISM

THE NPT IS THE ROOT OF THE NUCLEAR DOMINATION OF THE THIRD WORLD.

THE THIRD WORLD POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS DESCRIBED IN PATRIARCHAL TERMS.

THE THIRD WORLD POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS DESCRIBED IN PATERNAL TERMS.

THE DISCOURSE SURROUNDING THIRD WORLD POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS OPPRESSIVE.

THE DISCOURSE ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND POSSESSION BLAMES THE WRONG PEOPLE.

EXTINCTION SCENARIOS FROM NUCLEAR WAR ARE CHAUVINISTIC.

“CIVILIAN RESISTANCE” ALTERNATIVE

CIVILIAN RESISTANCE EXPLAINED

CIVILIAN RESISTANCE BEST DETERS A NUCLEAR ATTACK

CIVILIAN RESISTANCE DOES NOT RELY MERELY ON GUILT

IF DETERRENCE IS MORAL BECAUSE OF ITS NECESSITY, CIVILIAN RESISTANCE MUST BE GRAPPLED WITH TO DECLARE IT MORAL.

MISCELLANEOUS

NUCLEAR POWER IS TOO RISKY AND IS BASED ON THE UNRELIABLE METHOD OF TRIAL-AND-ERROR.

LEARNING BY DOING IN THE CASE OF NUCLEAR POWER IS DANGEROUS.

NUCLEAR WAR VIOLATES SOVEREIGNTY.

NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT A PERMISSIBLE FORM OF SELF-DEFENSE.

NEITHER SIDE IS JUSTIFIED IN LAUNCHING A NUCLEAR WAR.

NEGATIVE EVIDENCE

DISARMAMENT IMPOSSIBLE

DISARMAMENT IS UNREALISTIC. ACCEPT THE NUCLEAR STATE.
ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IMPOSSIBLE GIVEN THE CURRENT WORLD.

FULLY GETTING RID OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IMPOSSIBLE

**Unilateral Disarmament Bad**

Disarmament could lead to nuclear destruction.

Giving up US nuclear deterrence could precipitate the most dangerous war in history.

The US can’t fill the nuclear deterrent gap with conventional forces.

U.S. deterrence stops proliferation amongst its allies

**Deterrence/MAD Succeeds**

Even if a nation is lead by someone deemed “irrational” nuclear deterrence will keep them in.

Nuclear weapons uniquely allow for deterrence.

Even between heavily-armed states, a full-blown nuclear war is unlikely

Arms races are not inevitable since a large force is unnecessary to deter

Arms reduction treaties are likely

The threats posed by Russia and China require continued possession of nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapons have a strong historical track record

India and Pakistan provide a strong model for the continuing role of nuclear deterrence

Iran and North Korea are both subject to the logic of deterrence

Reduction of nuclear weapons is better than abolition since it retains their deterrent value

Deterrence prevented war between the US and the USSR.

Mere possession is sufficient for deterrence.

Even after deep cuts, nukes deter – and the cuts prevent nuclear winter.

Nuclear proliferation helps maintain peace, and prevents war

Nuclear acquisition prevents conflict amongst proliferating nations

Nuclear weapons are being developed by many nations as a self-defense mechanism.

Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East will not cause war or a nuclear terrorist attack

Nuclear proliferation leads to peace

Nuclear proliferation will lead to decreased violence, and less likeliness of war.

Atomic weapons have brought peace, and example is the Cold War, or Long Peace

Proliferation deters large-scale regional war

Proliferation prevents miscalculations of damage which empirically causes the bloodiest wars
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Topic Analysis by Ryan Hamilton

This topic has a lot of promise – but there are a lot of traps that debaters must work hard to avoid lest they inflict upon judges and one another a boring debate that has no substantial clash and few educational merits. To that end, it is my advice that debaters work hard to either affirm or negate the resolution on its basis as a normative ethical claim rather than on any kind of act-actor grounds. I think there are several good reasons why debaters should choose this interpretation of the resolution: first, it is clearly what the author of this resolution intended. There are some topics these days that focus on an actor or use a particular term of art that invites an advocacy that is hyperspecific – this is not one of them. More to the point, if someone asked another: should states possess nuclear weapons? And the other party replied: Iran ought not possess nuclear weapons, the asking party would probably say “That doesn’t answer my question.” It might be tempting to take the path which requires less intellectual rigor – but that is a path what has no destination that include sense.

Second, any engagement of implementation of plans requires debaters – the most advanced of which are still only high school students with perhaps one or two civics or government classes on their CV – to engage in rank speculation regarding the nature and way any country might chose to disarm or the political ramifications of joining this treaty or that. I have sat through a great many practice rounds already and the most boring and narrow debates were between two debaters forwarding case positions that required them to speculate on the nuclear weapons firing protocol between countries who may or may not have been minutes away from blowing us all away in a horrible nuclear holocaust because of some flock of birds or whatever or what Israel must do to satisfy its irrational enemies in the near east. Let’s face it: you’re not Madeleine Albright and neither am I.

Third, it doesn’t make any sense. You’d necessarily need an agreement or imperative that states ought not possess nuclear weapons prior to engaging in any type of debate regarding disarmament – an ethical debate about the merits of the topic would necessarily precede any debate about how best to form a reality around the normative claim should it be affirmed – so why not just have that debate? The alternative is to skirt the issue and try to shove a square peg in a very round hole – sometimes so forcefully that it can only be described as a sort of intellectually violent action. For instance, if the topic were: individuals ought not lie, the most proper debate would be about how others have rights to the truth and how lying calls into question the notion of truth in the first place. Once that proposition has been affirmed, and only once it has – can we move on to discuss methods by which we try to order society or moral systems around its validity. But the veracity of the claim must first be established. It is not clear, independent of the capability
to disarm all countries immediately, whether or not states have any kind of imperative to not possess them.

Lastly, the sort of debate found above doesn’t educate anyone regarding moral truth and vastly increases the breadth of research debaters will need to be competitive or even slightly authoritative in their claims. They will have to research all combinations of two (or more) of the 9 known nuclear powers to be topical (since states means two or more) and then, when it comes to implementation, research particular methods of disarmament, understand which economies can support which measures, and so on and so on. This might be easier to understand and is certainly more straightforward, but my advice is to stop the madness before it starts and write a case position that engages the moral and ethical issues that exist in the abstract and does not require any knowledge of the minutia that might result from any plans of disarmament that happen post-affirmation.

The alternative seems to avoid these pitfalls and provide an excellent opportunity for students to discuss and engage in philosophical debate about ethical prescriptions. Whether or not nuclear weapons – the sole purpose of which is to destroy on a magnitude so vast that we can hardly understand it, or to threaten that destruction to coerce others to act in such a way as we wish – are ethical is a question that is ripe for the picking. These sorts of debate, however, require an intellectual rigor – understanding moral concepts does not come easy to most of us, myself included. It requires reflection and meditation on concepts, going through examples trying to distill a clear principle. Please do not give up during your research periods – forge ahead, read one more page, look up one more explanation.

Once that process is done, most of the cases that follow the above advice will probably include a lot of framework. Give judges a very clear value and criterion structure that sets your argumentation up for success. I have no small stake in this – as a judge, I feel the argument about the way in which I should evaluate the arguments is probably the most interesting part of the debates.

I will outline some case positions for both sides below, starting with the affirmative.

**Affirming:**

First, and most obviously to me, is a case position that is consistent with a deontological understanding of ethics. Nuclear weapons are not ends in themselves, they are only instruments – typically of foreign policy or warfare – that seek the ends of a greater strategy. The key to that strategy is to threaten force so great that no actor – rational or otherwise – would ever defy an ultimatum where nuclear destruction were the consequence. There are two parts to the action: threat of force and it seems inevitable, use of force. But it is difficult to warrant claims that nuclear
weapons will necessarily be used in the future, and even then, it engages in the sort of rank speculation of which I have already spoken ill. But the threat seems to me to meet a threshold of violation of rights – it treats individuals strictly as a means to a greater strategic policy of coercion. This clearly means that states in possession of nuclear weapons violate a fair treatment of individuals standard by ignoring that individuals are ends in and of themselves, not slaves to some greater foreign policy objective by their home country or a foreign one. In this way, the possession of nuclear weapons is immoral because of the way it makes objects out of people – lives become the collateral of foreign policy strategies, numbers to be added together.

This position has several advantages, if you ask me: first, it avoids the debates about implementation that I have already discussed. Second, it doesn’t speculate on this, but rather speaks to the nature of mere possession of nuclear weapons without considering their particular use. All one must do is set up a framework whereby individuals ought to be treated as ends in themselves, warrant the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, easily enough done, warrant that the threat of said destruction itself is a sufficient enough violation of the standard and you have yourself a good starter affirmative case position.

I have given significant time to reflection on whether or not the nature of a nuclear weapon – with its implications for destruction and coercive power – is not so contrary to a free living and purposeful advancement of the species through time and space that it violates ethical standards by its nature alone. I think it is fairly reasonable to hold that the intention to destroy one’s enemy is not altogether immoral depending on the situation – but who can argue that the destruction be carried out when it has the capability to not just destroy one’s enemy but to annihilate him complete and along with him all mankind and even rob life of its home here on Earth – which nuclear weapons, by their very nature, do. If the idea can be rejected as immoral, then certainly there are sufficient dangers associated with the material object, the bomb itself, which are so offensive to our code of ethics which is meant to protect and promote life. This, of course, is a somewhat mystical case that would require a great deal to warrant in the framework, but it is not without literature in the academic world. When the topic was first released, I immediately researched what Bertrand Russell had to say about the issue. He is perhaps the most famous global zero (before it was called that) academic who found the nature of nuclear weapons, vis a vis their destructive power, to simply be incompatible with our humanity. Indeed, his famous radio address, Man’s Peril ends with a call for individuals to remember their humanity and forget all else. The underlying assumption of Russell’s objection to nuclear weapons was that they posed a risk not only to Soviets or Americans, to capitalists or communists, but to the advancement of the species into the future. For all of his liberal atheism, Russell saw in nuclear weapons the ultimate threat to a conservative position: he looked to what we’d accomplished, to how we gained from our surroundings an understanding of working, created beautiful works of art
and music. He liked what he saw, and thought that it ought to be preserved. Any threat to its preservation, particularly threats over which we as a species have control, ought to be eliminated out of hand.

Additionally, this gives the opportunity for local debaters to introduce new philosophies that aren’t outrageous to their circuits to not only raise the level of discourse but get a head start on college philosophy classes. This summer I was fortunate enough to assist in the philosophy focus week at the Victory Briefs Institute where was taught contractualism. Contractualism can be summed up in an easy and debate-packaged way: we form normative ethical codes on propositions which cannot be reasonably rejected. In other words, morality has a lot to do with actions which can be justified to others. It seeks to combine the best elements of consequential frameworks and deontic frameworks and create positions that neither could reasonably reject. The next thing to warrant is how undue harm to innocent parties is not justified by this ethical framework because of the lack of a convincing justification — even if the affirmative debater concedes that civilians in two or more warring parties can be considered collateral to the opposing state, nuclear weapons have consequences that will necessarily negatively effect innocent parties who aren’t part of the conflict — as small as radiation, air, and water pollution and as large as a cataclysmic nuclear winter that wipes out all life on Earth. Insofar as any use of nuclear weapons will inevitably harm uninvolved, innocent third parties to a conflict, their possession is unjust.

Negating:

The most attractive negative position, for me, comes out of an article by Hans Morgenthau called *The 6 Principles of Political Realism* that is easily found by a Google search mixed in with a little basic social contract theory. Morgenthau differentiates between the obligations of individuals and the obligations of states: since individuals operate on their own behalf, they are readily able to self-sacrifice since theirs is the only agency that goes down with them. States, on the other hand, exercise power on behalf of others and therefore can not engage in self-sacrificing actions because they would violate the agency of the individuals they are meant to protect. In this way, states should certainly not surrender nuclear weapons, doing so would be a major abrogation of what they are expected to do — then, states ought to acquire and accumulate weapons with this end in mind: protect the citizens. This furthers the state’s ethical obligation to protect its citizens and makes it a moral pursuit. It also has a “let’s get real” approach about the world approach — states do not exist in utopian settings where most people get along, but rather a “state of nature” more like what Thomas Hobbes described — caught between imperialism and regional tensions, states should be looking to how to best navigate the international system in a way that serves their best interests, and not subject to some high falutin’
moral charge that forces them to abandon what have turned out to be extraordinarily useful tools. More to the point, these weapons are part of a very rare genus whereby states with small or nonexistent conventional armies have the capability of pushing back against larger forces that are typically trying to exert control or exercise influence contrary to a weaker state’s good. The sort of naiveté engendered by the affirmative position only compounds the problem: it leaves states ill equipped to protect their citizens in an increasingly hostile international realm.

Indeed, basic social contract theory tells us that we give up certain rights to states in exchange for protection, and insofar as nuclear weapons exist, it makes sense that the state should seek to acquire them to further its goal of protecting its charges. No person would ever enter into a social contract knowing that their particular state would preference everyone the same regardless of borders – this idea rather negates the entire point of the social contract. Therefore, if states have any obligations to their citizens they must first uphold those in order for any subsequent action to be moral or just or credible – it is therefore not immoral to possess nuclear weapons, but rather the possession of instruments which further the duty of the state can be pro-actively moral and a hinge on which all further state action may be judged as immoral if they surrender the weapons.

All of this is just a starting point – I hope you’ll consider my advice as you embark on case writing and researching. Best of luck to you all!
**Topic Analysis by Tara Norris**

Resolved: States ought not possess nuclear weapons. New school year, new debate camp tricks to try, new resolution...and now a resolution that gets at the debate that other international relations topics imply. Since “nuke war” is the “ultimate impact,” how do we debate about the morality of nuclear weapons?

**Framework-y-ness**

The first order of business when determining frameworks in this resolution is figuring out the burdens. This isn’t straightforward in this resolution, and there are a lot of possible interpretations, but I think the simplest and most obvious one is the following:

Aff has to prove that nuclear weapons are bad, and thus states are morally obliged to not possess them.

Neg has to prove that there is a morally legitimate reason to possess nuclear weapons.

The two basic case structures for proving moral obligation are 1) rule based, or 2) consequential. A rule based, or deontological, model is one that puts forth a moral rule that cannot be violated no matter what beneficial consequences would arise. An AC with this structure should warrant the moral rule (and explain why it is pertinent to states) in the framework and explain why nuclear weapons violate at the contention level. A consequentialist framework depends on weighing the costs and benefits of taking a specific action (in this case, possessing or not possessing nuclear weapons). In LD, debaters often limit the kinds of costs or benefits that will be weighed in the value criterion, and in this resolution (as with many others), that value criterion will probably be something like “maximizing the protection of life.”

The following definitions are from dictionary.com, which means they’ll probably be the most common on this topic.

State, singular: a politically unified people operating a definite territory; nation. The resolution says “states”, however, meaning the affirmative is textually obligated advocate that more than one state not possess nuclear weapon, however much more fair a single-state advocacy might be.

Possess: to have as belonging to one.

Nuclear weapons: an explosive device whose destructive potential derives from the release of energy that accompanies the splitting or combining of atomic nuclei. So nuclear energy is definitely not off the table.
Dr. Strangelove

As I said above, you have the option of running a deontological framework: that possessing nuclear weapons is immoral not because of the bad consequences that might arise from having them, but because there is some inherent moral violation in a state having such a weapon. Why might nuclear weapons be immoral? Well, for one thing, they are made to kill a ton of people. If, under a deontological framework, morality is about intent, the intent of having nuclear weapons is to gain a strategic advantage through killing the enemy. This is the simplest deontological argument you could make: that it is immoral to possess something that was made to do evil. An alternate violation could be that nuclear weapons are meant to violate the rules of civilian immunity. When you detonate a nuclear weapon, it doesn’t just affect the enemy military. Nuclear fallout would certainly threaten civilians, even if the blast was somehow contained. The principle of civilian immunity can be considered a moral rule, and nuclear weapons cannot abide by it, so possessing them is a violation. A variant of this argument is that the threat of causing civilian harm, even if that harm will never occur, is a moral violation, because a) at some level, the nation levying the threat must be prepared to carry it out, and b) threatening immoral behavior and influencing actions on that threat, through fear, is immoral as well (think of it this way: if I told a parent that I would torture their child unless they gave me $100, and they did it, it would still be immoral, even if I was bluffing and had they not given me the money I would have left the child alone.) Threatening suffering to achieve an end goal, which is all deterrence really is, treats nations, and the individual decision-makers within those nations, as a means to an end.

Consequentialist cases will, I think, be more common as affirmatives, because the topic gives an apparent advantage to affirmatives claiming nuclear war as an impact, which even in non-WMD topics is the gold standard for giant impacts. However, the first thing to consider, before we even get to aff arguments, is: what kind of world does the aff get access to, and thus, from what state of affairs can she reasonably claim impacts? The most balanced and textual interpretation seems to me to be: a world where no states possess nuclear weapons. BUT: some nations have nuclear weapons now, meaning the affirmative should defend disarmament for these nations. The aff doesn’t get access to counterfactual ground, like “The world would be better if nuclear weapons had never existed,” because there is no specific textual basis for that interpretation, there would be no literature for the negative to use formulating arguments, and there is no action for the affirmative to defend (implicitly with a vague advocacy or explicitly with a plan text) against the negative status quo. However, there will definitely be good and legitimate (in my opinion) theory arguments that granting the aff the power to argue that multiple nations ought do something is
unfair, because that is not a decision that any single entity can ever make (for example, the US Congress might be able to decide that the US will disarm, but not that the US and Russia will both disarm). In a deontological world, this doesn’t matter, because each individual actor would be committing (or not committing) a deontological violation by possessing the weapons and ought not to do so regardless of what other nations do. Leaving aside these theoretical issues for now, though, we can move on to the stock consequentialist affs.

For the most part, cases with consequentialist frameworks will deal with nuclear detonation. There is a pretty standard link chain going from detonation to extinction: first a nuclear attack is launched, which turns into nuclear exchange either because the country being attacked has an arsenal or because it has allies with one, and the conflict expands to include the big nations (usually, the argument is that the US will aid X nation, and China or Russia will seize the opportunity as a way to counterbalance US power and aid the opposing nations), leading to a global nuclear war, which causes nuclear winter, which leads everything to become extinct. Whew. For one reason or another, 95% of debates do not even touch this link chain. Most of the debate will center on whether the initial detonation actually occurs. There are a couple of ways to access nuclear detonation:

- Accidental launches. This is pretty basic: it’s late, the night watchman is bored, he’s had a couple of beers, he stumbles into the big red button that says, “don’t push.” There are actually several ways that such detonations might occur (although if a nuclear weapon were really unstable, that would mean that it was more likely to detonate on a nation’s own soil than make it all the way past the border in any direction. Since the negative isn’t forced to defend universal proliferation, however, it would be a good idea to outline where such an accident might be likely, given current technology. The US is unlikely to accidentally launch a nuclear warhead into Canada. North Korea might be a little more likely. If nothing else, the aff should outline why future proliferators might end up being unable to completely control their nuclear weapons.

- Pre-emptive strike. This is when a nation launches a nuclear strike at an enemy for the purpose of crippling their capabilities (or their resolve) and preventing such an attack on themselves. A nation could do this because they are either misinformed or under-informed and therefore think that an attack in imminent. A nation could, due to close proximity to their enemy, be unable to determine if an attack was coming before it came and therefore have to act during tense times without knowing if the enemy had already launched weapons. A nation could be concerned about their own second-strike capabilities (the ability to respond after being hit with a nuclear strike), and therefore attempt to incapacitate the other nation before being possibly unable to act. A tense situation in international relations can lead to detonation.
Rogue leaders: Deterrence works because leaders know not to launch their nuclear weapons. If they do, they know that their own nations will be subject to the destruction of a nuclear attack. The benefit from launching an attack would never be worth the devastation of being hit with a nuclear attack. However, leaders who were motivated by achieving gain (particularly ideological gain) and willing to take on big risks might use nuclear weapons. Also, non-democratic leaders lack the check of popular approval on their actions, and so might risk more of the lives of their people for potential gains. Also, leaders are not the only ones with potential access to these weapons. If a nation lacked sufficient safeguards, a small group of military leaders with skewed conceptions of the international political arena could launch the weapons.

Another possible case could deal with the process of creating nuclear weapons themselves. I don’t know how up-to-date it is, but there is certainly evidence that mining for nuclear material is environmentally harmful. Environmental impacts can garner the same extinction potential as nuclear impacts. You should also include the risk analysis for the impacts: even if it’s just that the chance of extinction outweighs all other impacts, have that in the AC.

Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb

There is the question of negative burden. Does the negative have to defend proliferation? I would say not in most debates, which means Iran might not be a topical AC. The negative does have to defend, however, states that currently possess nuclear weapons. I think without an explicit counterplan, no states in the negative world can disarm; a counterplan with more than one state disarming could possibly be considered a topical counterplan and could spark a theory debate, as well. But if the resolution is a general statement, and no states have nuclear weapons in the affirmative world, then the negative could defend more limited possession of nuclear weapons than exists in the status quo.

There are a couple of possible deontological positions on the negative. I think it would be a good idea for most negatives to have a deontological case in their file, because you can force an affirmative to answer the case even when they might clearly outweigh any consequentialist negative case you might want to run, then you can focus on AC turns. The goal is to set up a right to nuclear weapons. The first would be the right to self-defense: set up that states have a right to defend themselves, and nuclear weapons are procured for defense. They are not created (at
least not since the earliest bombs) as offensive weaponry, but as a form of defense to protect the society. The justification for self-defense can come from the social contract (that the only moral obligation states are under is to protect their citizens), or consensus from the international community. Another deontological justification could be intent-based: that nations who possess nuclear weapons with the intent of deterring conventional war are morally justified (although this would be a weak argument on which to base an entire case).

Negatives interested in consequentialist positions should be able to access issues with disarmament implementation. The resolution would only demand that the action of disarmament occur, but for this to be desirable the possible disadvantages of disarmament should be considered.

- Conventional deterrence: This argument will probably be the most common on the topic. States are rational actors, so they recognize that a nuclear exchange could be a huge cost, and they will try to avoid that at all costs. Obviously this means not launching a nuclear weapon themselves, but it also means not engaging in conventional conflict, because such conflict can escalate to the point of involving nuclear weapons. Because of the risk of nuclear involvement, states are better served by staving off any armed conflict because of the potential risks. This means that with nuclear weapons, there is less war overall.

- Nuclear terrorism: Nuclear weapons possessed by states make the risk of nuclear terrorism less likely. This is either because 1) terrorists are deterred by states (this is the weaker of the two arguments) or 2) terrorists are likely to be able to access nuclear material during the process of disarmament, because of decreased security guarding the nuclear material that has not yet been reprocessed.

- Chemical weapons/ Bioweapons: This argument is that nuclear weapons were the WMD of choice, and kept states and terrorist groups from investing in chemical or biological weapons, which have the potential to kill as many people as nuclear weapons (or could possibly be more dangerous, because bioweapons are uncontrollable once unleashed). However, to win this argument, a debater would have to establish a really good reason why nuclear weapons prevent development of chemical or biological weapons, particularly by terrorists, to prevent their impacts being non-unique. It seems to me that smaller terrorist organizations or states without the ability to sustain a nuclear program would have an incentive to invest in such technology, as it tends to be smaller and cheaper than nuclear technology.
Overall, I think this topic can be interesting if debaters do the research (beyond this shallow survey of common arguments) and try to understand how this might affect, for example, the international balance of power (one thing I didn’t talk about that will probably be common are hegemony arguments: US has the most powerful conventional military in the world in addition to the largest nuclear arsenal), or what happens to nuclear material during disarmament. I look forward to seeing some interesting debates on this topic, and good luck!
Topic Analysis by Christian Keil

INTRODUCTION

When dealing with policy oriented resolutions, debaters often skip over the framework debate – they agree to a net-benefit standard, have little to no definitional/observational analysis, and spend the rest of their time talking about how many people would die from the nuclear war, genocide, or what have you. With this resolution, one that explicitly focuses on the most deadly, dangerous weapon the world has ever seen, the urge to avoid framework will be stronger than ever.

In the following sections, I will explain how a focus on framework might yield interesting positions, create unique divisions of ground, and even exclude the stock arguments (nuke war bad, deterrence, theft) that are sure to be run in a good number of rounds on this topic.

DEFINITONAL ANALYSIS

Nations:

1) a large body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or to possess a government peculiarly its own: The president spoke to the nation about the new tax. 2) the territory or country itself: the nations of Central America.

The obvious function of the inclusion of “nations” in the resolution (as opposed to having it be without an actor, e.g. Resolved: The possession of nuclear weapons is unjust) is to exclude non-state actors like terrorists, people from a given cultural group, or any range of non-governmental organizations. As the word “nations” refers to either a distinct set of people under a government, or that government itself, the resolution’s primary focus would seem to be on the implication of countries possessing nuclear weapons.

This is likely to be the extent of the discussion of “nations” in most rounds, but, as will be a theme throughout this analysis, I think that there are a number of topics here worth discussing. Here, the discussion will keep its focus on the exclusion/inclusion of non-state actors in a topical affirmation/negation, and explore alternate ways to impact the definition of “states” on both sides.

First, I think it’s important to note that many argument about non-state actors are still topical, even under the “states are nations” interpretation – for example, the affirmative argument that states ought not possess nuclear weapons because they can be stolen by terrorists. This

argument is acceptable, as it is still based on the states’ possession. A position that argued that terrorists (not states) ought not possess nuclear weapons, conversely, would be excluded under our interpretation, as it wouldn’t draw the link between state and terrorist possession. Simply, as long as arguments about non-state actors are tied to state possession in some way, they are legitimate.

That said, I think that it is possible (as it nearly always is) to theoretically defend the alternate structuring of a terrorist affirmative case. This will depend largely on the interpretational question of what affirming truly entails, which I will discuss in more depth later, but if affirming just means no nukes, non-state actors might be included in the body of people who wouldn’t be able to have them. Also, if the affirmative issues the judgment of “nuclear weapons are bad” on purely ethical grounds and ignores the implementation and real world consequences of the action of the resolution, they could contend that their case argues nuclear weapons are always bad, no matter who has them.

Another relevant point regarding our definition of “states” concerns the potential difference between the two definitions given above. While the two definitions seem quite similar, a smart affirmative could exploit the difference to further bolster a non-state-actor-based position. Using the first definition (people in a particular territory), it would seem to mean that an affirmation takes away weapons from all people living in a recognized “state” in the world. For example, if the resolution read, “States ought not have candy,” we would expect that government, in addition to destroying their candy stockpiles, would also mandate that all civilian candy be destroyed. Affirming the statement “states ought not possess nuclear weapons,” then, would entail that not only governments destroy their stockpiles, but that all citizens within a state (like terrorists) would be forced to destroy their nuclear weapons as well, at least under the first definition given above.

At the very least, it should be clear from the above analysis that your analysis of “nations” should serve to isolate which actors are acceptable to include in the resolutions judgment. It is important to consider all words and possible interpretations of the resolution when crafting an affirmative (or negative) case, and this is no exception: just decide which arguments you want to be allowed or disallowed, and define “states” accordingly. If your case is particularly reliant on the definition of states, it is probably a good idea to bolster the definition with a justification or two, just because it is so contentious.

Ought (Not)²:

1) Used to indicate moral obligation: they ought to respect the law. 2) Used to indicate desirability: he ought to be able to take the initiative. 3) Used to indicate logical consequence: If you drop an apple, it ought to fall.

² Adapted definitions from dictionary.com, to reflect the common phrasing of such definitions in debate.
I’ll spare you a lengthy discussion of ought – I’m sure you’ve debated/coached “ought” resolutions in the past and know the potential implications of each definition, how to implement each type, etc. Regardless, I’ll touch on each quickly and make one general observation, just to be sure we’re all on the same page.

The “logical consequence” definition is largely inapplicable to debate – aside from really weird, questionably topical arguments like “states will not possess nuclear weapons in the future, quantum physics says that blablabla” – there are no real, useful, topical applications.

The “desirability” definition is one that generally implicates a consequential view of morality, i.e. we look to whatever action creates the most desirable world in the end. I expect most cases on the topic to use this definition, just due to the big impact stories that are available (nuclear war, winter, and the like) as discussed earlier.

Finally, we have the “moral obligation” definition, one generally used with rules-based or deontological conceptions of morality. This definition will (of course) be used to justify running the normal “killing is bad” position, but can also be used to justify much more interesting positions – the international treaties affirmative, as an example. The argument would go something like this: because the only real “rules” that can apply to all states are international treaties, any given state ought to be bound by treaties that most agree are legitimate, and since there are a number that would presumably affirm – the NPT\(^3\), START\(^4\), and CTBT\(^5\), to name a few – it would follow that states ought not possess nuclear weapons.

Aside from the definitions themselves, there is one more general question that must always be asked when debating morality – is it necessary that we prove the actions of the resolution are practical, or even possible for states to take, or is justifying them on a purely philosophical basis enough? There is no true answer to this question, as we will discuss later, but this is important to note here: the definition you choose of “ought” can have an impact on the practicality vs. idealism debate.

possess\(^6\):

1) Have as belonging to one; own: I do not possess a television set. 2) Have possession of as distinct from ownership: a two-year suspended sentence for possessing cocaine.

The definition of possess seems fairly simple: if a nation possesses a nuclear weapon, it just means that they have it. This is, I feel, one of the definitions that will be the least necessary to include in a case – I can’t see much ground for controversy in the “possess” debate. It does seem like in a normal setting, the two definitions for possess would pose a potential problem, or area for

\(^3\) Go to Wikipedia for a fairly comprehensive summary – the full text of the treaty is available here: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infirc140.pdf
\(^4\) Awesome description/numerous descriptions: http://www.state.gov/t/vci/trty/126118.html
\(^5\) Full text: http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treatytext.tt.html
conflict (i.e. possessing versus owning a drug), but here, the two seem to imply the same thing – they are currently in the control of some state that can use them at their discretion.

There are only really two nuanced ideas that stem from “possess” that I’ve heard of/thought of thus far. First is the idea that states ought to possess nuclear weapons to prevent their use. The position would be sneaky, probably nontopical, and would evade the true meaning of the topic, but don’t be surprised if someone tries to run the argument that “possess means have, states don’t have the nukes any more if they use them.” A silly argument, but something to be ready for – someone’s bound to do it.

The second idea is slightly better, but still probably won’t find very much use in the average debate round. I could see affirmatives trying to argue that some sort of neutral party ought to control the weapons use – a multinational organization like NATO for example – solving back the harm of nations using them in war, but still garnering the deterrent benefit (should a country use a nuke against another, this neutral party would allow retaliation). Again, not the most persuasive argument to begin with, but as the weapons would need to be housed somewhere, the second definition of possess would seem to exclude the neutral party affirmative – even if states don’t control them, they still “possess” them.

In sum, be ready for some bad and groan-worthy “possess” debates if they do occur at all. I think that both sides would be best just agreeing that possess means own, and leaving it at that – this should be a relative peaceful section of a good debate on this topic.

Nuclear Weapons7:

1) a weapon of mass destruction whose explosive power derives from a nuclear reaction.

“Nuclear weapons” is another easy definition; nuclear weapons are extremely powerful weapons that are powered by fission or fusion. The only question begged by the dictionary’s definition is this: what is a weapon? I think the answer to this question could be used to effectively exclude a variety of negative arguments – but before jumping ahead to the consequences of our response, let’s attempt to answer the question.

The two definitions that I can find are indeed quite different. The first, from Houghton Mifflin8, defines a weapon as “an instrument of attack or defense in combat, as a gun, missile, or sword.” This seems to be an adequate definition of a nuclear weapon – it even specifically mentions a “missile,” which would seem to fit. The second, however, seems to work as well. Merriam-Webster9 defines a weapon as “something (as a club, knife, or gun) used to injure, defeat, or destroy.”

7 Princeton Wordnet.
8 http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/weapon
9 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/weapon
While the two definitions may not seem to pose a unique threat, the first, if won, could be used to exclude a variety of negative positions: those that argue for a peaceful use of nuclear weapons, be it to end oil spills, or destroy asteroids. These positions are actually supported in a good body of topic literature, however ridiculous they may seem. It was suggested multiple times as a feasible solution to the recent gulf oil spill\(^\text{10}\), and both the United States and Russia experimented with peaceful uses of nuclear weapons after the cold war\(^\text{11}\).

These positions do exist, but I think that a definition of “weapon” that limits the word to talk only about those devices used in combat would clearly exclude peaceful uses of nuclear weapons. Even if the affirmative rids the world of nuclear weapons, there could still be a stockpile of nuclear “devices” ready for oil spills and asteroids.

I won’t say which way I prefer in this debate, as I think it’s a good debate to have. As we will find in the following section, the resolution is less than clear about what it actually means to affirm – making what the affirmative claims to justify a hotly debated area – and the definition of “weapons” may be a normally overlooked input into that debate.

**INTERPRETATIONAL QUESTIONS**

While definitional analysis is surely relevant and occasionally interesting, there are much larger questions to ask about definitions that lack real context or specificity, as this one does. The questions to ask regarding this resolution are surely limitless, but I will attempt to address two that I feel have particular importance here.

Should the affirmative have to defend the implementation of the resolution’s judgment?

This a question that I alluded to earlier, and it’s a fairly straightforward question – should the affirmative be forced to defend the actual process of disarming and disassembling nuclear weapons?

In my opinion, they probably shouldn’t. First, I feel like forcing the affirmative to both defend implementation would make affirming unnecessarily hard – not only would they have to defend the action in principle, they would have to defend the real world implementation of the action. In a purely debate-centric focus, this would seem to be an unfair expectation of affirmatives, as negatives could presumably argue against either section and win. If the negative wins that the implementation would fail, they would win regardless of the outcome of the moral debate. The same holds for the opposite: even if the affirmative wins that disarming is possible, if

\(^{10}\) http://nyti.ms/9GPNLP

\(^{11}\) M.D. Nordyke [Professor of Nuclear Physics @ University of Arizona] "The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions," USDOE, September 1, 2000
they lose that it’s a good idea, they lose. Forcing affirmatives to defend implementation would seem to give them double the burden of the negative, and so it’s probably bad to use as an interpretation.

Also, I think that the resolution is primarily a question of the ethical value of a nuclear-free world. I would have no trouble believing both that states ought not have nuclear weapons and that it would impossible to safely disarm all nuclear weapons. The two statements don’t seem to clearly clash, making implementation arguments, at least in my mind, entirely irrelevant to the conflict of the resolution. It may be unrealistic to imagine a world without nuclear weapons, but that fact doesn’t seem to have a clear impact. I can still affirm that we ought to live in a world without violence, even if such a world couldn’t exist.

That being said, I do think there are persuasive arguments that support the alternate interpretation of the resolution. For example, I think if affirmatives want to garner ends-based impacts (nukes kill the world, nuclear winter, etc.), it would be reasonable to expect them to defend the ends-based impacts of disarmament (instability, power struggles, etc.). Affirmatives that argue only they should have access to ends-based impacts should be prepared to defend that interpretation, which could prove to be difficult.

Also, there is an extremely relevant educational concern – would it be beneficial from an educational perspective for us to debate an impossible resolution? I don’t think that the answer to this question is always no, but here, it might be a relevant concern. There is very, very little topic literature that discusses the implications of a world completely without nuclear weapons – even the authors like Carl Sagan that talk about the horrible impacts of nuclear war advocate “deep cuts” as opposed to universal disarmament. We’ll talk about this more in about a paragraph, but it is an important concern here. Sometimes, it might be beneficial for us to debate in purely ethical terms, but a good dose of the real world is necessary to keep debate grounded.

Ultimately, the choice between interpretations is a tough one, and one that will have to be debated out in a good number of rounds on this topic. I foresee this being one of the primary interpretational issues for September and October, which is why I mention it here. In the end, you should be ready to justify your answer, regardless of the decision you make – this is sure to be a contentious area of the topic.

Should the affirmative have to advocate universal disarmament?

As mentioned earlier, whether the affirmative can advocate universal disarmament is an extremely relevant concern to many conflicts on the topic – but I think it’s one that I have a much stronger opinion on: I don’t think that the affirmative should be forced to defend universal disarmament.
First, I think it could alleviate a good majority of the concerns outlined above if the affirmative would advocate a specific actor’s disarmament. Not only would it make the expectation of solvency/implementation defense significantly more reasonable, it could create an interesting area of clash; “Can (insert country here) effectively disarm?” is a much better debate than “can countries ever disarm successfully?” Also, it would solve the topic literature issue. There is extensive literature available discussing the ability of countries like the United States to peacefully disarm, and the potential problems/benefits of such disarmament.

There is, however, a relevant fairness concern for negatives – that they can’t predict which country or set of countries any given affirmative will choose – but I think that this is a pretty silly argument. There are only nine nations\textsuperscript{12} that currently possess nuclear weapons, so the negative would only have to prepare for nine different affirmative cases. The response of the negative is bound to be that an affirmative could choose any combination of the nine nuclear nations, but those arguments are bad for different reasons than their choice of an actor, and I’d love to see the article that contends the US, France, and Israel are the only nations that ought to disarm. Specifying a nation would at least give negatives a general idea of what they were about to debate, even if they couldn’t predict specifically what combination the affirmative they are currently debating ran.

Also, would it necessarily be the worst thing in the world to force debaters to be prepared for many different real-world actors? Forcing debaters to know a lot about many different nations is probably more of a good thing than it is bad – I would be hard pressed to think of a reason why we ought to preference interpretations that don’t force debaters to actually know anything that’s happening in the real world. This is in line with what I was talking about earlier under the first interpretational question, and could be the “good dose” of the real world that we need to stay grounded.

In the end, I feel like allowing the affirmative to choose between advocating a single actor or the entire resolution is a good idea. Surely, there will be those who disagree, and there will definitely be arguments made in round that explain why everything in the preceding section is false, but if forced to give a true answer, I think that the educational benefit and overall quality of debate that can occur under a single-state affirmative case is too enticing to categorically ignore.

**CONCLUSION**

Hopefully, I’ve done a good job to spark your framework creativity on this topic, but possibly the most important note of this analysis is this: the quest to discover unique interpretations and approaches to the resolution surely doesn’t end here.

\textsuperscript{12}United States, France, United Kingdom, Russia, China, North Korea, India, Israel, and Pakistan
This is but a sampling of the many interpretational and definitional issues that will surely be present on this topic – if you keep exploring the topic literature and thinking about the topic, you will surely find things that aren’t included in this analysis. Think about different ways to approach defining the terms of the resolution, different ways to draw impacts from those definitions, and consider entirely new framings of the resolution. I find that the most interesting and persuasive positions come from such thought – good luck!
Topic Analysis by Todd Rainey

This LD resolution is one that integrates a technology which brings forth new ethical dilemmas previously unknown, as never before the nuclear age was a weapon capable of wiping out life as we know it. Moreover, past weapons could be defended against, but in a nuclear world no city is safe, creating a unique vulnerability. As states exist in an international state of general anarchy, the resolution requires discussion of two points before looking at the way values and criteria will affect the debate.

Discussion on M.A.D.: The doctrine of mutually assured destruction has been the driving force behind nuclear weapons proliferation. In case you've been living under a rock (likely in fear of a nuclear attack), Mutually Assured Destruction is the notion that a nuclear attack on one power will be met with devastating retaliatory force, enough to deter any initial aggression between two nuclear powers. The relative lack of military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War has been attributed to this doctrine, although it can be contested by suggesting that other deterrents such as economic interest played a major role.

In the world of the resolution, it's important to note that the resolution does not say that states ought to possess nuclear weapons. This means that there is no resolution-specific mandate favoring expanded proliferation, or even preventing a treaty limiting the nuclear stockpiles of the world. That gives the affirmative some degree of ground to argue for or against M.A.D., although the vast body of literature that does support nuclear weapons would be based on the ideology. Thus, if the negative wants to bring up M.A.D., the debater must make certain to argue that the existence of nuclear technology necessarily leads to some degree of proliferation (and North Korea's nuclear tests have demonstrated the failure of the international community to prevent this trend).

The existence of nuclear technology: A common reply by supporters of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to naysayers is that ideally, our world might not have a single nuclear weapon, but even in a world of complete disarmament, the international community would have to remain vigilant against rogue states that violate the moral norms established by the international community. If so, what role – if any – would nuclear deterrence play against those actors? The affirmative will want to take very tight control over this part of the debate – first by playing to the extremity of the criterion. North Korea may be a quirky international entity, but it is still responsive to the same pressures as another country. Its aggression could – given the right set of sources – be reduced to a hungry nation making a play for resources, in which case a non-nuclear world would still have access to pressure points and deterrents. Moreover, rogue regimes often lack the same resources as the most powerful nations. The United States and Russia, for instance,
have the largest nuclear stockpiles while at the same time holding less aggressive nuclear stances than their smaller neighbors.

**Affirmative Values:**

I am aware that there are some out in the Lincoln-Douglas community who believe the value to be an outdated device. I beg to differ – not only are these people a minority who will have to fight uphill against judging bias, but LD’s value debate structure makes this a lot more important than many give it credit. In this debate, the affirmative wants to control the moral thrust of the debate, and since that happens before the first contention, the value is paramount. I propose three potential values to run for this case. They are:

**National Security.** National security is a value rooted in a morally relativistic compromise – in other words, by accepting varying cultural norms while providing those cultures with a degree of protection against imperialism, national sovereignty is the highest moral goal for which we can reach without imposing our own ethical considerations on others. Not only does every nation agree that its own national security is of prime importance, but the security of a nation is invariably correlated with the security of its own people, outliers notwithstanding.

National security is topically relevant, because the resolution 1) asks a very pointed question about states, the actors who pursue their own security; and 2) discusses a tool of mass destruction that has existed as a deterrent to conflict and destabilization for the last sixty years.

To rebut national security as a value, there exists the legitimate fear that its overemphasis leads to violence between countries. Preemptive warfare is often utilized on the grounds that it is better to strike the enemy before they are able to do damage to us on our homeland, and this destabilizing factor undermines the well-being of national citizens. To this the affirmative wants to stress that national security need not be a recommendation to policymakers as a result of affirming the resolution – simply that with regard to nuclear weapons, national security is the goal to consider.

**Human life.** Human life is what I call a policy value – because by using it as a value, you gamble on the effectiveness of a hypothetical course of action. Immoral actions lead to negative outcomes for others, while moral actions are more likely to foster the existence of human life. It’s a fairly easy value to defend, given the vast degree of respect afforded to life, and is the value to choose if you’re more comfortable discussing the technical merits of nuclear weapon possession rather than the moral basis of the weapons themselves.

Human life is topically relevant because the major ethical dilemma surrounding nuclear weapons is their vast capacity to kill; likewise, the effectiveness of deterrence hinges on the question of whether wars in the nuclear age have seen a reduction in violence. This makes the concern very important, and one that states should take into consideration.
To critique human life is to critique the notion that all lives are the same. Perhaps in a nuclear world, lives are spared in conflict only to die slowly and painfully of radiation. Perhaps dangerous regimes - permitted to hold greater sway over international affairs – manage to lower the standard of living across the globe. The affirmative response, of course, would be to point out the irreversibility of death. Living conditions can be improved, nations can rise and fall, but a death cannot be taken back.

Justice. This is a classic in the LD community, and the reasons why we value justice are available in a wide variety of places, so this will focus on the topical relevance of justice. The resolution asks whether states ought not possess nuclear weapons, but since it does not ask whether all states must possess them, there is great potential for an unequal system to emerge. The status quo, for instance, witnesses a “nuclear club” whereby a few largely wealthy, nuclear nations actively prevent non-nuclear nations from proliferating. Since we can’t expect the international community to happily hand Zimbabwe a couple hundred nukes, it is reasonable to suggest that negation of the resolution would give rise to something similar to the status quo. The value of justice questions whether this two-tiered system is in fact fair.

The critiques of justice are every bit as well-known as the reasons to support it, but resolutionally speaking, there are a few nuances the negative should not miss: the value of justice, for instance, might not fully recognize the game-changing effect that nuclear weapons have on an ethical discussion. Other international questions of justice do not threaten the survival of the planet as a whole, but given the magnitude of a nuclear weapon’s destructive capacity, justice may simply have to sit on the backburner while questions of survival are discussed. As a rebuttal, the affirmative needs to not only hammer home that an unjust peace is no peace at all, but argue that as the international community’s standards serve as a framework for a wider array of issues, justice in the international community may be necessary to ever achieve justice on a smaller scale – meaning that if justice isn’t a value here, it may as well never be a value.

Affirmative Criteria:

The affirmative has the privilege of either focusing on the large by taking a criterion of National Equality or the very small by focusing on Likelihood of Catastrophe. (By small, I mean that the focus is on humans rather than their collective organizations) Because the two debates are very different, you may wish to prepare both in connection with your chosen value to run against debaters depending on their strengths. You especially don’t want to feed into an opponent’s negative argument if you know they will choose one criterion or another, so it helps to already be set up to rebut that argument.

National Equality. A criterion of national equality is helpful to the affirmative when striving to achieve international security, since absent equality, there exists a legal disparity among nations. This legal disparity provides some nations a wider variety of outlets through
which to pursue their agendas, whereas national equality provides some measure of reciprocity conducive to peace. Setting up this criterion also helps the affirmative because it is impossible in a nuclear-armed world. The status quo allows only a handful of nations to hold a weapon that others are forbidden to pursue. Since the negative defends the status quo, rebutting its moral footing seems a strong course of action.

National equality can be rebutted in a number of ways. First is to question its relevance to the value at hand. National equality per international regulations doesn’t necessarily lead to peace or security – whether or not we like to admit it, some nations are driven by different motives or held back by a greater number of checks. Democratic states have shifting priorities and their leaders can be removed, while despotic states often serve the interest of one leader at the expense of others. To weigh the resolution on this criterion could be damning. The affirmative does have the out, however, that international standards of governance, military, and all matters are paramount – and that a flaw in other areas does not mean that we should ignore a flaw in our current nuclear ethic.

Likelihood of catastrophe. To match the policy-based affirmative, we weigh a simple criterion that suggests the pathway to the value is based on numbers. The affirmative doesn’t want to quantify catastrophe (since the status quo, having only seen two nuclear attacks, has not seen the extinction of the human race) but rather weigh the likelihood of annihilation. It also has a clear brightline for the judge: moral decisions should be based off of whichever imperative saves lives. From there, the affirmative must of course prove that nuclear-armed states are more dangerous than non-nuclear armed ones (keeping in mind their real-world limitations).

The negative may wish to simply accept this criterion rather than attack it, since the body of literature goes both ways on the effectiveness of nuclear weapons. A little rebranding may be helpful, suggesting that repeated wars and terrorist actions deserve the same consideration as one large nuclear incident.

Negative Values:

Because the negative has to argue for the ethical justification of bombs that can level cities, its values will be more in line with the non-destructive capacity provided by nuclear weapons. Since the bombs do nothing on their own except drain resources, it will want to focus on what we lose in a world without such weapons in state hands. That leads the negative to the same values held by the architects of M.A.D.

Human life – Just as the affirmative has the ability to bring to bear the question of human life, the negative has sufficient evidence to take this value. Its topical relevance has already been discussed, so we will only briefly touch on this value with regards to how the negative wants to

set it up in the debate. Focusing on the real-world impact of our moral decisions makes human life an easy rebut to any questions of risk or peace. When you crunch the numbers and ask whether an ethical decision will save or cost lives, you simply save lives and worry about the rest later. That gives the negative the opening to the argument that nuclear weapons are an effective enough deterrent to justify their potential harms.

The affirmative rebuttal to human life is both to go with the value and argue the existential threat that the bomb poses to human life. Does a weapon that reduces the average lifespan of a population by thirty years deserve the same moral consideration as one that reduces the average by a few minutes? Nuclear weapons, as an existential threat, promise extinction – an infinite cutoff of human life, meaning that whatever other benefits they gain are pointless.

**National sovereignty** – National sovereignty has similar justifications to national security; it is a morally relativist compromise, it provides for some degree of stability on the international scene, and when it is present there may generally be peace. National sovereignty opens the door to the claim that nations have a right to protect their interests, establish their own security, and pursue what course provides for that security. That in turn runs the risk of critiquing national sovereignty by pointing out that a sovereign North Korea may not respect the sovereignty of other nations, but remember that we seek the action which maximizes national sovereignty, meaning peace is a criterion which leads to that point.

**International peace.** I would consider international peace to be more of a criterion than a value, but when dealing with inexperienced judges, it is strong enough as a value to pass. This is because peace is nice; it is accompanied with generally longer lifespans, and it is the stated value of most Miss America contestants each year. The nuclear debate hinges on the nature of the violence prevented by – or caused by – a nuclear weapon, so valuing peace in the context of the resolution makes perfect sense. When we decide the fate of our nation’s stockpile, we should be primarily concerned with the action that reduces conflict.

International peace can be criticized as a criterion, of course (in that it is not intrinsic, for we value peace because of the other things it brings us), and it can also be criticized as a means of supporting national violence. Mao’s China was internationally peaceful during the Cultural Revolution, yet within its borders millions died. The negative rebuttal to this is that international instability gives credibility to oppressive regimes by instilling a greater degree of paranoia, while peace opens up new opportunities. It’s also worth asking whether or not international war would have reduced the number of deaths under Mao – in all its callous likelihood, genocide is inevitable, making international peace the best we can do with regards to this resolution.

**Negative Criteria**

As I formulated my thoughts on the negative criteria, I noticed that the negative will likely be more policy-driven than the affirmative, meaning that it will want to discuss matters with the
understanding that the international scene is messy and convoluted, and that some decisions are morally ambiguous. The two best I could think of were Deterrence to War and Realism.

**Deterrence to war.** Deterrence to war is a clear-cut connection to reach international peace, and is the underlying doctrine used to support nuclear weapons for the most part in the status quo. An ethical decision under this criterion is one which provides the highest cost to conflict, thus reducing the number of conflicts, and in turn the number of deaths or people who suffer. This criterion is of course resolutionally significant, and is a fair criterion to use as well, since it doesn’t force the affirmative to disagree with you. On the other hand, it does provide the footing you need for your evidence to drive home the important point – it is good for states to have nuclear weapons, since the practice saves lives.

Deterrence to war is a good connection to national sovereignty as well, as it gives states the tools they need to protect themselves against outside aggression, while at the same time having the freedom to pursue internal policy. This framing of the criterion gives the negative room to argue in terms of how rights are constructed in an international setting and absent a strong governing body.

**Realism.** Realism at its root is the recognition of the imperfect, and is a criterion set up to rebut affirmative moral claims by arguing that in all likelihood any decision will have some morally hazardous fallout. By making realism your criterion, you set up the debate as not asking which course of action is ethical or moral, but which is the most workable – a sort of anti-theory. This allows you to sidestep claims of justice or inequality, while making it perfectly clear that now that Pandora’s box has been opened, there is no way to close it and we are better off accepting the status quo and preparing for it than posturing what the world would look like if nations were somehow to no longer possess an irreversible technology.

Realism can be attacked by pointing out that it presupposes several values of its own (national sovereignty, for instance, which can still be debated), or by questioning the assumption that there is no moral course of action. Moral questions sometimes come before the policy means of addressing them, but ignoring them altogether prevents those policies from being formulated in the first place. Even if we don’t have the ability to abolish nuclear weapons now, we should not stop looking for ways to do so if we know their existence to be immoral. The rebuttal to this is twofold. First, there have been condemnations of nuclear weapons since their initial use, and thus far no working plan to eliminate them has been found, indicating that there may be no metaphysical capacity to abandon them. Second, absent realism states are likely to have greater cause for conflict and violate the affirmative’s moral sensibilities, making the affirmative position inconsistent. This debate delves into policy once more, so be sure to keep the ethical or moral nature of realism distinct from the effectiveness concerns that are likely to arise.

**Conclusion**
There should be sufficient evidence for the contentions in this topic to build themselves – and the major disagreements that the varying advocacy groups in this topic have are more over paradigm than over statistics or facts. This means that you want to take hold of your value and criterion before you move to your contentions, and ideally use those contentions as a reciprocal support for your value. If you do so, you will likely be able to win on style and clarity, since the decision past that point is largely arbitrary.
Topic Analysis by Cameron Baghai
States ought not posses nuclear weapons. Simple enough topic on first glance, but to be successful, debaters will need to understand the nuances in it.

BACKGROUND
Nuclear weapons were first developed during WWII by the US, Britain, and Canada via the Manhattan project. Two bombs were subsequently dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing approximately 220,000 almost immediately. Thousands more died from the radiation. Soon after the bombings, Japan surrendered.

The Soviet Union eventually developed their own nuclear weapons, and they and the US then began building enormous arsenals of weapons. The Cold War was basically a staring contest between the two great powers; both were ready to blast each other off the face of the planet.

However, Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain the only two places that have been bombed by nuclear weapons for strategic purposes. Although the end of the Cold War reduced the fear of nuclear war, the threat is by no means nonexistent.

The United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China are the five nuclear weapons states that are part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel, a signatory to the NPT, is an undeclared nuclear power. India, Pakistan, and North Korea are three nuclear powers that are non-signatories of the treaty. Iran and Syria are accused of having nuclear weapons programs, but there is dispute as to their existence and progress.

Treaties
1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty: US, USSR, and UK agreed to stop nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space. However, the treaty still permits underground testing.

1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: US, USSR, UK, and 133 non-nuclear weapon states agreed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The three “pillars” of the treaty are non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. Nuclear states are obligated to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear states cannot acquire nuclear weapons, and the goal is to eventually create an environment conducive to disarmament. However, states can have nuclear technology for peaceful civilian purposes.

1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The US, CIS, UK and 90 other countries banned all nuclear explosions.

2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: US and Russia agreed to lower the number of permissible deployed strategic nuclear warheads even further in seven years.

FRAMEWORK

The resolution seems unambiguous enough, right? Six words. However, the simpler resolutions are often the ones that allow for the most framework debate.

States:

No, the resolution is not talking about the individual states within the United States. As tempting as it might be to write an AC about why Texas should not have nuclear weapons, I think most can agree that that is not how the topic should be debated.

However, there are still multiple legitimate interpretations of the word.

First, the plural nature of states might imply that the resolution demands an abstract interpretation. Instead of taking the policy-esque/plan approach, maybe the generality of the term indicates the affirmative should make arguments that don’t depend on any one state taking the action. While there are textual reasons to prefer this interpretation, the vague nature such a debate demands might hamper education and depth of argumentation. It almost might limit ground for both sides for the same reasons. A deontological AC arguing that nuclear weapons are always immoral would work under this interpretation.

A similar interpretation could be that the affirmative gets to choose two or more states and claim that those specific states should get rid of their nuclear weapons. This interpretation would allow the affirmative to make arguments as to why plan texts and policy approaches to debate are beneficial while also staying consistent with the text of the resolution. However, there could be theoretical objections to the affirmative being able to defend a plan involving two actors (for example: The United States and Russia will completely disarm by 2020). This interpretation would allow the affirmative to sidestep some of the international relations issues with disarmament (like how other nuclear states would react if the US got rid of its nukes) while still remaining specific enough to have very detailed and nuanced advantages.

A slightly different approach would be to claim that the affirmative only needs to defend that one state should disarm. For example, it would be sufficient to prove Israel ought to get rid of its
nuclear weapons. The obvious problem with this interpretation is that the resolution says states, which is plural, and not state. However, there are theoretical reasons why such an interpretation of nuclear weapons might be beneficial. It provides stable ground for both sides and permits an in-depth discussion of the issues.

Finally, the affirmative could argue that the resolution is meant to be debated on-balance. In other words, the affirmative burden is to show that in general states shouldn’t have nukes, even if there are some exceptions to that rule. The theoretical merits of this approach are similar to the first interpretation, but it makes the affirmative’s job much easier.

Ultimately, I think that any interpretation of states can be justified. The important thing for the affirmative to remember is to include framework analysis from the beginning. Few things are as frustrating for a judge as an AC that is ambiguous in terms of how it operates.

Ought Not
Let’s start with ought. While most dictionaries define ought as some kind of moral obligation, some take it to mean desirability. However, it’s important to note that the two aren’t mutually exclusive—what is moral might be determined by what is desirable. Either way, the definition you choose to defend could have implications for your case. An interpretation leaning toward desirability would probably best be suited for a plan-based case or at the very least one with some kind of consequentialist/utilitarian framework. Alternatively, an interpretation of ought as moral obligation is more in line with a deontological AC.

The next thing to take note of is the negative phrasing. The resolution posits that states have a moral obligation (or it would be desirable) to not posses nuclear weapons. This is very different from saying that there isn’t an obligation to possess nukes (that phrasing would be not ought). The affirmative must argue that it is not permissible for states to have nuclear weapons. As such, even though the resolution is negatively phrased, generic negative positions like “states don’t have moral obligations” are arguably still negative ground.

Posses

This term is pretty straightforward. Although I suppose someone could come up with some wanky interpretations, I think the best road to go is to use the most intuitive definition of posses.
One thing to think about though is whether the resolution is limited to a discussion of states that already have nukes. Can the affirmative make arguments dealing with countries that are in the process of acquiring them but haven’t yet? What about countries that want them but haven’t started a nuclear program? While allowing the affirmative to have advocacies tied to these countries would expand the scope of education, it would also seem to make it much more difficult for the negative to predict what arguments the affirmative will make.

Nuclear Weapons
Self explanatory.

AFFIRMATIVE POSITIONS

Nuclear Weapons Are Very, Very Dangerous
This position is simple. It basically explains that nuclear weapons would really mess up the world if they went off, and says the risk of that happening is scary enough that we should get rid of nuclear weapons. So the entire position focuses on the effects of a nuclear weapon (blast force, the giant fireball, radiation, climate change, etc. etc.). I do NOT recommend running this position. Absent analysis as to why possession leads to a nuclear detonation, the position is basically one big impact without a link. Which leads us to the second position...

Nuclear Weapons are Very, Very Dangerous and Will Go Off
This is the first position plus the necessary link. It takes an abstract approach and just explains why possessing nuclear weapons results in a high risk that they will be detonated. Three of the most common arguments are that nuclear weapons will result in accidents (contamination leaks, misguided launch, etc.), terrorists will steal the nuclear material and use it, and irrational leaders will launch the weapons. Of course, impact analysis explaining how bad it would be if a nuclear weapon went off is still necessary. This is one of those positions that people at camp tended to run without an explanation of what the affirmative burden is. Make sure that if you run this position, you explain what it is that you’re arguing and must defend. Do you control the advantages of a nuclear-free zone? Or are these reasons why any state should get rid of nuclear weapons, regardless of whether others do?

Plan
There are a lot of variations of the plan-based approach, but the theme is pretty simple. The affirmative makes some framework arguments about why it only needs to defend one (or some
finite number) of countries getting rid of nuclear weapons, and then the affirmative explains why that would be a good thing. The benefit of this position is that it allows for much more nuanced argumentation, better evidence, and deeper educational gains. However, it’s susceptible to theoretical objections. After all, the resolution doesn’t specify a country—why should the affirmative be able to?

NEGATIVE POSITIONS

Deterrence
This position starts with the assumption that one state will not attack a state that has nuclear weapons. There are three main subdivisions of the argument. First, nuclear weapons decrease conventional warfare. The possibility of wars escalating into nuclear scale is so terrifying that nations would rather resolve their conflicts peacefully than risk annihilation. Second, there’s a lot of literature that talks about something called Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This is the idea that in a world with multiple nuclear powers, no one will use nuclear weapons because they fear retaliation from other nuclear powers. Third, some authors argue that the existence of nuclear weapons makes biological weapons and chemical weapons less necessary (and also deters their use). I think the best way to tackle this case would be to have a short framework, carded analytical arguments explaining why deterrence happens, empirics (ideally statistics) verifying your analytical argument, and then impact analysis explaining why deterrence is so important.

Asteroids/Aliens Disadvantage
This was a surprisingly common position at camp. The argument is pretty simple: nuclear weapons are needed so that we can blast asteroids and hostile ships out of the sky. Seem pretty out there? Yeah, I think so too. The lack of immediacy, the availability of alternatives, and the silliness of the argument make it more comical than persuasive. Also, if the affirmative is only talking about one country, or a specific group of countries, this position is sort of irrelevant because other countries could keep the nukes for these Independence Day scenarios.

Specific Disadvantage
This argument identifies a particular scenario and argues that if one nation gets rid of nuclear weapons in that scenario, really bad stuff goes down. For example, if the US got rid of it’s nukes, we’d lose power, and a decrease in hegemony is terrible. Another argument is that if India gets rid of nuclear weapons, India-Pakistan relations will not be pretty. For this argument to work, the
affirmative must be discussing the nation you’re talking about. In other words, if the affirmative says Israel should disarm, and your negative is about India disarming, the disadvantage won’t apply.

FINAL THOUGHTS
1/ Know what you think the affirmative burden is. Know why you think that. And know how to defend what you think.
2/ Learn how to weigh arguments very effectively! A lot of debates will come down to weighing (for example, does the small risk of a devastating nuclear explosion outweigh the larger risk of a less devastating conventional war?). Some terms to think about:
Scope—how many people are affected
Scale—how they’re affected
Probability—how likely it is that you can access your impacts
The default weighing “formula” is Magnitude (which is scope multiplied by scale) multiplied by Probability. So Scope x Scale x Probability. However, there’s a lot of good literature out there that argues we should analyze risk differently. Read it.
3/ Look into international relations theory. Knowing how states interact with each other will give you the upper hand in rounds. Some terms to look up are realism, liberalism, neoliberalism, and constructivism.
4/ Keep rounds clean. With a topic as broad as this one, rounds can get very messy. Your judge will be happier if you clean them up. If that’s not a good enough reason to keep things clean, your judge will also probably give you higher speaker points.
5/ Have fun! There’s a lot of potential for good debate on this topic. Don’t waste it.

Here are some places to start researching, in no particular order:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm
http://reason.com/archives/2003/02/01/learning-to-love-the-bomb
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/

Topic Analysis by Fritz Pielstick
I like that this topic is short. I like that it is about nuclear weapons. I like that there are a lot of really good arguments that can be made. On the other hand, I dislike that there are a lot of really bad arguments that inevitably will be made. I feel that on topics that deal with lots of people dying,
the arguments that debaters tend to make are extreme—in their size, their goodness, and their badness.

**Rant #1**

If you have been thinking about the topic prior to reading this (and I would certainly hope you have), then the thought of defining states as anything other than “nations” has probably at least crossed your mind. If such a thought has crossed your mind, and you have sincerely considered that thought, I have one piece of advice: Please let that thought go. Defining states as subdivisions of nations is a terrible argument. Your “West Virginia ought not possess nuclear weapons” argument is not ever going to create a good debate. Additionally, there are no authors who defend that West Virginia should have nuclear weapons, which makes negating somewhat difficult. The word “states” in the resolution refers, generally, to nations. It does not refer to individual states or provinces within nations, nor does it refer to certain emotional conditions, nor does it refer to phases of matter. “Current nuclear powers should disarm” is an example of an acceptable argument. “Minnesota/Anger/Liquid ought not possess nuclear weapons” are not examples of acceptable arguments.

Finally, do not try to argue that terrorist groups are states. This was done by some debaters on the last “nukes” topic. While arguments about nuclear terrorism could certainly be compelling on this topic, a better way to frame such a position would be to argue that states (as in countries) possessing nuclear weapons greatly increases the probability that terrorists will acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear material.

**Rant #2**

This topic marks the beginning of my sixth year of involvement with debate, and my fifth year of involvement with LD. In the aforementioned span of time, I have yet to encounter a topic where I am not entirely sure what the affirmative’s ground is. This is the first such topic. Granted, we know that affirmative ground can be loosely described as “Nukes bad, yo!” What is less clear, however, is whether the statement “Nukes bad, yo!” means that the affirmative gets to advocate a hypothetical world in which there are no nuclear weapons, or if they have to defend some process of disarmament. Can the affirmative draw their impacts from a world in which all nuclear states have magically gotten rid of their nuclear weapons? If so, does the utopian ideal of a non-nuclear world mean that the affirmative gets access to all of the tremendous benefits that would arise in such a world? Or, does the affirmative have to concede that this world is not possible (either in a literal sense, or in a debate theory sense), and instead draw impacts from some reduction of nukes, rather than a total elimination? I’m not entirely sure what the answers to any of these questions are.

Understanding affirmative ground is important because affirmative ground defines what negative ground is. Depending on how the previous questions are answered, the negative has
easy access to some arguments in certain situations, and has almost no access to the same arguments in other situations. For example, if the affirmative gets to draw its offense from some imagined world that is sans nuclear weapons, then “nuclear deterrence” arguments do not make a lot of sense on the negative. Even if the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is true, the risk of nuclear catastrophe is still greater in the negative world than in the affirmative world. Deterrence doesn’t matter if there are no nuclear weapons. This is not to say that deterrence arguments cannot be made if the affirmative gets to defend a totally non-nuclear world (negative debaters can still defend that nuclear weapons deter against conventional warfare, biological warfare etc.), but rather that deterrence arguments (probably the simplest negative ground on the topic) are substantially harder to access.

Another relevant consideration in terms of the distribution of affirmative and negative ground is whether the affirmative has to defend an actual process of disarmament. If the affirmative does, in fact, have this burden, this greatly increases potential ground for the negative. In this case, the negative can defend not only that nuclear weapons are good, but that disarmament is bad. These are two separate things. Disarmament is a lengthy, complicated process that facilitates a great deal of consequences. The negative can fairly easily defend why the process of disarmament is a bad thing, irrespective of the relative goodness or badness of nuclear weapons themselves.

Regardless of how these questions are answered, the existence of these questions is a good indication that debates over what the affirmative has to defend, or rather, gets to defend, will be commonplace on this topic. I can’t wait…

Definitions

In “Rant #1” we discussed the proper definition of the word “states.” I will focus on defining the remaining terms in the resolution.

“Ought” is generally defined as either (a) an indication of desirability or (b) an indication of a moral obligation. If we assume that the affirmative selects the latter of the two, then the question arises of what the negative’s ground is. If “not” negates “ought”, then it is not immediately clear if the negative has the burden to defend the converse of the resolution (i.e. that states have an obligation to possess nuclear weapons), or if the negative minimally must defend that the possession of nuclear weapons is permissible. Assuming that the negative has only the minimal burden of defending permissibility, the negative can obviously advocate realism or argue that states have no moral obligations. If ought implies desirability, then the burdens are obviously

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14 As a side note: If states have no moral obligations, then do they have rights entitlements? Probably not. If they have no rights entitlements, then ought they possess property, such as nuclear weapons? Probably not…
very clear: the affirmative must prove that the possession of nuclear weapons is undesirable, while the negative must prove that it is desirable.

“Possess” has the potential to be tricky. Since ‘possess’ and ‘use’ are two different words that mean two different things, there might be some sneaky negative debaters that try to argue that states ought to possess nuclear weapons, but they ought not use them. There are certainly reasons why is this (a) an abusive argument and (b) a bad argument, but I am willing to bet that this position will see the light of day in the hands of some debaters, so expect it.

“Nuclear weapons” is straightforward. I trust the debate community to use a commonplace, standard definition of “nuclear weapons”.

**Affirmative Ideas**

The affirmative gets to (in one capacity or another) defend eliminating an instrument of warfare that is designed to kill an extraordinary amount of people. As such, there are some mighty big affirmative cases out there. I will sort through them.

1. Nuclear terrorism.

I think this can be a very good argument if run with enough nuance. There are a lot of strategic advantages to this argument, and if you plan to make this argument into an affirmative case, you should take advantage of them. First of all, the probability of the impact (terrorists nuking people) is pretty high, as far as nuclear scenarios go. It is very conceivable that terrorists will detonate a nuclear device at some point in the relatively near future. Second, smart affirmative debaters will very easily control the uniqueness on this impact. Terrorists do not have the ability to create their own plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium. This means they must rely upon states to provide them (intentionally or not) with either nuclear weapons or the materials to build them. Third, this position competes well with nuclear deterrence arguments because terrorists are not easily deterred, particularly if they expect to die in the process.

2. Environmentalism

Nuclear weapons are highly destructive towards the environment. First of all, a nuclear war would be devastating to the environment. Second, states that pursue nuclear weapons are inclined to test them, which is obviously harmful to the environment. Third, nuclear weapons programs require states to mine and enrich uranium, and dispose of nuclear waste, which are harmful to the environment.


Nuclear war can only happen if there are nuclear weapons. Nuclear war would be a terrible thing and would kill a lot of people. As such, states ought not possess nuclear weapons, so as to eliminate (or at least minimize) the possibility of nuclear war.

The argument here would be that in a nuclear world, states with nuclear weapons intervene to stop other states from developing nuclear weapons, so as to preserve their power. This is a bad thing, because it creates war and conflict (such as the Iraq War).

5. Feminism

The argument here is that nuclear weapons should be rejected from a feminist perspective. Granted, there is literature that argues that nuclear weapons are metaphorical phallic symbols. This argument would probably fall under the umbrella of feminist objections to nuclear weapons. This is probably not the argument you want to be making. A better argument might be that nuclear weapons are a form of masculine aggression, control, and domination.

6. Deterrence fails.

There are a lot of compelling arguments for why deterrence will eventually fail. First (as I briefly discussed earlier), terrorists in possession of nukes are not likely to be deterred because (a) they cannot be easily found and (b) many of them view themselves as martyrs and expect to die for their cause. Second, some states might just hate one another too much to be deterred. Centuries of religious conflict between Israel and a nuclear Iran, or between India and Pakistan, could very easily manifest itself in the form of nuclear war. Third, the possibility of an accidental launch might make nuclear deterrence impossible. If one state were to accidentally launch a nuclear weapon, whichever state is unintentionally attacked would likely respond quickly and violently (particularly if that state is also a nuclear power), before any conflict could be resolved.

7. Nuclear weapons cause indiscriminate harm.

This argument allows for nuanced philosophical positions to become relevant on this topic. If written and run correctly, a deontological or rule-utilitarian position about the importance of distinguishing between civilians and non-civilians could be compelling.

Negative Ideas

1. Realism.

I briefly discussed this earlier. The argument would be that in our anarchic international arena, states should be, at minimum, permitted to possess nuclear weapons to maximize their relative power and ensure their safety.

2. States have no moral obligations.
This argument seems to be run on every topic even remotely concerned with international relations. Obviously, the application here would be that states are permitted to possess nuclear weapons because they have no obligations.

3. Deterrence.

This is probably the most compelling stock negative position. As I mentioned in “Rant #2”, this position is more difficult to sell if the affirmative gets to defend a world that is entirely devoid of nuclear weapons. There are certainly arguments to be made for why the affirmative does not have the right to do this, and those arguments would definitely activate a lot of deterrence arguments for the negative. Even if the affirmative gets to defend a non-nuclear world, the negative can still defend that nukes serve as a deterrent against conventional warfare, or against biological warfare etc.

4. Hegemony

The argument here would be that nuclear states (such as the United States) ought to possess nuclear weapons to maintain their hegemony. It would then follow that the collapse of U.S. hegemony would be a terrible thing.

5. Specific states.

The negative can argue that the generalized, inclusive statement “States ought not possess nuclear weapons” would mean that all states would be denied possession of nuclear weapons. They could then argue that there are specific scenarios where it would be advantageous for states to possess nuclear weapons.

6. Sovereignty

States have a primary right to make sovereign decisions. As such, it is their right to possess nuclear weapons if they so choose, which means it is, at minimum, permissible for them to possess nuclear weapons.

7. Economic and bargaining power.

States should be given the opportunity to possess nuclear weapons, to increase their clout in the international community, and maximize their bargaining and economic power.

8. Asteroids!

Believe it or not, there is a lot of evidence that argues that nuclear weapons could be useful in deflecting asteroids that are on a collision course with the Earth. I don’t think this argument will be uncommon. But, while I think some debaters might be attracted to the weirdness of this argument, I don’t feel that it is a particularly strategic argument. First, the timeframe on the impact is terrible.
An asteroid is not going to come near the earth anytime soon. Second, it is logical to think that by the time an asteroid did come near the Earth, we would have developed some other form of technology that would allow us to save the day. Third, I’m not sure asteroid deflection requires states to possess nuclear weapons. We could keep a handful of nuclear weapons locked away somewhere, out of possession of any one particular state, and use them in the unlikely event that an asteroid comes flying towards the Earth.
**Topic Analysis by Saad Asad**

*States* - a politically organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory; especially : one that is sovereign\(^{15}\)

The burden of the affirmative will be to prove at least two states ought not possess nuclear weapons. One could argue that the resolution is asking the affirmative to prove all states ought not possess nuclear weapons. For example, if one states “Ducks ought to eat bread,” then one would be referring to all ducks. If one wanted to specify to a particular set of ducks, an article like “the” or a pronoun like “those” would precede it. Since the resolution lacks such specifiers, we conclude the resolution is referring to all states.

Thus, the affirmative would be arguing all states ought not possess nuclear weapons. However, the negative need not prove the converse of the resolution that all states ought to possess nuclear weapons. Unless the affirmative argues otherwise, the negative burden is only to disprove the resolution. Hence, the negative need only argue some states ought possess nuclear weapons.

Please, do not argue that a state such as West Virginia or Oklahoma should not possess nukes.

Ought-used to express obligation *(ought to pay our debts)*, advisability *(ought to take care of yourself)*, natural expectation *(ought to be here by now)*, or logical consequence *(the result ought to be infinity)*\(^{16}\)

Use the definition of obligation to express cosmopolitan arguments that are concerned with welfare of all peoples of the earth. This means arguments that stress we have moral obligations to citizens outside our own country should obviously use the definition of obligation. Use the definition of logical consequence to defend realist perspectives since “logical consequence” is a descriptive definition and so is realist theory. To elaborate, on the negative, it is logically consequent for states to acquire nuclear weapons because states are concerned with maximizing security.

The additional benefit of defining ought this way is that it allows you to sever links to a value of Morality. Consequently, turns on your case that make appeals to a moral calculus become irrelevant.

It will be insufficient to cite the definition from a dictionary to justify using “logical consequence” as legitimate interpretation of the resolution. Since this interpretation is descriptive (as opposed to obligation definitions which are prescriptive), it is necessarily creating a truth-
testing resolution. Debaters will have to defend why truth-testing is a better way to adjudicate the round than a comparative-worlds theory.

For example, one could argue truth-testing minimizes judge intervention since the judge does not have to weight arguments against each other. Minimizing judge intervention is key to fairness.

However, avoid focusing debates on the definition of “ought.” Many judges find it boring especially when the topic is about something as exciting as nukes. As always, consider the audience you are debating in front of. Lay judges will most definitely not want to hear you lecture about how truth-testing is a better way to interpret the resolution than comparative-worlds.

Since “logical consequence” is descriptive there can be no solvency. However, if ought is defined as “obligation,” the affirmative may have to defend solvency. Consider that a man who cannot swim does not have an obligation to save a drowning person. Thus, the affirmative may have to prove that nuclear disarmament is possible. Admittedly, this would bog down the debate, so I would discourage this interpretation.

Possess- to own

Possess does not imply use. The negative can argue that simply possessing nukes is sufficient to achieve x benefit (say, deterrence).

Nuclear weapons - an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion

Although nuclear weapons is plural, that has no resolutional implications. The affirmative’s burden is still to prove at least 2 states ought not possess any nuclear weapons. It is plural to be grammatical.

Consider the sentence if the term wasn’t plural: States ought not possess nuclear weapon.

AFFIRMATIVE

NUKE WAR!

This will be, by far, the most common argument on this topic. The basic gist of this argument is that more nuclear weapons increase the likelihood of nuclear war. Through the following ways:

1. Construction of additional nuclear weapons increase the chance of one going off accidently

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2. To protect against larger states, smaller states will build nuclear weapons to protect themselves
   a. These smaller states tend to have less rational leaders. Ex. Kim Jon Il, Mahmoud Ahmadinejahd
   b. Smaller states have less technical expertise than more advance states. Ex. Pakistan, North Korea
   c. Smaller states have an uneasy relationship between military and government increasing the risk of an accidental detonation. Ex. Pakistan

3. Increase proliferation increases the likelihood of nukes falling in to the hands of terrorists.

4. Simple mathematics: As t approaches infinity, p (probability) approaches 1. In English, as more time passes, the possibility of a nuclear detonation becomes certainty.

Once the links to why more nuclear weapons are bad is established, it is necessary to establish why a nuclear detonation will be bad:

1. Millions dead from initial blast(s).
2. Fireball engulfs those not in the immediate radius resulting in 3rd degree burns. This also releases smoke that blocks the sun (similar to how a large volcano’s eruption can block the sun) causing a nuclear winter. As temperatures decrease, livestock and agriculture is wiped out.
3. Holes in the ozone layer appear from the blast which is not an immediate harms since the smoke shields the Earth from the sun’s rays, but will eventually be a problem.
4. Radioactive fallout will cause cancer growths on those who were not in the immediate vicinity of the blasts.
5. Psychological effects will be massive considering the size of the human population wiped out. Economic effects will also be drastic as entire nations and their respective outputs will have disappeared.

This may sound drastic, but is very well possibly if two large nuclear powers go to war (i.e. Russia and the U.S.A). Even if two nuclear powers like India and Pakistan attack, the effects will not be localized to South Asia due to entangling alliances and interests within the region.

PARAMETRICIZE!

Choose two states and argue why they should not have nuclear weapons. Topic literature is rife with discussion focusing on specific states and why their pursuit of nuclear weapons is illegitimate. The resolution is hinting at these states and to provide an educational and more in-depth discussion, we should narrow it down to a few.

The two most obvious are North Korea and Iran. Both have been the subject of sanctions and international condemnation in their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Also, Israel has been
condemned by Arab countries for its nuclear weapons, but also the UN has called for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East implicitly attacking Israel's nuclear weapons.

It’s pretty simple to argue their acquisition of nukes causes regional instability. Iran’s acquisition will encourage other regional powers like Saudi Arabia or Turkey to pursue nuclear weapons. Or worst case scenario, Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear reactors leading to a Hezbollah/Hamas retaliation in the region. North Korea’s acquisition poses a threat to Japan and South Korea while at the same endangers US relations with China if a war happens.

NEGATIVE

DETERRENCE!

M.A.D. You probably learned about this in history class; M.A.D. is mutually assured destruction. That is, no state would nuke another state because doing so would cause a massive retaliation. Thus, peace is created because neither state wants complete annihilation. This is a very persuasive argument to present to lay judges since they've most likely heard of it.

SOVEREIGNTY!

States have a contractual obligation (Locke's Social Contract, or any contract for that matter) to protect their own citizens. If the best means to maximize their own security is to pursue nukes, then they have every right to. International obligations are impossible to hold countries to without a central authority. In this anarchic state, nations must pursue the best possible means of defending themselves from external threats. Not allowing a state to possess nukes would be a violation of the state’s sovereignty. The state is the sole arbiter of justice in its own jurisdiction; everything else is a threat. Realist theories hold similar outcomes but don’t necessarily argue that states have contractual obligations to their citizens.

US HEGEMONY!

Some states should have nuclear weapons because they are a more responsible agent than others. In this case, the U.S. should have nuclear weapons to ensure global security. As the world police, the U.S. control of nukes ensures threats can be eliminated quickly in the global arena. Also, by acting as the guarantor of security for nations like Japan, South Korea, Western Europe, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf countries it discourages additional proliferation that could destabilize these regions. The U.S. will only use these nukes to ensure democracy and human rights are upheld in the world and to threaten evil when it attempts to impose itself on benign regimes. This argument is best pared with the affirmative arguing nuclear war is inevitable. By having only a few states have nuclear weapons, the harms of accidental detonation are avoided. But the benefits of U.S. hegemony stopping wars are also gained.
Affirmative Evidence

Deterrence fails

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT GUARANTEED TO DETER NON-NUCLEAR STATES IN CRISSES
Organski and Kugler (1980: 176), however, report that in six of their seven relevant cases that involved confrontations between nuclear and nonnuclear powers, the nuclear state lost. They conclude that the theory of nuclear deterrence is unsupported by their results. In a related piece, Kugler (1984) cites evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons does not confer an advantage in crises with nonnuclear states, and that classical deterrence theory is flawed. Russett (1989), Huth (1988), and Huth and Russett (1984, 1988) report that extended deterrence success is not systematically associated with either the possession of nuclear weapons or an advantage in the overall strategic military balance; rather, existing and usable conventional forces in, or deployable to, the conflict area appear to be a more important factor. Finally, Blechman and Kaplan (1978) produce findings that the strategic nuclear balance has little salience in crisis outcomes; again, the local balance of conventional military power appears to be determinative.

NUCLEAR ADVANTAGES DO NOT PROVIDE A COERCION BENEFIT VIS-À-VIS OTHER NUCLEAR STATES
On the basis of numerous case studies, Snyder and Diesing (1977: 458-459) conclude that, unlike in prenuclear times, relative measures of military power between major nuclear states provide little insight as to who possesses a coercive advantage in a crisis. Given a stable, second-strike strategic nuclear balance, a quantitative nuclear edge for one side does not automatically confer an exploitable bargaining advantage (i.e., a greater willingness to escalate across the nuclear threshold). Although the conventional military force balance in the crisis area does appear to affect states’ relative bargaining power in historical cases, even conventional military superiority cannot provide an unambiguous index of comparative risk tolerance, resolve, or escalatory propensity. At best, Snyder and Diesing note, one side’s conventional preponderance places the pressure to escalate across the nuclear threshold on the conventionally weaker opponent.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DO NOT DETER OTHER WMD
The next disappointment followed quickly. Soon after the Gulf War of 1990–1991 the UN Special Commission discovered that Iraq had been working on a comprehensive military nuclear programme that had been only a few months away from detonating a nuclear device. For the IAEA, which had not uncovered this programme despite its regular inspections, this revelation constituted a fiasco. In response, many governments agreed on an additional protocol to the NPT, which extended the authority of the IAEA to conducting surprise inspections. Yet doubts about the reliability of the verification measures of the non-proliferation regime persisted, especially as the crucial question of how to deal with treaty violations remained unanswered.

ANY ACCIDENTAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BREAK DOWN DETERRENCE
During the Cold War, a constant tension persisted between nuclear deterrence and the preservation of nonuse. While these two goals were at first clearly separated by an us-versus-them bipolarity (deter them from aggression, not us; prevent nuclear attack against us, not them), they became increasingly entangled over time. Deterrence came to be seen as guaranteeing nonuse, and continued nonuse as proof of successful deterrence. Now that the bipolar order of the Cold War has crumbled, nonuse and deterrence will no longer sustain each other. However, nonuse is the sturdier of the two. The success of nuclear deterrence is an interpretation of recent history; nonuse since 1945 is an indisputable historical fact. Deterrence is theoretical; nonuse is concrete and unambiguous. Faith in nonuse made it easy for both hawks and doves to place their confidence in deterrence. The strategic order among the major nuclear powers is fragile precisely because it rests so heavily on beliefs and untested theories. As soon as these beliefs are confronted with compelling evidence to the contrary, the strategic order will start to break up. A nuclear detonation that resulted from an accidental missile launch or a malfunctioning command chain would force national leaders to promise a fundamental change in policy. "Ready" and "robust" deterrent forces would no longer suffice as the answer to the dangers of the new nuclear age.

DETERRENCE FAILS DUE TO THE POTENTIAL IRRATIONALITY OF STATE LEADERS
And, as we know from history, psychology, sociology, political science, and our own common experiences, people can be counted upon to behave sensibly only part of the time, unreasonably, foolishly, even irrationally and self-destructively the rest. Frequently throughout history they have held some things more dear than "mere" individual or national survival; honor and glory come to mind as transcendent values frequently invoked. To some extent people are also usually captives of habit or ideology; we think of Moscow's leaders as at least to some extent ideologically inspired or motivated in their policymaking. An ideological component in decisionmaking, passion and fervor, generally erodes rationality.
GROUPTHINK MAY COMPROMISE LEADERSHIP RATIONALITY
The problem may be compounded when such decisions are made by small groups of people rather than by single individuals. What psychologist Irving Janis (1982) calls "groupthink" sets in, with all the members of the decisionmaking group so anxious to get along with each other, maintain their power positions, appease the group leader, and push the interests of their respective bureaucracies that they suspend the critical thinking required for sensible decisionmaking. Not knowing very well what goes on behind the closed doors of the Kremlin, we tend to exaggerate the unity and underestimate the diversity of the collective Soviet leadership, thus neglecting the role of those non-rational bureaucratic politics and "groupthink" factors we almost automatically look for when analyzing the somewhat more visible policymaking process of Western governments. In the very political processes of the Kremlin that we occasionally glimpse, we see at work some of those factors degrading the unitary rationality that nuclear deterrence ideology assumes.

DETERRENCE FAILS DUE TO THE RISK OF UNAUTHORIZED USE
Social science and common experience also cast doubt on another key assumption of nuclear deterrence: the leader's tight, near-perfect control of a large number of subordinates in a complex organization spread over a huge country and beyond at sea. For nuclear deterrence to be as dependable as its exponents suggest it is, the possibility for human error or communications breakdown or unauthorized action must be reduced to near zero; this is clearly a difficult if not impossible task, people, organizations, and machines being what they are. Mechanical errors or computer failures must also be eliminated or reduced to near zero, another formidable task, as we know from reports of problems in the American military machinery that we are told - not very reassuringly, actually - is more sophisticated and more carefully operated by more carefully screened functionaries than is the Soviet machinery. How confident can we be that the collective leadership in Moscow has such tight control over its strategic forces that a single rogue Soviet ICBM launch officer or submarine commander cannot independently send his missiles with multiple warheads towards dozens of American targets? How confident can we be that the Soviet Union’s surveillance satellites, radars, sensors, and computers - all technologically primitive compared to those of the United States - will not malfunction disastrously, leading to the catastrophe?
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STILL ENCOURAGES PHYSICAL COERCION BETWEEN NUCLEAR STATES.


Most obviously, of all the serious disputes that have occurred between nuclear states since 1949, not one has escalated to war, whereas numerous conflicts between nonnuclear states have crossed the Small and Singer (1982) war threshold. In fact, Osgood-Tucker and Snyder-Diesing suggest that crisis bargaining between nuclear powers has taken on some interesting new twists. Specifically, they argue that with war itself eliminated as a plausible policy option, nuclear nations have raised the threshold of provocation below which they can threaten, maneuver, and physically coerce one another short of war. The corollary issue involves the value of nuclear weapons in disputes with nonnuclear states: Does the possession of nuclear power seriously inhibit the actions of nonnuclear opponents, or does it provide only a dubious marginal military or psychological advantage to the nuclear state? Previous empirical work conducted on the subject of nuclear weapons and deterrence points to the limited salience of this military capability.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO STOP WAR BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR STATES.

The principal policy implication of this analysis is that nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to impede escalatory dispute behavior by either nuclear or nonnuclear antagonists. At best, the evidence (to date) suggests that secure, second-strike nuclear forces are sufficient to prevent a direct nuclear attack by an opponent on one's own territory (Howard, 1984; Jervis, 1984, 1988; Russett, 1989). Nuclear disputes, however, show a pronounced tendency to escalate (short of war) and to engage coercive tactics that include the limited use of force. In confrontations between nuclear and nonnuclear states, war is a distinct possibility, with aggressive escalation by the nonnuclear power probable. If force is to be brought to bear in either of these dispute types, usable conventional military power is likely to prove critical.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS COUNTERINTUITIVE TO CREATING PEACE.

By exchanging immoral threats, the super-power players merely push the real problems into the background, taking the position that no solution at all is preferable to the risk of escalating a conflict that could lead to a nuclear exchange. In fact nuclear deterrence may well be self-defeating over the long run. Although real security no longer exists, our national security managers relentlessly seek to instill a sense of security in us by pursuing actions that objectively increase the danger: they build more and deadlier weapons.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS BASED UPON THE IMAGE OF ARMAGEDDON EVENTUALLY LEADING US TO DESTRUCTION.


Furthermore, since nuclear deterrence requires credible threats that weapons may be used, its success diminishes its own credibility, and efforts to reassert its credibility threaten to bring about its failure. The runaway arms race is due only in part to worst-case analyses on both sides and current methods of weapons procurement; it is also a product of the constant need to underwrite deterrence with the image of Armageddon. Since perceptions of our preparation for self-protection and of our willingness to retaliate are directly correlated, nuclear deterrence will require greater efforts to ensure the survivability of our nuclear forces. What better way to communicate the seriousness of our intent than to commit a staggering proportion of the federal budget to the development of new weapons? President Reagan argued that defense budget cuts "will send a signal of decline, of lessened will, to friends and adversaries alike." 34

NUKES HAVEN'T BEEN USED BECAUSE OF LACK OF STRATEGICITY AS OPPOSED TO DETERRENCE.


In the case of wars in progress, nuclear weapons have not been introduced in many cases because they cannot be effectively deployed relative to overall military objectives. The Israelis cannot use nuclear weapons on the Golan for fear of polluting the Kennerit; the Iraqis could not use them against Jerusalem without destroying the mosques they seek to liberate. The United States could not use nuclear weapons in South Vietnam without contaminating the countryside of our own allies; the Soviets could not use them against Prague and Budapest without destroying the industries they seek to exploit.

A COMMITMENT TO DETERRENCE IS A COMMITMENT TO PROLIFERATION.


To these dangers we should add the consideration that the American argument, "the United States must have the bomb if the Soviet Union has one," is replicable by every nation state, producing pressure for proliferation which in turn increases the chance of war, and the consideration that no degree of threat can deter a nuclear terrorist who prefers to be dead rather than blue, or red, or green, and who has built his bomb with the help of weapons technology developed by states that are sworn "to deterrence only."
NUKES AREN’T ABLE TO ADEQUATE SECURE A COUNTRY LIKE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES.


There is no necessary connection between nuclear strength and conventional weakness, but in a world of limited resources the development of strategic forces has twisted military budgets in favor of high technology, and the result has been complicated guns that won't shoot and complicated planes that can't fly. The idea that the nation's "first line" of defense consists of radar towers and missiles rather than men on the battlefield must inevitably weaken the morale of the Army and the Marines. However plausible it may have seemed to John Foster Dulles, there is little support now for the view that nuclear threats can substitute in any way for the painful sacrifices of conventional war.

NUCLEAR WAR ISN'T IRRATIONAL – IT JUST SEEMS SO BECAUSE THE STAKES ARE SO HIGH.


Yet many key decision-makers do plan for nuclear war and do have a measure of control over the nuclear arms race. From their particular frame of reference - which in practice sets a high priority on maintaining existing power structures - their behaviour is rational. Most members of the public, on the other hand, do not have much control over the nuclear arms race. It is from their frame of reference - which sets a higher priority on preserving human life and using resources to best advantage, for example - that preparations for nuclear war can be seen as indeed irrational and out of control. Thus, what is rational from the point of view of those in power who prepare for nuclear war can be at the same time irrational from the point of view of many of the relatively powerless majority who will suffer the consequences. This difference is not new, and was apparent for example during the Southeast Asian war, in which US forces destroyed many villages in order to 'save' them. Although the possible consequences of nuclear war are much greater than most other problems arising out of modern industrial society, this does not mean that the reasons for the problem are fundamentally any different. Just as the systematic murder of Jews and others under the Nazis was carried out by fairly ordinary people living and working in a social and institutional framework not greatly different from prevalent ones today, so nuclear war will be unleashed and waged by ordinary well-meaning people doing their job in a familiar bureaucratic and ideological framework. Far from being 'irrational' or mystical, the forces behind the nuclear arms race are mostly all too familiar; what is changed is the magnitude of the consequences.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DECREASE GLOBAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY
(Nathan Busch, Professor of Government at Christopher Newport University, 2004, “No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation” p 281-314)

Summing Up: Will the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be Better or Worse? This study has revealed numerous reasons to be skeptical that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase international stability by helping prevent conventional and nuclear wars. Because there is reason to suspect that emerging NWSs will not handle their nuclear weapons and fissile materials any better than current NWSs have, we should conclude that the further spread of nuclear weapons will tend to undermine international stability in a number of ways. First, because emerging NWSs will probably rely on inadequate command-and-control systems, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use will tend to be fairly high. Second, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt systems that allow for rapid response, the risks of inadvertent war will also be high, especially during crisis situations. Third, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt MPC&A systems that are vulnerable to overt attacks and insider thefts, the further spread of nuclear weapons could lead to rapid, destabilizing proliferation and increased opportunities for nuclear terrorism. Finally, there is reason to question whether nuclear weapons will in fact increase stability. Although nuclear weapons can cause states to be cautious about undertaking actions that can be interpreted as aggressive and can prevent states from attacking one another, this may not always be the case. While the presence of nuclear weapons did appear to help constrain U.S. and Soviet actions during the Cold War, this has generally not held true in South Asia. Many analysts conclude that Pakistan invaded Indian-controlled Kargil in 1999, at least in part, because it was confident that its nuclear weapons would deter a large-scale Indian retaliation. The Kargil war was thus in part caused by the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Thus, the optimist argument that nuclear weapons will help prevent conventional war has not always held true. Moreover, this weakness in the optimist argument should also cause us to question the second part of their argument, that nuclear weapons help prevent nuclear war as well. Conventional wars between nuclear powers can run serious risks of escalating to nuclear war.5 Based on a careful examination of nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, as well as preliminary studies of the programs in Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, this book concludes that the optimists’ arguments about the actions that emerging NWSs will probably take are overly optimistic. While it is impossible to prove that further nuclear proliferation will necessarily precipitate nuclear disasters, the potential consequences are too severe to advocate nuclear weapons proliferation in hopes that the stability predicted by the optimists will indeed occur.
Deterrence immoral

DETERRENCE IS IMMORAL.


The immorality of nuclear deterrence lies in the threat itself, not in its present or even likely consequences. Paul Ramsey also recognizes this point: "Whatever is wrong to do is wrong to threaten, if the latter means 'means to do'... If counter-population warfare is murder, then counter-population deterrence threats are murderous."17 Since it would be wrong to retaliate, and through moral intuition we know it to be wrong, then it cannot be right for us to intend to do it. Indeed moral systems depend upon some version of the so-called wrongful intentions principle: to intend to do what one knows to be wrong is itself wrong.18 The necessity of this principle is obvious from reflection about our moral experience and is not denied by any major system of morality.

DETERRENCE IS NOT MADE MORAL BASED ON THE CONDITIONAL ACTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.


The objection that it is not immoral to intend massive retaliation may also be based on the claim that the U.S. intention is entirely conditional upon the behavior of the adversary. We are intending not to attack, but to launch a strike only if the opponent attacks. Such conditional intentions seem strange because they are by nature self-extinguishing: the purpose of forming the intention to retaliate is to prevent the very circumstances in which the intended act would be performed.21 Nevertheless the wrong intentions principle applies to conditional just as to unconditional intentions. When a terrorist hijacks an airplane at gunpoint and threatens the lives of his hostages, the immorality of his threat is not canceled by its being conditional upon the behavior of the officials he seeks to coerce. The same is true of nuclear deterrence. In addition to the leaders who decide to launch a first strike, millions who have no part in the decision will die or suffer. Thus one does not significantly change the immorality of the threat to kill innocent persons by making it conditional upon the actions of national leaders.
INTENDING TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONDITIONALLY CAN BE MORALLY OBJECTIONABLE, EVEN IF THEY ARE NEVER USED

Now, I have argued elsewhere, and at some length, for the plausibility of a principle more or less equivalent to 2′. Very briefly my argument is this. When a person freely performs what she admits is an immoral action, we are in a position not merely to assess what she has done but also to assess her for having done it. We are in a position to make, that is to say, a judgment not only of the relevant action, in such cases, but also of the agent. It is tempting, of course, precisely because we are making a negative judgment about the agent for what she has done in such cases, to think of that judgment as inextricably connected with the fact that she has actually performed the presumptively immoral action. And this much, perhaps, is true: the particular opprobrium an agent bears in such cases is opprobrium due to what she has done. What is also true, however, and much more important, it seems to me, is this: an agent does not have to have succeeded in doing wrong, nor even to have tried and failed, in order to bear exactly the same sort of opprobrium as an agent who succeeded in doing wrong. A person who plans to do wrong, for example, but who is, through no fault of her own, prevented from putting her plans into action, will typically be held to be liable to at least some opprobrium simply because of her plans. Similarly, someone who actually gets to the point where she is just about to do wrong, just about to pull the trigger, for example, and thus kill her hated guiltless rival—but who is prevented from doing so through circumstances that are entirely fortuitous, will be judged, in morals if not in laws, as being just as reprehensible as the person who actually manages to do the wrong that she was about to do.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE VIOLATES THE JUS IN BELLO CONDITIONS OF JUST WAR DOCTRINE

It is in connection with the principles of jus in bello that charges of the immorality of nuclear deterrence arise. Threatening civilian populations completely disregards the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Deterrence requires that millions be threatened as a means to influence the decisions of a few leaders. Thus deterrence requires that we treat human life as a mere object of a policy and a means rather than an end. The theologian Paul Ramsey draws the analogy of deterring reckless automobile drivers by tying babies to the front bumpers of their cars. He points out that this would be no way to regulate traffic even if it succeeds in regulating it perfectly, for “such a system makes innocent human lives the direct object of attack and uses them as a mere means for restraining the drivers of automobiles.”
NUCLEAR RETALIATION WOULD BE AN IMMORAL RESPONSE TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK


Yet even if nuclear deterrence does not violate the rights of its hostages, it is nevertheless immoral. It commits a nation to a course of retaliation, since if a nation bluffs its adversary may learn this through espionage. But if deterrence does fail, and the opponent launches an attack, there would be no rational or moral reason to carry out the threatened retaliation. Indeed the leaders of the stricken nation would have conclusive moral reasons not to retaliate. Retaliation would punish the leaders who committed this unprecedented crime and would prevent them from dominating the postwar world; but it would accomplish no deterrent effect while massacring millions of innocent civilians in the attacking nation, and in other nations, would set back postwar recovery for the world immeasurably, and might even render the earth unfit for human survival.

DETERRENCE VIOLATES THE WRONGFUL INTENTIONS PRINCIPLE


While the absence of a desire to kill is important, it is not sufficient to exculpate our national leaders for the intention to retaliate. What counts in establishing the immorality of their intentions are the preparations they make to retaliate, the signals they send to the adversary, and courses of action that may leave their hands tied and make retaliation almost automatic. These plans and actions underscore their willingness, in order to deter aggression, to accept the risk that in the end they will apply the sanctions and allow the world to be consumed.
THE CONDITIONAL NATURE OF DETERRENCE THREATS DOES NOT EXONERATE THEM FROM THE WRONGFUL INTENTIONS PRINCIPLE


p. 52.

The objection that it is not immoral to intend massive retaliation may also be based on the claim that the U.S. intention is entirely conditional upon the behavior of the adversary. We are intending not to attack, but to launch a strike only if the opponent attacks. Such conditional intentions seem strange because they are by nature self-extinguishing: the purpose of forming the intention to retaliate is to prevent the very circumstances in which the intended act would be performed. Nevertheless the wrong intentions principle applies to conditional just as to unconditional intentions. When a terrorist hijacks an airplane at gunpoint and threatens the lives of his hostages, the immorality of his threat is not canceled by its being conditional upon the behavior of the officials he seeks to coerce. The same is true of nuclear deterrence. In addition to the leaders who decide to launch a first strike, millions who have no part in the decision will die or suffer. Thus one does not significantly change the immorality of the threat to kill innocent persons by making it conditional upon the actions of national leaders.

THE TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS RISKS USING THEM AGAINST STATES WHO ARE NOT CULPABLE FOR ANY HARM


The critical moral feature of nuclear weapons systems that frustrates the above conditions might be called "technological recalcitrance." That is to say, at present levels of technology, such weapons systems are recalcitrant to the intentions of their users: they are relatively uncontrollable, subject to accidents, and strikingly indiscriminate in the scope of their damage. Let us sketch the outward shape of the problem of technological recalcitrance manifested in nuclear weapons systems. It is a feature of such systems that the time between decision and delivery is extremely short. The delivery time of the new Pershing missiles in Europe is about nine minutes. Countering such an immediately present danger means abandoning the luxury of even modest deliberation time. Defense strategists are driven to employ increasingly complex, hair-triggered control systems capable of launching hundreds of nuclear weapons at a moment's notice. Nuclear weapons systems, thus, become technologically "slippery." Technologically slippery systems increase the risk of accidental attack and hence the risk of violating principles 1 and 3. The ever-present possibility of human error is aggravated by the use of independent automated delivery mechanisms. Almost every traditional weapons system lacked this feature. The sword, the spear, the cavalry, were relatively accident free. When Marcus Aurelius considered marching on Partha, he could be confident his attack was the result of human intention. A nuclear counterattack may occur as a consequence of technological accident, or it may occur in response to a limited, accidental launch by the other side. In neither case could the enemy be regarded as either culpable or insane.
THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NECESSARILY HARM INNOCENTS


Furthermore, the very character of nuclear weapons systems implies increased harm to noncombatants -to persons who are neither harming nor about to harm us. Nuclear weapons systems are quite different from single nuclear weapons. In such systems individual weapons occur as parts of complex attack plans designed to explode thousands of bombs in a given order and pattern. This, coupled with the indiscriminate character of the hydrogen nuclear explosion, means that civilian casualties in the event of a nuclear attack by the superpowers would be substantial. It explains why even theories designed to justify war, such as the jus ad bellum and jus in bello doctrines, have difficulty justifying the inevitable harm to noncombatants resulting from nuclear warfare.7 A nuclear strike would bring about as a matter of certainty the deaths of thousands ofpersons who could in no way be regarded as culpable. Even if one includesthe ordinary Soviet citizen along with Soviet leaders as culpable agents,thousands of children under the age of six would be killed. A nuclearexchange may also harm innocents living beyond the boundaries of targetednations. Indeed, Jonathan Schell has argued that nuclear weapons areunique in threatening the very existence of the human species.8

THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IS SHORT-CIRCUITED BY A LACK OF NEGOTIATION TIME


Next, a nuclear weapons system tends to foreclose options to negotiate and thus to frustrate the principle of proportionality. A delivery time of seven or twenty minutes forecloses the possibility of allowing the other side to respond to the initiation of hostilities and consider peace negotiations. This drawback is critical since, whether in the resolution of strikes or war, compromise is more likely the closer one moves to the brink of disaster. With conventional warfare, the steady advance of pain and death tends to weaken the idealism of its participants and bring home the costs of the struggle. With nuclear warfare, there are no costs until the final terrible moment-and then everything becomes due at once. Again, traditional weapons were more accommodating. When Louis XIV began a march against the enemy, the enemy had days or weeks to reconsider the issue in contention; and so did Louis.9
NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY MUST BE MAINTAINED. HARM TO CIVILIANS CANNOT BE “MINIMIZED.”


To conclude that the principle of discrimination means merely a "minimization" of noncombatant deaths leaves open the question of what counts as an acceptable minimum. To answer the question by reference to the principle of proportionality has the effect of reducing the principle of discrimination to the principle of proportionality, and this is an effect which flies in the face of the traditional insight that noncombatant immunity is a prior and limiting principle governing any weighing of costs and benefits. Worse, however, is the circularity that arises. Clearly, it is not an argument against a strict interpretation of noncombatant immunity to say that modern warfare as we know it would be impossible, for what is at stake is precisely the permissibility of certain aspects of modern warfare. Nor is it an argument against a strict interpretation to appeal to the right of self-defense, for, again, it is the character of the limiting conditions on the exercise of the right to self-defense that is at issue.

MCMAHAN’S DEONTOLOGICAL CRITICISM OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE


While the Deontologist's Argument seems clearly mistaken, the foregoing critique suggests that it may be possible to construct a more powerful argument against nuclear deterrence within a deontological framework. This argument would retain the claim that it would be wrong to use nuclear weapons in the ways that have to be threatened to maintain deterrence but would have as its second premise a principle similar to the "bridge principle" suggested in the last section. This similar principle is that it is wrong, other things being equal, to risk doing that which it would be wrong to do2' and wrong to support a policy which carries a risk of wrongdoing in particular a policy which makes it possible for wrong to be done in one's name or with one's authorization. The argument's third premise would then be that any policy of nuclear deterrence which it would be possible for citizens in a democracy to support would involve a risk that nuclear weapons would be used with their authorization. It follows from these three claims that it would be wrong for citizens in a democracy to support a policy of nuclear deterrence.
BENEFITS OF McMahanS APPROACH VERSUS THE DEONTOLOGIST'S ARGUMENT


The argument also has the right focus. It would not draw a radical moral distinction between the policy followed by Sinceria and that followed by Incertia. Nor would it, in the circumstances envisaged in my second example, rule out my following a policy of bluff (though, paradoxically, it would rule out my citizens being able to support my deterrent policy). The argument would not, moreover, need to be absolutist in form in order to provide a strong objection to nuclear deterrence. Because it would locate the wrongness of deterrence not in the intrinsic wrongness of having certain intentions but in the obviously important fact that the policy risks the deliberate use of nuclear weapons in ways which would be wrong, the objection to nuclear deterrence will remain quite strong even if it is conceded that it is not absolutely forbidden to risk doing what it would be wrong to do. (This being the case, it is also unnecessary to insist that the prohibition on using nuclear weapons should itself be absolute.) Finally, since the second premise need not be interpreted as an absolute principle, the argument does not imply that the pursuit of a policy of deterrence must be equally wrong as the actual use of nuclear weapons.

DETERRENCE "BLUFFS" RESULT IN LYING TO THE PUBLIC


Nuclear deterrence involves the serious possibility of at least two sorts of morally troublesome deception. First, if the thermonuclear threat is a bluff that the leadership would not actually carry out, if there is a gulf between declaratory policy and action policy, this massive public deception raises the usual moral problems that deception raises, especially deception by public officials in a democracy grounded on an informed citizenry. If the highest officials can, for years, dissemble about this most important matter, it will become too easy for them to lie on all manner of lesser matters. Second, if the leaders know, as they must, that deterrence might fail and they nevertheless still profess such confidence in it (partly to promote credibility), their confident, soothing reassurances involve improper deception damaging to the delicate bond of trust that should exist between the leaders and the citizenry in a democracy.

NUCLEAR DECISIONS LACK ANY FORM OF DEMOCRATIC CHECKS


If retaliation decisions must be virtually automatic and instantaneous, the decisions can hardly be based on moral choice which requires time-consuming reflection and consideration of alternatives, as well as, in the American system, at least some role for the national legislature and even for public opinion. So nuclear deterrence demands immorally casual decisions, leaving decisionmakers with no choice but to act hastily and leaving citizens and even their elected representatives with no possibility of meaningful participation. As technology continues to yield quicker and ever more accurate missiles, making a disarming Soviet first strike at least theoretically possible, pressure mounts to adopt "launch on warning" policies ("Use 'em or lose 'em") or even to turn the enterprise over completely to fully automatic computer operation, thus heightening this particular moral problem of maintaining human, moral choice.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS ABSOLUTELY IMMORAL.


A number of philosophers have held that it is indeed immoral to threaten an immoral action. Michael Walzer, for example, endorses Paul Ramsey's declaration that "whatever is wrong to do is wrong to threaten," clearly holding that nuclear threats are immoral and that our deterrent policy is essentially a "commitment to murder." Likewise, Anthony Kenny holds that "NATO defense policy involves a readiness to commit murder on a gigantic scale." The threat to do so is, of course, conditional, but "one may not intend even conditionally to do what is forbidden absolutely." If deterrence is successful, of course, then the threatened immoral action will not in fact happen. But this is not thought to make much moral difference since we are in effect holding the civilian population of the other nation hostage. Ramsey, for example, views the targeting of cities as morally equivalent to tying children to the bumpers of cars in order to ensure that people drive carefully, and Douglas Lackey contends that nuclear deterrence is analogous to McCoy kidnapping Hatfield's child and wiring him to explosives in order to prevent Hatfield's attack. McCoy, he says, has no right to increase the chance of Hatfield's child dying.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS AN IMMORAL AND PARADOXICAL THREAT.


And it seems stunningly foolish, counterproductive, indeed self-destructive for the Royal Navy to reveal that the United Kingdom's last line of deterrence, its ultimate safeguard against nuclear attack—the certainty of retaliation—is not certain at all. In fact, any fanatical enemy could figure it had a 50-50 chance that Gordon Brown did not order retaliation. In all likelihood, it's probably 90-10 against; what prime minister, what human being would want to put in his own handwriting the order to kill tens or hundreds of millions of innocent civilians—especially at the point when the threat to do so had failed to deter the attack it was meant to deter? The Letter of Last Resort serves at least one purpose: It reawakens us to the awful unresolved paradox of nuclear deterrence. We must make any potential nuclear attackers believe that they would be vaporized—suffer national nuclear holocaust—if they hit us first with nuclear weapons. And yet if they went ahead and did it, if the genocidal threat failed to deter them, there would be no point in carrying out retaliation; it would be useless mass murder, genocide pure if not simple. On the other hand, if the potential foe thought that we might not retaliate once the threat served no purpose—that retaliatory "deterrence" would, in essence, turn out to be a bluff—it would encourage those disposed to strike first to cause a nuclear holocaust without fear of reprisal. We had to threaten genocide—and convince people we meant to carry out our threat—in order to prevent genocide.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IS USELESS AND IMMORAL ONCE A WAR STARTS.


Most people think they know the "correct" or "expected" response to the first category. Our entire Cold War defense strategy rested on the premise of "massive retaliation" resulting in "MAD--Mutual Assured Destruction." The idea was (and still is, I suppose) that no nation would be foolish enough to launch a nuclear weapon at the United States because the response FROM the United States would be immediate, total and nuclear as well. But when you actually put yourselves in the shoes of the person who would have to make that call, you should immediately see some striking ethical (as well as pragmatic) dilemmas.

Let's start with the massive first strike scenario envisioned in the Cold War. Imagine, if you will, that Russia (or some other heavily armed nuclear power of the future) has launched all (or nearly all) of its nuclear arms at you in the hopes of knocking out your retaliatory capability all at once. In this scenario you would actually have some warning BEFORE any of the bombs go off that those bombs are on the way. What is the correct response? What would you do? The heart of the MAD theory rests on the assumption that you will implement "massive retaliation" at this point. But let's think about this. The other side has already launched all of their weapons. Most of the people in your country are going to die--either in the initial blast or from the radioactive fallout afterward. The majority of your military forces will be wiped out. The ecological devastation facing those who do survive will be severe to say the least. Your nation, for all intents and purposes, will cease to exist in 15 to 20 minutes. Nothing you can do can stop this. What is the point, at THIS theoretical moment, of pressing the proverbial button and responding in kind? By doing so, what do you accomplish? You will wipe out most of the people of another once great nation. That's hundreds of millions (or possibly billions if we consider a China scenario) of deaths on your hands. You will be adding a tremendous amount of ecological devastation onto an already bleak situation. The dust and debris that you will kick into the air will result in an even more severe nuclear winter scenario than if you simply do nothing. This will kill tens of millions of people around the world who weren't a member of either warring nation-state. Maybe hundreds of millions. You will add to the mass extinctions of other species as well. You might be contributing the destruction of all civilization as we know it. And you won't save a single member of your own country. Even worse, if the attacking nation is a non-democratic one (and democratic nations tend to not go to war with one another), then you are killing millions of people even within that attacking nation state who had no say whatsoever in your being attacked. Who, but a monster, could make this decision? And yet, our nuclear "defense" policy rests on convincing other nuclear-armed nations that our leaders are, in fact, monstrous enough to respond using massive nuclear retaliation in the event we are attacked. And so does theirs. It rests on the assumption that our need for revenge will trump any other rational, humane or compassionate considerations in the moment. Can this be ethical? What does it say about us? And might it be even more un-ethical to call massive retaliation un-ethical if it actually does reduce the effectiveness of MAD by making potential attackers thinking we WILL respond humanely?
NUCLEAR WAR WILL KILL CHILDREN AND THAT IS UNMISTAKEABLY IMMORAL.


But no matter how either or both of these lines of argument may be exploited and extended to justify the deliberate killing of many non-combatants in war, they cannot support the intentional or knowing killing of those persons who are both unmistakably and unequivocally non-combatants in causal terms and also wholly innocent in all the morally relevant respects. Children, of whom there are many in all countries, are the clearest example of such persons. They are fully noncombatants in all the relevant causal respects, and clearly so. If they are reasonably young children, they literally cannot fight or engage in any of the other activities that might have the requisite causal connection with more direct war-making activities. Hence, to kill them intentionally or knowingly is not to use deadly force directed against either a culpable or a nonculpable deadly attacker, no matter how relaxed the relevant causal criteria may be thought to become in time of war. And they are innocent in each and every one of the senses in which it might be permissible to kill in the course of war those who are not. Given the way social, institutional, and political life is organized in all countries, they play no role in bringing about the war or in supporting it through their actions, commitments, and the like. Nor, typically, have they had any hand or choice in being wherever they happen to be once war begins, or as it continues, so that it can correctly be said that they assumed those risks of being killed that are known to be associated with the occurrence of war. They are, a large and indeterminate number of them, fully noncombatants and wholly innocent in all of the relevant senses. They are the clearest kind of case, but there are also many other individuals in all countries at war to whom these same descriptions and conclusions apply.

THE MERE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A THREAT TO THE PEACE

John W. Lango, prof. @ CUNY, Jan. '05, “Preventative war, just war principles, and the United Nations,” Journal of Ethics, p. 254

The controversy today concerning the Bush administration’s preventive war policy is reminiscent of the controversy two decades ago concerning the Ronald Reagan administration’s nuclear war fighting policy. In the midst of the earlier controversy, McGeorge Bundy advocated the efficacy of “existential deterrence”: Instead of relying on credible threats about nuclear retaliation – such as threats about escalation dominance in a limited nuclear war – existential deterrence does not need “provocative threats.” For the mere possession of nuclear weapons – their mere existence – creates “terrible and unavoidable uncertainties” about how (or even whether) they would be used in retaliation, uncertainties that are sufficient for deterrence. Analogously, my claim is that the mere possession of WMD by states – even ones that do not (apparently) have aggressive intentions – creates terrible and unavoidable uncertainties about what could happen, uncertainties that constitute a threat to the peace.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE INTRINSICALLY ILLEGAL, DISARMAMENT IS THE ONLY SOLUTION
William Walker, prof @ Univ. of St. Andrews, May '07, “Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment,” International Affairs, p. 451-452
This returns us squarely to the issue of disarmament. Given the many dangers of nuclear catastrophe arising from the behavior of states and non-state actors in a globalizing environment, the pursuit of nuclear disarmament has a security logic that is stronger than ever. As so often in history, however, the more desirable it appears, the more elusive it becomes as order fragments and states look to their own defenses. It is a mistake, however, to regard nuclear disarmament as an ideal serving a utopian aim. According to Immanuel Kant, the pre-eminent philosopher of the enlightenment, ideals should be ‘construed as regulative principles, which guide us down the path to amelioration’. The commitment to disarmament represents a direction of travel — towards an increased political and instrumental restraint, now serving the avoidance of both nuclear war and catastrophic terrorism. It neither requires nor necessarily welcomes a precipitous abandonment of deterrence. The political tenacity and value of the disarmament norm have a deeper significance which takes us back to Horkheimer and Adorno. It signifies that nuclear weapons are intrinsically illegitimate, and that any legitimacy or legality afforded to them has to be contingent and temporary. They are intrinsically illegitimate because they confer the capacity to commit acts involving the indiscriminate annihilation of lives and worlds. Every holder of nuclear weapons, whether a democracy or tyranny, a state or non-state actor, is capable of this annihilation by accident or design. The great dilemma and incipient tragedy of the nuclear age is that this latent ‘radical evil’ , as it may justifiably be called, gives substance to nuclear deterrence and is thereby ascribed value in international relations. If an international order without nuclear deterrence is beyond achievement, then the possessors of nuclear weapons have an exceptional responsibility to exercise restraint, act reasonably, pursue an inclusive politics resting on public reason, and honour the universal desire for protection against annihilation. This grave duty now falls on nine nuclear-armed states. The greatest danger — and opportunity — lies in their infectious disregard — and regard — for the responsibilities that fall upon them.

THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONSTITUTES A GRAVE THREAT TO THE WORLD.
For many years, the United States has distrusted rogue nations, has avoided helping them, and even has imposed sanctions on them. But generally speaking, the United States has not felt substantially threatened by them. Despite their hostile rhetoric and intentions, rogue nations generally have lacked the ability to combat the United States militarily in a conventional conflict. The United States has known this, and so have the rogue nations, and this understanding has promoted peace. But Iran and North Korea now appear to be developing nuclear weapons. With such weapons, these nations could threaten to attack the United States or its allies in a very serious manner. Merely by possessing such weapons, Iran might bring an end to Israel; as Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense Ephraim Sneh has said, when faced with the threat of nuclear weapons in Iranian hands, "most Israelis would prefer not to live here; most Jews would prefer not to come here with their families; and Israelis who can live abroad will." Iran and North Korea also could prevent or discourage the United States from deploying military forces in areas where they possibly might face attack. Or they could allow their nuclear weapons, intentionally or unintentionally, to fall into the hands of terrorists who might use them against the United States.
Nuclear accident risk

THE PURSUIT OF DETERRENCE IS MAKING THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH HIGHER
For example, the budgets for offensive nuclear forces and those for all defensive measures indicate that the major nuclear powers now allocate about a hundred times as much to deterrence as to the prevention or mitigation of a catastrophic accident or human error. Though hidden from public scrutiny, the same imbalance exists - and is far more dangerous - in the tradeoffs military planners make between enhancing deterrence and reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war. While they have switched off wartime targeting and taken some missile forces off alert, Russian strategists continue to keep part of their forces on a hair-trigger posture to enhance deterrence against an implausible U.S. surprise attack. U.S. military leaders likewise keep some of their forces on continuous alert, feeding the arguments of Russian planners that their missiles must be ready for launch at a moment's notice. Unless addressed, this skewed cosmic gamble will persist for years, placing nearly all bets on deterrence, with little insurance against human folly.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE CONTRIBUTES TO A POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH.
As for the prevention through deterrence of large-scale nuclear war, it can be argued that every decrease in the chance of a nuclear first strike that results from fear of a retaliatory second strike is matched by an increase in the chance of a nuclear first strike that results from accident or mistake, human or mechanical failure; that every decrease in the chance that innocent millions will die from an undeterred first strike is matched by an increase in the chance that innocent millions will die from a nuclear second strike that cannot be stopped after initial deterrence has failed.

PROLIFERATION MAKES ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH LIKELY
(Nathan Busch, Professor of Government at Christopher Newport University, 2004, “No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation” p 281-314)
Will Emerging NWSs Be Likely to Avoid Inadvertent Use?
This study has demonstrated that the further spread of nuclear weapons would probably increase the risks of inadvertent use. As we have seen, the risks of inadvertent use are relatively high among current NWSs, and there is little reason to think that emerging NWSs will avoid these risks. The pressures to build survivable forces caused both the United States and Russia to develop systems that allowed for launch-on-warning. In order to allow for LOW, they placed their nuclear weapons on permanent alert in the early 1960s, which would allow the weapons to be launched within fifteen minutes from a detected attack. They also developed sophisticated early-warning systems to detect incoming nuclear attacks. As pessimists have argued, the policies of LOW require rapid decision-making, which significantly increases the risks of panic-launches due to miscalculation or false warnings.

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264898
WEAPONS ARE CURRENTLY ON HAIR-TRIGGER ALERT- THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ACCIDENT IS HIGH.


Nuclear accidents pose the greatest threat to the precariously balanced Russian-American nuclear equation. The two countries' thousands of nuclear weapons still stand poised on hair-trigger alert against each other. Even when the system is healthy, technological malfunctions, faulty intelligence, misperceptions, and crisis mismanagement are only a misstep away. Today the system is failing. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's doomsday machine has been allowed to fall into disrepair. Indeed, the Russian nuclear infrastructure and command system are so frayed that if they belonged to the United States, regulations would compel the secretary of defense to declare the force unsafe and stand it down. Yet, instead of dismantling this overworked machine, Russia's January 2000 national security doctrine extends nuclear weapons' missions to "repel armed aggression," a formulation that encompasses almost any scenario. In a future crisis -- with NATO, to take an often-invoked example -- this unrealistic strategy could pressure the Russian leadership to make nuclear threats to bolster the doctrine's credibility. NATO leaders would feel compelled to counter such threats. Any escalation thereafter would put the United States at the mercy of Russia's intelligence, warning, and command-and-control capacities. The sinking of the Kursk submarine revealed Russia's technological, operational, and decision-making competence today. And that was an exercise, not a conflict.
Nuclear theft/terrorism

THERE IS ALWAYS A RISK OF NUCLEAR THEFT.
The risk of outsider or insider theft is dominated by those facilities or transport legs where nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material exist that have the weakest security because terrorists and thieves are more likely to choose those points of attack and more likely to succeed if they do. The probability of successful outsider theft depends on the security levels at the various sites or transport legs and the levels of capability the terrorists could bring to bear to steal what they wanted from them. Terrorists are likely to face substantial uncertainties on both points but the information available to defenders about what capabilities terrorists might have is far more limited. No one really know how clever a plan, with how many attackers, what weapons, or what capabilities, terrorists might be able to bring to bear to accomplish a nuclear theft.

THEFT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE, AS ADVERSARIES CAN ADAPT TO CHANGES IN SECURITY.
Second, intelligent and adaptive adversaries may react to security upgrades not by giving up but by increasing their capabilities recruiting more people, buying better weapons, and developing more sophisticated tactics. If nuclear facilities need only defend against a handful of outsiders with limited armament, or one insider, relatively simple and low-cost security upgrades will be sufficient. If, on the other hand, nuclear facilities must withstand large teams of well-trained and well-armed militants, and the risk of large insider conspiracies is high, then the security measures needed to reduce the risk of theft to an acceptable level would be expensive and complex. There are presumably some constraints on terror groups' ability to increase their capabilities, but no one knows for sure where the upper bound lies.

THEFT IS AN EMPIRICALLY VERIFIED POSSIBILITY – THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST 18 CASES.
The principal source of black market nuclear material is likely to be nuclear theft, by outsiders or insiders not directly connected to terrorist groups. Numerous cases of theft of weapons-usable nuclear material, apparently with the intention of selling the stolen nuclear material on the black market, have occurred. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA; 2005) has documented eighteen seizures of stolen HEU or separated plutonium confirmed by the states concerned. More incidents have occurred, but the states in question have not been willing to confirm them.
THE SOLUTION TO NUCLEAR TERRORISM HAS TO BE PREEMPTIVE – ONCE THEY GET NUKES, IT’S OVER.

Once terrorists have acquired a nuclear weapon or the materials to make one, the policy options available to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism become far more limited. The great advantage of policies focused on keeping nuclear weapons and materials locked down at their source is the certainty of location; rather than searching for a needle in a haystack, the nations in control of these items know where they are. But once a nuclear weapon or the nuclear material to make one has walked out the door, it could be anywhere, and the problems of finding and recovering it multiply a thousand fold. Intelligence efforts focused on detecting the recruitment and activities involved in making a crude nuclear bomb should be expanded, but the operations needed to make a bomb could be small and difficult to detect (Bunn and Wier 2006 [this volume]). As one U.S. government study put it, "a small group of people," without any "access to the classified literature," using "only modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without arousing suspicion," could potentially make a crude nuclear bomb, if they obtained the necessary nuclear material. U.S. Efforts to rebuild failed states, avoid future failed states, and help countries gain control over areas the CIA refers to as "stateless zones" could help limit terrorists' access to sanctuaries where they could work on a bomb program, but such a program would also have a significant chance of being carried out undetected in a machine shop in any country in the world.

GUARDING BORDERS DOESN’T SOLVE NUCLEAR TERRORISM.

Efforts to install nuclear detectors at key border crossings, to make it more difficult for terrorists to transport such items from wherever they acquire them to a safe location where they can work on them, should continue but the nuclear materials for a bomb would easily fit in a briefcase, their radiation is weak and difficult to detect, and nuclear terrorists and smugglers are likely to pick routes that are not monitored by nuclear detection equipment. Attempting to protect the United States from nuclear terrorism by detecting and stopping nuclear contraband at the border is like a football team defending at its own goal line but with that goal line stretched across thousands of kilometers, much of it unguarded wilderness, and with millions of people and vehicles legitimately crossing it every year.
THE USA NO BUENO AT SECURING ITS OWN NUKES.
Looking next at the U.S. safety record in transporting and handling nuclear weapons, again there is more cause for relief than for complacency. There have, for example, been at least twenty-four occasions when U.S. aircraft have accidentally released nuclear weapons and at least eight incidents in which U.S. nuclear weapons were involved in plane crashes or fires (Sagan 1993:185; Williams and Cantelon 1988:239-245). In 1980, during routine maintenance of a Titan I1 missile in Arkansas, an accident with a wrench caused a conventional explosion that sent the nuclear warhead 600 feet through the air (Barasch 1983:42). In another incident an H-bomb was accidentally dropped over North Carolina; only one safety switch worked, preventing the bomb from detonating (Barasch 1983:41). In 1966 two U.S. planes collided over Palomares, Spain, and four nuclear weapons fell to the ground, causing a conventional explosion that contaminated a large, populated area with plutonium. One hydrogen bomb was lost for three months. In 1968 a U.S. plane carrying four H-bombs caught fire over Greenland. The crew ejected, and there was a conventional explosion that scattered plutonium over a wide area (Sagan 1993:156-203). None of these accidents produced nuclear explosions, but recent safety studies have concluded that this must partly be attributed to good luck. These studies revealed that the design of the W-79 nuclear artillery shell contained a previously unsuspected design flaw that could lead to an unintended nuclear explosion in certain circumstances. In consequence the artillery shells had to be secretly withdrawn from Europe in 1989 (Sagan 1993:184; Smith 1990). In other words, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has its own safety problems related to its dependence on highly computerized warning and detection systems, its Cold War practice of patrolling oceans and skies with live nuclear weapons, and its large stockpile size. Even where U.S. scientists have developed special safety technologies, they are not always used. The presumption that Third World countries lack the technical competence to be trusted with nuclear weapons fits our stereotypes about these countries' backwardness, but it distracts us from asking whether we ourselves have the technical infallibility the weapons ideally require.

EACH NEW PROLIFERATOR INCREASES THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Despite nearly universal opposition, North Korea has developed a small nuclear arsenal, and Iran appears to be following in its footsteps. Other states, particularly in the Middle East, are starting nuclear power programs modeled after that of Iran. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile materials is thus dangerously close to a tipping point. Beyond this danger, there are still tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the world. If just one of these thousands of weapons fell into the hands of terrorists, it could be detonated with catastrophic results. So, although the old danger of a massive nuclear exchange between great powers has declined, a new risk looms of a few nuclear detonations being set off by a terrorist group or a nuclear-capable rogue state, or of a nuclear power making a tragic mistake. The threat of nuclear terrorism is already serious, and, as more nations acquire nuclear weapons or the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons, it will increase
TERRORISTS CAN GET NUKE FROM STATES LIKE PAKISTAN

Graham Allison January/February 2010 (Director at Belfar Center for Science and Intl Affairs, Prof of Govt, Faculty Chair of the Dubai Initiative at Harvard’s JFK School of Government) “Nuclear Disorder” Foreign Affairs, pg. 78-80

As Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has noted, nuclear terrorism is "the most serious danger the world is facing." In 2007, the U.S. Congress established the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. The commission, of which I am a member, issued its report to Congress and the new administration in December 2008. It included two provocative judgments: first, that if the world continued on its current trajectory, the odds of a successful nuclear or biological terrorist attack somewhere in the world in the next five years were greater than even, and second, "Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan." Over the past eight years, as its stability and authority have become increasingly uncertain, the Pakistani government has tripled its arsenal of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons material. During this same period, the leadership of al Qaeda has moved from Afghanistan to ungoverned areas inside the Pakistani border, the Taliban have become a much more effective insurgent force within Pakistan, and the military leader who ruled Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, has been replaced by a fragile, fledging, splintered democracy. Pakistan's military has grown increasingly reliant on its nuclear arsenal to deter India's overwhelming superiority in conventional arms. This strategy requires the dispersal of nuclear weapons (to prevent Indian preemption) and, especially in crises, looser command and control. In 2002, India and Pakistan went to the brink of war -- a war that both governments thought might go nuclear. After Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists with links to Pakistani intelligence services killed 173 people in a dramatic attack in Mumbai in November 2008, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh displayed exquisite restraint. But he has warned unambiguously that the next major terrorist attack supported or sponsored by Pakistan will trigger a sharp military response. In October 2009, Taliban extremists wearing Pakistani army uniforms occupied the government's military headquarters in Rawalpindi. Had they instead penetrated a nuclear weapons storage facility, they could have stolen the fissile core of a nuclear bomb. More troubling is the question of what would happen to Pakistan's estimated 100 nuclear bombs, and even larger amount of nuclear material, if the government itself were to fall.
THE ODDS OF A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK ARE HIGH

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When asked about this, U.S. officials suggest that Pakistan's arsenal is secure: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently stated, "I'm quite comfortable that the security arrangements for the Pakistani nuclear capabilities are sufficient and adequate." History offers a compelling counter to these claims. In 2004, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, A. Q. Khan, was arrested for selling nuclear weapons technology and even bomb designs to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Khan created what the head of the IAEA called the "Wal-Mart of private-sector proliferation." Khan was enabled by an extended period of instability in Pakistan. Could uncertainty and instability in Pakistan today provide similarly propitious opportunities for mini-Khans to proliferate nuclear technology? That al Qaeda has been significantly weakened by the U.S. military's focused Predator and Special Forces attacks on its leadership in the ungoverned regions of Pakistan is good news. The bad news is that bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, remain alive, active, and desperate. On 9/11, al Qaeda demonstrated the capacity to organize and execute a large-scale terrorist attack more operationally challenging than detonating a nuclear weapon. As the 9/11 Commission documented, al Qaeda has been seriously seeking nuclear weapons since the early 1990s. The commission's report provides evidence about two Pakistani scientists who met with bin Laden and Zawahiri in Afghanistan to discuss nuclear weapons. These scientists were founding members of Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, which is ostensibly a charitable agency that was created to support projects in Afghanistan. But the foundation's board included a fellow scientist knowledgeable about nuclear weapons construction, two Pakistani air force generals, one Pakistani army general, and an industrialist who owned Pakistan's largest foundry. Bin Laden called the acquisition of nuclear weapons al Qaeda's "religious duty" and has announced the movement's aspiration to "kill four million Americans." As former CIA Director George Tenet wrote in his memoir, "The most senior leaders of al Qa'ida are still singularly focused on acquiring WMD [weapons of mass destruction]." "The main threat," he argued, "is the nuclear one. I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives desperately want to go." As the noose tightens around al Qaeda's neck, its motivation to mount a spectacular attack to demonstrate its prowess and rally its supporters grows. Bin Laden has challenged his followers to "trump 9/11." Nothing could realize that aspiration so successfully as a mushroom cloud over a U.S. city.
THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM IS HIGH – TERRORISTS HAVE THE MEANS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Graham Allison 2007 (Director at Belfar Center for Science and International Affairs, Prof of Government and Chair of the Dubai Initiative at Harvard's JFK School of Government, "The Three 'Nos' Knows" http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-three-nos-knows-1843/

MUELLER IS entitled to his opinion that the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is "exaggerated" and "overwrought." But analysts of various political persuasions, in and out of government, are virtually unanimous in their judgment to the contrary. As the national-security community learned during the Cold War, risk = likelihood x consequences. Thus, even when the likelihood of nuclear Armageddon was small, the consequences were so catastrophic that prudent policymakers felt a categorical imperative to do everything that feasibly could be done to prevent that war. Today, a single nuclear bomb exploding in just one city would change our world. Given such consequences, differences between a 1 percent and a 20 percent likelihood of such an attack are relatively insignificant when considering how we should respond to the threat. Richard Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb who Enrico Fermi once called "the only true genius I had ever met", told Congress in March that he estimated a "20 percent per year probability [of a nuclear explosion-not just a contaminated, dirty bomb-a nuclear explosion] with American cities and European cities included." My Harvard colleague Matthew Bunn has created a model in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science that estimates the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack over a ten-year period to be 29 percent-identical to the average estimate from a poll of security experts commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005. My book, Nuclear Terrorism, states my own best judgment that, on the current trend line, the chances of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade are greater than 50 percent. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has expressed his own view that my work may even underestimate the risk. Warren Buffet, the world's most successful investor and legendary odds-maker in pricing insurance policies for unlikely but catastrophic events, concluded that nuclear terrorism is "inevitable." He stated, "I don't see any way that it won't happen." To assess the threat one must answer five core questions: who, what, where, when and how? Who could be planning a nuclear terrorist attack? Al-Qaeda remains the leading candidate. According to the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Al-Qaeda has been substantially reconstituted-but with its leadership having moved from a medieval Afghanistan to Pakistan-a nation that actually has nuclear weapons. As former CIA Director George J. Tenet's memoir reports, Al-Qaeda's leadership has remained "singularly focused on acquiring WMDs" and that "the main threat is the nuclear one." Tenet concluded, "I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives want to go." What nuclear weapons could terrorists use? A ready-made weapon from the arsenal of one of the nuclear-weapons states or an elementary nuclear bomb constructed from highly enriched uranium made by a state remain most likely. As John Foster, a leading U.S. bomb-maker and former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, wrote a quarter of a century ago, "If the essential nuclear materials are at hand, it is possible to make an atomic bomb using information that is available in the open literature." Where could terrorists acquire a nuclear bomb? If a nuclear attack occurs, Russia will be the most likely source of the weapon or material. A close second, however, is North Korea, which now has ten bombs worth of plutonium, or Pakistan with sixty nuclear bombs. Finally, research reactors in forty developing and transitional countries still hold the essential ingredient for nuclear weapons. When could terrorists launch the first nuclear attack? If terrorists bought or stole a nuclear weapon in good working condition, they could explode it today. If terrorists acquired one hundred pounds of highly enriched uranium, they could make a working elementary nuclear bomb in less than a year.
TERRORISTS COULD EASILY ACQUIRE AND TRANSPORT A NUCLEAR WEAPON

Graham Allison 2007 (Director at Belfar Center for Science and International Affairs, Prof of Government and Chair of the Dubai Initiative at Harvard's JFK School of Government, "The Three 'Nos' Knows" http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-three-nos-knows-1843/

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THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK IS HIGH—SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD GUARANTEE MASSIVE DESTRUCTION.


The threat of a nuclear attack by terrorists has never been greater. Over the past two decades, terrorist violence and destructiveness have grown. As the September 11, 2001, attacks demonstrated, al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda–inspired terrorists desire to inflict mass casualties. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have expressed interest in and searched for unconventional means of attack, such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Of these weapons, only a nuclear detonation will guarantee immediate massive destruction. A nuclear explosion would immediately devastate the heart of a city and could kill hundreds of thousands of people. In the longer term, hundreds of thousands more could suffer from radiation sickness and cancer, and thousands of square miles of property would experience radioactive contamination requiring several years and billions of dollars to decontaminate. The broader economic costs of the attack could soar into the trillions of dollars, potentially threatening the national economy and even disrupting the global economy. The probability of nuclear attack has increased because traditional deterrence—threatening assured destruction against a valued asset such as a national territory—does not work against the terrorist groups most likely to covet nuclear weapons. Such groups are usually not tied to a particular geographic location. Moreover,
these terrorist organizations are often guided by religious, quasi-religious, or cult leaders who align themselves with a supreme being rather than with a nation-state that needs protection.

STOPPING PROLIFERATION IS KEY- THE MORE COUNTRIES WITH NUKEs, THE GREATER THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK.


Preventing nuclear terrorism is also closely connected to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. By reducing the number of countries with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials, terrorists will have fewer places to buy or steal these critical components of nuclear terrorism. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is at the forefront of multilateral efforts to inspect nuclear facilities to try to detect diversion of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Presently, 650 IAEA inspectors are responsible for inspecting nine hundred nuclear facilities in ninety-one countries. The annual budget of the IAEA is about $120 million—comparable to the payroll of the Washington Redskins football team.

NOT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SECURE- IT ONLY TAKES ONE TO ALLOW FOR A NUCLEAR ATTACK.


The challenge is formidable. Russia has thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, including some small enough to fit in a suitcase. North Korea has nukes it might be willing to sell to the highest bidder. And there is enough enriched uranium and plutonium in the world to make 100,000 nuclear weapons or more. Most of the bombs and fuel are under secure control. But "security for others is appalling," according to a 2008 study by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. At the same time, NTI recently reported that as a result of cooperative international efforts, considerable progress has been made — including 17 countries' elimination of "all of the weapons-usable nuclear material on their soil." The gravest threat comes in South Asia, where both Pakistan and India are expanding their production of weapons-grade material. Pakistan is especially worrisome because its political instability creates a potential for nukes to escape control. But the summit isn't going to address the arms race on the subcontinent, a topic considered too difficult for immediate progress. Nor will it be able to elicit cooperation from Iran or North Korea, which were not invited because they have failed to comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The relatively easier tasks will be hard enough. First is getting participating nuclear states to lock up their nukes and fuel and provide a comprehensive inventory of what they have and where. Second is forging agreement between Russia and the United States to reduce their stockpiles of tactical nukes — which becomes a bit more plausible now that they have shown they can work together on strategic weapons. The success of the summit has to be judged on whether the leaders unite on a commitment to tangible deeds, not mere expressions of good intent.
NATIONS LIKE RUSSIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE THE PERFECT CONDITIONS FOR LOOSE NUKES TO GET INTO THE WRONG HANDS.


Mainly in Russia. Before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 27,000 nuclear weapons and enough weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to triple that number. Since, severe economic distress, rampant crime, and widespread corruption in Russia and other former Soviet countries have fed concerns in the West about loose nukes, underpaid nuclear scientists, and the smuggling of nuclear materials. Security at Russia’s nuclear storage sites remains worrisome. The former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—where the Soviets based many of their nuclear warheads—safely returned their Soviet nuclear weapons to post-communist Russia in the 1990s, but all three countries still have stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Ukraine and Kazakhstan also have nuclear power plants the byproducts of which cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb but might tempt terrorists trying to make a “dirty bomb”—a regular explosive laced with lower-grade radioactive material. Some experts also worry about Pakistan, a relatively recent nuclear power with untested security systems, dozens of nuclear weapons, and no shortage of Islamist militants. The United States recently offered to help Pakistan improve its nuclear security measures, an offer which Pakistan has tacitly accepted since November 2001.

PAKISTAN IS A MAJOR SECURITY CONCERN-THE NEW COMMAND SYSTEM, TERRORIST PRESENCE, AND UNCLEAR REGULATIONS MEANS TERRORISTS CAN GET A HOLD OF VALUABLE INFORMATION.


More likely routes for terrorists to buy or be given a nuclear weapon involve corruption among nuclear custodians, black markets, or a coup that brings to power officials sympathetic to terrorist causes. In these respects, Pakistan stands out as a vexing security concern. First, it has a relatively new nuclear command and control system. Second, al-Qaeda and Taliban forces have established a formidable presence in the region. Third, some elements of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency sympathize with the Taliban, although the extent to which the ISI has access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is unclear. Fourth, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has twice been the target of assassination attempts. Fifth, the most infamous nuclear black market originated in Pakistan. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist and the so-called father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, ran a nuclear distribution network that sprawled across Europe, Africa, and Asia and supplied nuclear programs in Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Although no evidence has emerged that Khan’s network sold nuclear materials or weapons to terrorists, his network did sell blueprints for a nuclear bomb to Libya. Conceivably, terrorists or criminals may have obtained or eventually could obtain this information. The Khan network also demonstrates that the Pakistani nuclear establishment is vulnerable to an insider threat.
RUSSIA IS VULNERABLE TO THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

Peter D. Zimmerman and Anna M. Pluta 2006 (Peter Zimmerman is a nuclear physicist, is Chair of Science and Security in the Department of War Studies and Director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College London. Anna Pluta is a researcher in the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College London and a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics. Survival Summer 2006, Vol 48 No 2, pg. 58

Lax safeguards and dire economic conditions, together with the growth of terrorism, have created incentives for the theft of nuclear material. The fact that this has so far not resulted in a nuclear terrorist attack does not, unfortunately, mean that it will not do so in the future. High levels of criminalisation and corruption, combined with economic instability and the presence of a large, inadequately secured nuclear complex, may make it relatively easy for terrorist groups to obtain nuclear materials. Russia's nuclear cities are particularly vulnerable. The ten cities housing 750,000 people remain closed. Their facilities, 'crumbling under a lack of government support', continue to house large quantities of bomb-grade materials. Louise Shelley and Robert Orttung of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at the American University have researched the influence of corrupt officials and the work of criminal and terrorist networks on technical security in the Russian weapons complex. Following a study of the closed city of Ozersk in the Chelyabinsk Oblast they found that a wide array of criminal networks exists in the city and could be used by terrorists groups to obtain nuclear material. As Shelley and Orttung point out, Chelyabinsk is on a major drug trafficking route, and drug dealers inside the closed city have connections to Tajik drug groups, which in turn may be connected to terrorist organisations. Released convicts living in Ozersk, as well as corrupt employees of the nuclear plant, may have both incentive and ability to sell nuclear materials to criminal groups. The material could be easily transported out of the city by a number of routes, ranging from conscript soldiers who guard the city to criminalised taxi drivers or construction groups. In 1998, the mayor of Krasnoyarsk-45 warned that a social explosion in his city was unavoidable unless urgent action was taken. Nuclear scientists and other workers had been underpaid for several months and basic medical supplies were lacking. In 2000 the Federal Security Bureau arrested four sailors at the nuclear submarine base in Vilyuchinsk-3 on the Kamchatka Peninsula with a stash of radioactive materials stolen from their nuclear submarine. Additional radioactive material was also later found in their homes. In December 1998 Russian authorities thwarted an attempt to steal 18.5kg of HEU, nearly enough for a nuclear bomb, from an unspecified nuclear facility in the Chelyabinsk Oblast. The theft involved an organised group of facility employees. Frost dismisses the incident on the grounds that the Russian Special Forces intercepted the thieves before they left the facility. One such success does not guarantee that all attempts to steal fissile material will be foiled.
UNEMPLOYED NUCLEAR EXPERTS GUARANTEES INFORMATION WILL FALL INTO THE WRONG HANDS.

Peter D. Zimmerman and Anna M. Pluta 2006 (Peter Zimmerman is a nuclear physicist, is Chair of Science and Security in the Department of War Studies and Director of the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s College London. Anna Pluta is is a researcher in the Centre for Science and Security Studies atKing’s College London and a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics. Survival Summer 2006, Vol 48 No 2, pg. 59

In spite of the urgent need to improve economic conditions and encourage foreign investment within the nuclear cities, no international coordinated effort to this end exists today. One such programme was the Nuclear Cities Initiative, launched jointly by the United States and Russia in 1998 to downsize and reduce the capacity of the Russian nuclear-weapons complex. Fraught with criticism for poor management and performance from the start, the scheme was incorporated into the Russian Transitions Initiative in 2003 and is now no longer active. As Russia downsizes its nuclear complex the number of unemployed nuclear experts will grow. Some have estimated that as many as 20,000–25,000 civilian jobs will be needed, but only 5,000–6,000 have been created.22 Given the difficult economic situation, the presence of organised crime and growing levels of corruption, the closed cities remain a potential source of nuclear material for terrorist groups. According to Deborah Yarsike Ball’s 2002 study of 600 Russian scientists, 21% were likely to consider relocating abroad to states such as Iran, Iraq, Syria or North Korea where they could work in their fields.23 In a 2001 study the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that more than 62% of the employees working at the nuclear cities earned less that $50 per month and 58% of the experts were forced to take second jobs to earn money. The Carnegie report highlighted poverty, inadequate salaries and a growing willingness to emigrate among the nuclear cities’ inhabitants. The lack of economic prospects in the nuclear cities has led to a growing exasperation on the part of the scientists, some 200 of whom said they would ‘work for anyone and do anything’.24 As Alisa Carrigan has found, such assertions may not pose as much of a risk with regard to proliferant states as would at first appear.25 No successful nuclear-weapons programme to date has relied on foreign scientists working for extended periods in the proliferant state. Rather, proliferators have sent their scientists to study in the nuclear state. Although the economic situation in the closed cities has gradually improved since the survey was carried out, there are no guarantees that the economic upturn will last. Should the Russian economy encounter a recession, the conditions of the 1990s will likely return to the nuclear cities.
**Proliferation risks**

**UNLESS WE ALL DISARM, EVERY STATE WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.**


Others argue more pragmatically that the more we try to keep nuclear technology from the Third World (by, for example, forbidding reprocessing) the more they will try to get it (Rose and Lester 1978). Pragmatism and justice alike seem to indicate that, if anyone is to have a nuclear capacity, then everyone should—and eventually will. If we cannot live with that result, then we must commit ourselves to a world in which no one has a nuclear capacity.

**TONS OF KNOWLEDGE ON HOW TO CREATE NUKES EXISTS- COMBINED WITH TONS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, THERE IS A LARGE LIKELIHOOD OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK.**


Add to this picture 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons: many lacking any locking device to prevent their unauthorized use and some stored at bases where a colonel with the cooperation of two lieutenants could "privatize" a dozen warheads and transfer them to world markets to convert into cash. Remember that an additional 12,000 nuclear weapons exist in various storage facilities across Russia, many in buildings with no protection other than guards whose salaries are frequently delayed for months. Beyond assembled weapons, there are approximately 70,000 nuclear weapons-equivalents in stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. A softball-sized chunk of this fissile material would provide Iran or a bin Laden terrorist group with the critical ingredient from which a crude nuclear device could be assembled. There are also biological weapons, chemical weapons, and thousands of ICBMs— and a deep pool of know-how for producing missiles and other weapons. In sum: the overriding reason Russia"s nuclear arsenal should matter most to American security appears vividly as one considers the danger of "loose nukes." Terrorists or rogue states could surreptitiously deliver one or a half-dozen nuclear weapons to attack American troops abroad or cities at home. One backpack-sized nuclear weapon in that van parked outside the Oklahoma City Federal Office Building would have caused not just the building but the city itself to disappear. One such nuclear device in the van that was used by terrorists to attack the World Trade Center would have caused Lower Manhattan to disappear. Russia could become a convenience store for weapons unless the United States takes vigorous steps to help consolidate and secure these vulnerable nuclear stockpiles. Here as elsewhere in a nonproliferation strategy, the surest defense is to stop proliferation at the source.

As the most open society in the world, this country will remain the most vulnerable to attacks, especially by weapons delivered surreptitiously— in the cargo holds of ships, in trucks and rail cars, even in express packages. In the real world of the next quarter-century, dreams of an invulnerable America are fantasy— whether Ronald Reagan's vision of a Star Wars shield that would "render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" or UN resolutions to "eliminate all nuclear weapons from earth." Anyone who doubts that terrorists could smuggle a nuclear warhead into New York City should note that they could always wrap it in a bale of marijuana. In 1991, then Senator Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar initiated a modest, bipartisan, $400-million-a-year program of investment in securing Russian nuclear weapons and materials. Together with a
contract for purchase of weaponsusable, highly enriched uranium extracted from dismantled
Russian warheads, these "cooperative threat reduction" programs have helped motivate Russian
measures in what is so far a promising effort.

**NEW PROLIFERATION WILL TRIGGER A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE**
Steve Miller and Scott Sagan 2010 (prolif experts) “Alternative nuclear futures” Dædalus (Winter),
p. 135
The most disturbing variant of this negative vision for the nuclear future would be one in which the
norm against acquisition of nuclear weapons is fractured and new NWS emerge. States that
determined for their own self-interest ed reasons to acquire nuclear weapons could defy or
ignore the NPT/IAEA system or simply withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea did). In conflict-
prone regions in which fuel cycle capabilities exist in multiple states, there arises the possibility of
the competitive pursuit of nuclear weapons (as occurred in South Asia between India and
Pakistan). If enrichment and reprocessing are more widely distributed across states, acquisition
of nuclear weapons by one power could more easily trigger nuclear acqui-sition by others. In the
past, rapid cascades of proliferation—though some times predicted—have not occurred and are
not certain to occur in the future.15 But the dynamic could well be different if the nonproliferation
regime is thought to be eroding and more nws possess the latent capability to manufacture nu-
clear weapons. The reassuring record of a past era marked by few nws, a sturdy norm against
acquisition, a reasonably sound nonproliferation regime, very in-frequent spread of nuclear
weapons to new states, and possession of fuel cycle capabilities by only a few states may not be
a reliable guide to the future if trends slide in a negative direction. Decades ago, Henry Rowen
and Albert Wohlstet-ter famously worried about the dangers of “life in a nuclear-armed crowd.”
Decades hence, we could find ourselves liv-ing in that world if unwise choices and unfortunate
preferences lead us down an undesirable nuclear path.
PROLIFERATION MAGNIFIES THE RISK OF EVERY IMPACT


Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous....” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil....” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace....” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future. Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war –
won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?
NUCLEAR SPREAD WILL CAUSE GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR

The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.17 Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the present century have made several plausible arguments based on international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states' nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power; status quo–oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and therefore, slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions. These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history of nuclear policy in the “first nuclear age,” roughly corresponding to the Cold War.18 Pessimists who predicted that some thirty or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence “rationality” according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war outside of Europe.19
Proliferation means that every major conflict will inevitably go nuclear
(National Journal 9-14-2002, “Invading Iraq Wouldn't Necessarily Make Us Safer”)

That risk dwarfs anything that Saddam Hussein could do with chemical or biological weapons. And even if he drops dead tomorrow, it is quite probable that we will experience such a catastrophe within 20 years-if not 20 months-unless we do two things that are barely on the national radar screen and that go against the grain of Republican unilateralism. The first is to spend whatever it takes to secure the vast Russian nuclear stockpile and other nuclear installations around the world. They are far more dangerous than Saddam because there is no doubt that Al Qaeda (and perhaps other terrorists) will use any unsecured weapons or fissile (bomb-making) materials against us if they can get ahold of them. The second is to get much, much more serious about stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a huge threat to civilization itself. A push to end nuclear proliferation could work only if enforced by the threat or use of pre-emptive military action-not only in Iraq but also in Iran, North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others of the more than 60 nations capable of building nuclear weapons-either on our own or through an international coalition. Doing this on our own, as Bush administration hawks prefer, could mean launching bloody invasion after invasion, at enormous cost in lives, treasure, and international standing, if rogue states call our bluff. Rallying a potent and determined coalition seems possible only if we stop thumbing our nose at world opinion, offer to scrap the bulk of our own arsenal, and renounce first use of nuclear weapons in exchange for similar concessions by others. The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation, another five or 10 potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off anonymously on our soil by terrorists or a terrorist government. Even an airtight missile defense would be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat. As to Iraq, unless we can get U.N. Security Council support for whatever we decide to do (on which, more below), either a go-it-alone U.S.-British invasion or a Bush backdown from the beating of war drums would carry incalculable risks. An invasion would, of course, end Saddam's quest for nuclear weapons and probably Saddam himself. So far, so good. But some hawks greatly underestimate the costs and risks, claiming that an easy victory in Iraq will lead to a flowering of democracy that will inspire the rest of the Arab world to follow suit, destroy the appeal of militant Islam, pave the way for Israeli-Palestinian peace, and make us all safer. This is a fantasy. Unless Saddam is overthrown from within, we would have to take Baghdad in house-to-house fighting, with many thousands of casualties. The task of pacifying and democratizing a nation that has never known freedom and hates our ally Israel would be at least as difficult as bringing peace and democracy to Afghanistan. And the administration has not made a very credible beginning there. The effects of a unilateral invasion on our national security would extend far beyond Iraq. Viewed optimistically, it might also-if accompanied by a credible threat to launch a succession of pre-emptive wars-convince Iran, Libya, North Korea, and other potential threats that we would do the same to them if they persist in developing nuclear weapons. But then again, rogue nations might react by hiding, rather than ending, their bomb-building programs. And as the cost of a policy of pre-emptive wars without end becomes apparent, American voters might balk. A U.S.-British invasion would also divert resources from the war against Al Qaeda, especially in Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda is already regrouping. It would alienate Russia and others whose cooperation we need in the vital project of securing fissile materials. It would thereby increase the danger of a nuclear attack by Al Qaeda or others. By enraging hundreds of millions of Muslims worldwide, it would swell the ranks of terrorist groups-perhaps making it easier for them to recruit nuclear engineers as well as suicide bombers-and risk a militant Islamist takeover of nuclear-armed Pakistan. Years or even decades of sometimes-bloody occupation could keep the hate-America pot boiling. With Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south demanding independence, we would have to choose between crushing those movements and alienating Turkey, a vital ally with a region of restive Kurds bordering Iraq. Many in Europe and elsewhere would see the Bush administration as less interested in
democratizing Iraq than in controlling the region's oil and in achieving world domination. All of this international ill will could doom any hope for support in fighting nuclear proliferation. Does all of this mean that a unilateral invasion should be ruled out as complete folly? Not necessarily. The dangers of backing down are also grave. It is foolish for doves to scoff at the risk that a nuclear-armed Saddam could or would launch what they say would be a "suicidal" attack on the United States. He seems entirely capable of smuggling a bomb into one of our cities, perhaps in league with Al Qaeda, and setting it off anonymously in the hope of escaping retaliation. If we stand aside while Saddam builds or buys nuclear weapons, and if at some point thereafter a bomb takes out Washington or New York, how could we be sure that Saddam was involved? The culprits might be terrorists connected, not to Iraq, but perhaps to Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, or Libya. Against whom would we retaliate? Doves also seem disingenuous in ruling out an invasion unless and until we can produce irrefutable evidence that Saddam presents an imminent nuclear threat. Most would be no less dovish after seeing such proof than they are now. After all, once Iraq has nuclear arms, an invasion would be far more perilous. So a decision not to invade now is a decision not to invade ever-not, at least, until Saddam has actually used nuclear or biological weapons or repeated his use of chemical weapons. And a Bush backdown now would surely embolden other rogue states to accelerate their nuclear programs. In short, the future will be extremely dangerous no matter what we do about Iraq. The best way out would be to use the threat of a unilateral invasion to push the U.N. Security Council to demand that Iraq submit to unconditional, unrestricted arms inspections, as proposed by President Chirac of France, followed by military action if Saddam balks or cheats or it becomes clear that inspections cannot be effective. France and Russia might go along, suggests a former Clinton administration official, if that were the only way to get a piece of the post-invasion protectorate over the world's second-largest oil supply. We should not become so fixated on Iraq that we ignore the greater dangers: Al Qaeda, loose nuclear materials in Russia and elsewhere, and nuclear proliferation. House Republicans have idiotically refused to provide adequate funding to secure nuclear stockpiles abroad. They and the Bush administration have greatly damaged the effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by spurning the closely related Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, without which more and more nations will be tempted to seek nuclear weapons. Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-weapons states, where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "the survival of civilization truly is in question from day to day," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal organizations." So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The only way to avoid such a grim future, he suggests in his memoir, Disarmament Sketches, is for the United States to lead an international coalition against proliferation by showing an unprecedented willingness to give up the vast majority of our own nuclear weapons, excepting only those necessary to deter nuclear attack by others.
PROLIFERATION INCREASES INSTABILITY
(Victor Asal, Professor of Political Science at State U of New York and Kyle Beardsley Professor of Political Science at Emory University, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior” Journal of Peace Research, Vol 44 No 2, p 139-155, 2007)

Nuclear Weapons and Instability The anti-proliferation argument about the possible contribution of nuclear weapons to the outbreak of war rests on the fear that these weapons, given their destructive capabilities, are inherently dangerous and their spread to a variety of places is counterproductive. What dangers does proliferation pose? In the short term, the great dangers are a regional nuclear war, which could obliterate cities, kill millions and devastate downwind areas; and nuclear terrorism. . . . Over the longer term, there will be new nuclear threats as more and more nations acquire more sophisticated delivery systems. (Forsberg et al., 1995: 2) Given the magnitude of the risk that nuclear weapons pose, those who argue against proliferation do not see a payoff that matches the risks. Nuclear weapons are ‘obstacles to, rather than facilitators of, international security’ (Hanson, 2002: 361). Anti-proliferators (1) question whether nuclear weapons prevent war (a question of the very utility of deterrence); (2) wonder about its applicability to new proliferators and their rationality, even though it may have worked between the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War; (3) fear a war during a transition period to nuclear status of a member of an existing rivalry; and (4) fear the dangers of nuclear weapons being controlled by countries where the military is the deciding voice. In this article, we focus on the first of these questions and test if participation of one or more nuclear states in a crisis increases or decreases the likelihood that the crisis will devolve into war.3 McGwire (1994: 215) rejects the claim that nuclear weapons prevent major wars, except within a very narrow context. He gives examples of Vietnam, the Iran–Iraq War, and the Korean War. Based on his analysis of international crises, Geller supports this conclusion, stating that ‘nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to impede escalatory behavior by either nuclear or non-nuclear antagonists. . . . Nuclear disputes, however, show a pronounced tendency to escalate (short of war) and to engage coercive tactics that include the limited use of force’ (Geller, 1990: 307). Payne (1997) and Hanson (2002) go even further by raising the possibility that nuclear weapons were not even important to keeping peace between the superpowers.
Nuclear war impacts

A NUCLEAR BOMB WILL FLATTEN A CITY.


A single, one megaton nuclear bomb or warhead is one which possesses eighty times the explosive power of one of the two nuclear weapons ever used to date, the one dropped on Hiroshima. Were such to be detonated a mile or so above a large urban area, it would, in virtue of its explosive force, flatten virtually every structure within a radius of four miles, and it would heavily damage buildings within a radius of eight miles. Within two miles from the center of the explosion, winds of four hundred miles per hour would be produced, and four miles from the center they would still have a speed of one hundred eighty miles per hour.

A NUCLEAR BOMB WILL PRODUCE A MASSIVE FIREBALL INCINERATING INHABITANTS OF A CITY.


The fireball, which follows directly on the explosion, would produce at least third-degree burns on the body of any person out in the open and within a radius of nine miles from the center of the blast. Those closer to it would be incinerated if they were not otherwise killed by the force of the explosion, the ensuing winds, and the falling structures. Within a radius of eight miles, mass fires would soon occur, caused by the inflammable materials ignited by the heat of the fireball, and those within these fire storms would also be burned to death. And within the first twenty-four to forty-eight hours, the radioactive fallout from the detonation would deliver doses of radiation, well in excess of those that are lethal, to persons who were within an area of about two thousand square miles and exposed to it.

NUCLEAR WAR WILL DESTROY ALL LIFE.


The United States possesses nine thousand nuclear warheads, which, were they all to be launched and detonated, would probably yield about 3,500 megatons of short-term, immediate destructive force—a force equivalent to that of the destructive power of three hundred thousand bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima. Were either country to launch and detonate some substantial number of its nuclear warheads, most, if not all, of the persons living in the country so bombarded would be killed by the initial blasts, the ensuing massive fire storms, and the lethal radiation generated.3 And it is possible, perhaps even probable, that, were either or both to do so, all forms of life existing on earth would be destroyed by the longer-term effects and consequences of the force, fire, and radiation unleashed.
NUKES CANNOT DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS
FROM ENEMY COMBATANTS LIKE SOLDIERS CAN.

War, Nuclear War, and Nuclear Deterrence: Some Conceptual and Moral Issues. Richard
Wasserstrom. Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 3, Special Issue: Symposium on Ethics and Nuclear
Deterrence (Apr., 1985), pp. 424-444. Published by: The University of Chicago Press. Stable
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381030

The first and most obvious thing has, of course, to do with the weapons, with the
combination of the massiveness and the necessary indiscriminancy of the destructiveness
that would result. There would be no identifiable battlegrounds or individuals doing battle -
there could not be any, even residual, descriptive sense to a differentiation between
combatants and noncombatants or between combat zones and military bases, on the one
hand, and hospitals, schools, places of worship, and homes, on the other.

NUCLEAR WAR WILL KILL 1 BILLION PEOPLE.

Sagan, Carl. "Carl Sagan / The Nuclear Winter." The School of Cooperative Individualism /

The World Health Organization, in a recent detailed study chaired by Sune K. Bergstrom (the
1982 Nobel laureate in physiology and medicine), concludes that 1.1 billion people would be killed
outright in such a nuclear war, mainly in the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, China and
Japan. An additional 1.1 billion people would suffer serious injuries and radiation sickness, for
which medical help would be unavailable. It thus seems possible that more than 2 billion people-
almost half of all the humans on Earth-would be destroyed in the immediate aftermath of a global
thermonuclear war. This would represent by far the greatest disaster in the history of the human
species and, with no other adverse effects, would probably be enough to reduce at least the
Northern Hemisphere to a state of prolonged agony and barbarism.

NUCLEAR WAR WILL ALTER THE OZONE LAYER.

Sagan, Carl. "Carl Sagan / The Nuclear Winter." The School of Cooperative Individualism /

Likewise, in 1973, it was discovered that high-yield airbursts will chemically burn the nitrogen in
the upper air, converting it into oxides of nitrogen; these, in turn, combine with and destroy the
protective ozone in the Earth's stratosphere. The surface of the Earth is shielded from deadly
solar ultraviolet radiation by a layer of ozone so tenuous that, were it brought down to sea level, it
would be only 3 millimeters thick. Partial destruction of this ozone layer can have serious
consequences for the biology of the entire planet.
NUCLEAR FALLOUT WILL STARVE THE PLANET.
In the baseline case, the amount of sunlight at the ground was reduced to a few percent of normal—much darker, in daylight, than in a heavy overcast and too dark for plants to make a living from photosynthesis. At least in the Northern Hemisphere, where the great preponderance of strategic targets lies, an unbroken and deadly gloom would persist for weeks. Even more unexpected were the temperatures calculated. In the baseline case, land temperatures, except for narrow strips of coastline, dropped to minus 250 Celsius (minus 13 degrees Fahrenheit) and stayed below freezing for months— even for a summer war. (Because the atmospheric structure becomes much more stable as the upper atmosphere is heated and the low air is cooled, we may have severely underestimated how long the cold and the dark would last.) The oceans, a significant heat reservoir, would not freeze, however, and a major ice age would probably not be triggered. But because the temperatures would drop so catastrophically, virtually all crops and farm animals, at least in the Northern Hemisphere, would be destroyed, as would most varieties of uncultivated or domesticated food supplies. Most of the human survivors would starve.

THE REMAINING RADIATION WILL BE ENOUGH TO KILL THOSE WHO SURVIVE THE BLAST.
In addition, the amount of radioactive fallout is much more than expected. Many previous calculations simply ignored the intermediate time-scale fallout. That is, calculations were made for the prompt fallout—the plumes of radioactive debris blown downwind from each target—and for the long-term fallout, the fine radioactive particles lofted into the stratosphere that would descend about a year later, after most of the radioactivity had decayed. However, the radioactivity carried into the upper atmosphere (but not as high as the stratosphere) seems to have been largely forgotten. We found for the baseline case that roughly 30 percent of the land at northern midlatitudes could receive a radioactive dose greater than 250 rads, and that about 50 percent of northern midlatitudes could receive a dose greater than 100 rads. A 100-rad dose is the equivalent of about 1000 medical X-rays. A 400-rad dose will, more likely than not, kill you.

MODERN CIVILIZATION AS WE KNOW IT WOULD BE DESTROYED. PREPARE FOR MASSIVE EPIDEMICS AS THE BODIES BEGIN TO THAW.
The cold, the dark and the intense radioactivity, together lasting for months, represent a severe assault on our civilization and our species. Civil and sanitary services would be wiped out. Medical facilities, drugs, the most rudimentary means for relieving the vast human suffering, would be unavailable. Any but the most elaborate shelters would be useless, quite apart from the question of what good it might be to emerge a few months later. Synthetics burned in the destruction of the cities would produce a wide variety of toxic gases, including carbon monoxide, cyanides, dioxins and furans. After the dust and soot settled out, the solar ultraviolet flux would be much larger than its present value. Immunity to disease would decline. Epidemics and pandemics would be rampant, especially after the billion or so unburied bodies began to thaw. Moreover, the combined influence of these severe and simultaneous stresses on life are likely to produce even more adverse consequences—biologists call them synergisms—that we are not yet wise enough to foresee.
NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BLOCK OUT THE SUN.
A nuclear explosion is like bringing a piece of the Sun to the Earth's surface for a fraction of a second. Like a giant match, it causes cities and industrial areas to burn. Megacities have developed in India and Pakistan and other developing countries, providing tremendous amounts of fuel for potential fires. The direct effects of the nuclear weapons, blast, radioactivity, fires, and extensive pollution, would kill millions of people, but only those near the targets. However, the fires would have another effect. The massive amounts of dark smoke from the fires would be lofted into the upper troposphere, 10-15 kilometers (6-9 miles) above the Earth's surface, and then absorption of sunlight would further heat the smoke, lifting it into the stratosphere, a layer where the smoke would persist for years, with no rain to wash it out.

NUCLEAR WAR WILL ACCELERATE CLIMATE CHANGE.
Martin, Bryan. "The Global Health Effects of Nuclear War." University of Wollongong - New South Wales, Australia. Web. 25 Aug. 2010. <http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html>. Another possibility is that decreases in ozone or increases in oxides of nitrogen levels in the stratosphere, caused by nuclear war, could lead to climatic change. A reduction in ozone levels by a factor of two could cause a decrease in surface temperature of one half to one degree Centigrade, but including oxides of nitrogen in the calculation reduces this effect. Whether or not a change in temperature at the earth's surface by this amount for a few years could cause irreversible climatic change is hard to assess. The National Academy of Sciences study concluded that the effects of dust and oxides of nitrogen injection into the stratosphere 'would probably lie within normal global climatic variability, but the possibility of climatic changes of a more dramatic nature cannot be ruled out'.[39] Since the Academy assumed a nuclear war with the explosion of many more high-yield weapons than are presently deployed, the danger of climatic change from dust or oxides of nitrogen is almost certainly less than assessed in their report.

ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, AND SOCIALLY NUCLEAR WAR WILL UPEND SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF COUNTRIES.
Martin, Bryan. "The Global Health Effects of Nuclear War." University of Wollongong - New South Wales, Australia. Web. 25 Aug. 2010. <http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html>. In the absence of direct attacks, the major indirect effects of nuclear war on a country such as Australia would not be physical but economic, political and social. Economically, nuclear war would cause an enormous disruption of world production and trade. Politically, nuclear war seems likely to cause massive upheavals not only in countries directly involved but in many of those far from the direct destruction.[44] The social effects of nuclear war would be many, and include the psychological effects of massive nuclear destruction and the more immediate stresses of large numbers of refugees from Europe and North America. Study of and planning for these non-physical effects of nuclear war has been meagre or nonexistent. But unless the almost total lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament since 1945 is somehow reversed, these possible effects seem certain to become reality sooner or later.
SOME OF THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ARE UNKNOWN; WORSE EFFECTS MAY ARISE FROM THEM.


Third, simply not enough is known to predict with confidence all the global effects of nuclear war. The implications for ozone were not publicised until 1974 and the consequences of fires were first publicised in 1982. This suggests that further significant effects may remain to be discovered. Furthermore, the exact consequences of known processes are a subject of scientific controversy. John Hampson's scenario for possible inadvertent destruction of ozone in a local region is an example of what may happen within the limits of scientific possibility. Until much more study is made of the effects of nuclear war, a high level of uncertainty will remain.

NUCLEAR WAR WOULD START A NUCLEAR WINTER, CAUSING MASSIVE DEATH.


In the 1970s, it was realised that nuclear explosions could inject large amounts of nitrogen oxides into the stratosphere, acting as a catalyst to reduce ozone levels and thereby allow increased amounts of ultraviolet light to penetrate to the earth's surface. It was only in 1982 and 1983 that another possible consequence became the subject of intensive scientific investigation and extensive political discussion: severe climatic effects. A major nuclear war would lead to vast amounts of soot and dust being lofted into the atmosphere, most importantly from the burning of cities. This material would absorb incoming solar radiation but continue to allow infrared heat from the earth's surface to escape to outer space. The result could be a significant drop in surface temperatures, especially in continental interiors. The temperature drop could cause massive death by freezing and destruction of ecosystems.

THE ENVIRONMENT IS KEY TO HUMAN SURVIVAL – NUCLEAR WINTER FINISHES OFF HUMANITY.


It's easy to take the air we breathe for granted, but the atmosphere is a vital component of all life on this planet. In fact, scientists believe it co-evolved to its present state along with Earth's unicellular organisms. It protects us from dangerous levels of solar radiation, but also allows the sun to heat our world. Sunlight shines through the atmosphere and warms the planet's surface, which then emits terrestrial radiation that heats the air. If sufficient ash from burning cities and forests ascended into the sky, it could effectively work as an umbrella, shielding large portions of the Earth from the sun. If you diminish the amount of sunlight that makes its way to the surface, then you diminish the resulting atmospheric temperature -- as well as potentially interfere with photosynthesis. ... Such a winter could finish the destruction that nuclear war started, sending the survivors down a chilling path of famine and starvation.
A USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TODAY WOULD DEVASTATE DEMOCRACIES


Rather than make rash decisions in the wake of the first post-World War II nuclear calamity, the United States should at least think through how best to respond, and prepare some helpful measures beforehand. A nuclear blast would show the vaunted deterrent to be incapable of preventing massive destruction at home; it could undermine democratic governments and demoralize military services. As divided and unprepared democratic forces fumbled for a plan of action, demagogues might rush forward, convincingly promising protection. If the era of nonuse should end violently, many countries might freely choose dictatorship to preserve order and survive. Conversely, the principal powers might adopt an ill-conceived scheme for world government that would either degenerate into global tyranny or - far more likely - prove totally ineffective.

NUCLEAR WAR IMMEDIATELY KILLS 400-500 MILLION PEOPLE.


The blast or heat from a one megatonne bomb - about 75 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb, and a size often found in nuclear arsenals - would kill almost all people, even those in shelters, out to a distance of two kilometres. Beyond ten kilometres the chance of death even for people without special protection would be very small. If the bomb is exploded at an altitude higher than the radius of the fireball from the explosion, as happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, local fallout is minimal. If exploded at or near the earth's surface, fallout lethal to unprotected people will be deposited downwind - most often to the east toward which prevailing upper atmospheric winds blow - for a distance of up to hundreds of kilometres. After a fortnight the radiation levels will have dropped to about one thousandth of what they were one hour after the blast. A major global nuclear war could kill up to 400-500 million people from these effects, mainly in the United States, Soviet Union and Europe, and to a lesser extent China and Japan. The death toll would depend on a range of factors, such as the areas actually hit by weapons and the extent of evacuation and fallout protection. This death toll would be made up mainly of the people in the immediate vicinity or downwind of nuclear explosions, and would total about ten percent of the world's population. This figure would be much higher if most of the largest population centres in countries all around the world were bombed, but there are no known plans for systematically bombing the largest population centres in areas such as India, Southeast Asia and China.
THE RADIATION AND NUCLEAR WINTER RESULTING FROM NUCLEAR WAR ENDS HUMANITY.


Even more unexpected were the temperatures calculated. In the baseline case, land temperatures, except for narrow strips of coastline, dropped to minus 250 Celsius (minus 13 degrees Fahrenheit) and stayed below freezing for months -- even for a summer war. (Because the atmospheric structure becomes much more stable as the upper atmosphere is heated and the low air is cooled, we may have severely underestimated how long the cold and the dark would last.) The oceans, a significant heat reservoir, would not freeze, however, and a major ice age would probably not be triggered. But because the temperatures would drop so catastrophically, virtually all crops and farm animals, at least in the Northern Hemisphere, would be destroyed, as would most varieties of uncultivated or domesticated food supplies. Most of the human survivors would starve. In addition, the amount of radioactive fallout is much more than expected. Many previous calculations simply ignored the intermediate time-scale fallout. That is, calculations were made for the prompt fallout -- the plumes of radioactive debris blown downwind from each target -- and for the long-term fallout, the fine radioactive particles lofted into the stratosphere that would descend about a year later, after most of the radioactivity had decayed. However, the radioactivity carried into the upper atmosphere (but not as high as the stratosphere) seems to have been largely forgotten. We found for the baseline case that roughly 30 percent of the land at northern midlatitudes could receive a radioactive dose greater than 250 rads, and that about 50 percent of northern midlatitudes could receive a dose greater than 100 rads. A 100-rad dose is the equivalent of about 1000 medical X-rays. A 400-rad dose will, more likely than not, kill you. The cold, the dark and the intense radioactivity, together lasting for months, represent a severe assault on our civilization and our species. Civil and sanitary services would be wiped out. Medical facilities, drugs, the most rudimentary means for relieving the vast human suffering, would be unavailable. Any but the most elaborate shelters would be useless, quite apart from the question of what good it might be to emerge a few months later. Synthetics burned in the destruction of the cities would produce a wide variety of toxic gases, including carbon monoxide, cyanides, dioxins and furans. After the dust and soot settled out, the solar ultraviolet flux would be much larger than its present value. Immunity to disease would decline. Epidemics and pandemics would be rampant, especially after the billion or so unburied bodies began to thaw. Moreover, the combined influence of these severe and simultaneous stresses on life are likely to produce even more adverse consequences -- biologists call them synergisms -- that we are not yet wise enough to foresee... Many biologists, considering the nuclear winter that these calculations describe, believe they carry somber implications for life on Earth. Many species of plants and animals would become extinct. Vast numbers of surviving humans would starve to death. The delicate ecological relations that bind together organisms on Earth in a fabric of mutual dependency would be torn, perhaps irreparably. There is little question that our global civilization would be destroyed. The human population would be reduced to prehistoric levels, or less. Life for any survivors would be extremely hard. And there seems to be a real possibility of the extinction of the human species.
NUCLEAR WAR ESCALATES TOO QUICKLY TO BE STOPPED BEFORE EXTINCTION.


In the end of course we will all lose. Because the nuclear genie, unleashed from its bottle in the war against Iran, will never retreat. And just like the US could develop nuclear weapons in only 4 years with completely new technology 60 years ago, many more countries and groups will be highly motivated to do it in the coming years. Think about the current disproportionate response of Israel, applied in a conflict where the contenders have nuclear weapons. 10 to 1 retaliation, starting with a mere 600 casualties, wipes out the entire Earth's population in eight easy steps. Who will be willing to stop the escalation? The country that lost 60,000 citizens in the last hit? The one that lost 600,000? 6 million? As the nuclear holocaust unfolds, some will remember the Lebanon conflict and subsequent Iran war and blame it on Israel. Others will properly blame Americans, for having allowed their Executive to erase the 60-year old taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, first in doctrine and then in practice, despite having the most powerful conventional military force in the world. Others of course will blame "Muslim extremism". And then the blaming will wither away as a three-billion-year old experiment, life on planet Earth, comes to an end.

ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON HAS AWFUL IMPACTS ON BIODIVERSITY, THREATENING TO ANNIHILATE THE WORLD

The Nuclear Sublime, Frances Ferguson, Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism (Summer, 1984), pp. 4-10 Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0300-7162%2819842%2914%3A2%3C4%3ATNS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

Nuclear weapons are weapons to annihilate the world, exempting nothing. A One-Megaton [small] Nuclear weapon poses a significant risk to the extinction of all life forms in the area of an approximate 1000 mile radius, with a reasonable risk extending in a 5000 mile radius. Localized fallout will contaminate the water table within a 1000 mile directly underneath the ground and expecting into any continuous water table. Beyond this we have innumerable secondary effects, many of which remain unknown. Particularly with regard to global warming, a increase in global temperature from a nuclear detonation is theoretically obvious. However, we cannot estimate the change in the real world.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE SUCH HORRIBLE EFFECTS, THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO STOP THEM

Russell Hoffman, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR, Information Clearing House, 8/8/03

As many as 9 out of 10 people -- or more -- who die from a nuclear blast, do not die in the explosion itself. Most people probably think that if they die from a nuclear blast, they will simply see a flash and get quickly cooked. Outside the circle where people will be instantly vaporized from the initial gamma radiation blast, the light from the explosion is so bright that it will immediately and permanently blind every living thing, including farm animals -- and soldiers, of course. Together, the pressure wave and the accompanying winds will do in quite a few, and damage most of the rest of the people (and animals, and structures) in a huge circle -- perhaps hundreds of square miles in area. Later, these people will begin to suffer from vomiting, skin rashes, and an intense unquenchable thirst as their hair falls out in clumps. Their skin will begin to peel off. This is because the internal molecular structure of the living cells within their bodies is breaking down, a result of the disruptive effects of the high radiation dose they received. All the animals will be similarly suffering. Since they have already received the dose, these effects will show up even if the people are immediately evacuated from the area -- hardly likely, since everything around will be destroyed and the country would be at war.
NUCLEAR WAR IS NEVER ANYTHING LESS THAN GENOCIDE
Russell Hoffman, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR, Information Clearing House, 8/8/03
The firestorm produces hurricane-force winds in a matter of minutes. The fire burns so hot that the asphalt in the streets begins to melt and then burn, even as people are trying to run across it, literally melting into the pavement themselves as they run. Victims, on fire, jump into rivers, only to catch fire again when they surface for air. Yet it is hard to see even these pitiable souls as the least lucky ones in a nuclear attack. For the survivors of the initial blast who do not then die in the firestorm that follows, many will die painfully over the next few weeks, often after a brief, hopeful period where they appear to be getting better. It might begin as a tingling sensation on the skin, or an itching, which starts shortly after the blast. These symptoms are signs that the body is starting to break down internally, at the molecular level. The insides of those who get a severe dose of gamma radiation, but manage to survive the other traumas, whose organs had once been well defined as lungs, liver, heart, intestines, etc., begin to resemble an undefined mass of bloody pulp. Within days, or perhaps weeks, the victim, usually bleeding painfully from every hole and pore in their body, at last dies and receives their final mercy.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DO NOT RECOGNIZE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS.
Russell Hoffman, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR, Information Clearing House, 8/8/03
A significant percentage, probably most, of the people who die from a nuclear attack will die much later, from the widespread release of radioactive material into the environment. These deaths will occur all over the world, for centuries to come. Scattered deaths, and pockets of higher mortality rates, will continue from cancer, leukemia, and other health effects, especially genetic damage to succeeding generations. Nuclear weapons do not recognize the end of a war, or signed peace treaties, or even the deaths of all the combatants. They simply keep on killing a percentage of whoever happens to inhale or ingest their deadly byproducts. Some deaths will occur hundreds and even thousands of miles away, because low levels of ionizing radiation are capable of causing the full spectrum of health effects, albeit at a lower rate within the population. Not to mention the radioactive runoff from the rivers and streams that flow through the blast area and the area under the radioactive mushroom cloud's drift. It may carry its deadly cargo for thousands of miles, raining a fallout of death only on some cities, and not on others. It will land upon nations which had not been involved in any way in India's dispute with Pakistan. These nations will be mighty hurt and mighty upset.

THERE WILL BE A SYSTEMATIC FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY
Russell Hoffman, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR, Information Clearing House, 8/8/03
Pacemakers, for example, may stop working because of the "hit" from the EMP. It will be quite something to see people in a thousand mile radius of the epicenter of the blast (or further) who are using pacemakers, suddenly drop dead, and all the computers permanently go down and all the lights go out, all at the same time. And commercial and private aircraft will drop out of the sky, since their sensitive electronics and fly-by-wire systems are not very well shielded from the EMP. These planes will then not be available for evacuation purposes, nor will they be available to air-drop food, water, morphine and cyanide, all of which will be in great demand throughout the area. Home plumbing systems and most other plumbing systems are good examples of large metallic structures that will suddenly become electrified, destroying the motors, gauges, electronics, etc. which are attached to the plumbing systems. More and more pumping equipment is computer controlled nowadays for efficiency. Imbedded controllers are becoming prevalent but as they do, the potential damage from the Electro-Magnetic Pulse increases dramatically. Train tracks will also carry the charge, as well as telephone wiring. All these things will have a nearly
simultaneous surge of energy sent through them, igniting gas containers such as fuel storage tanks, propane tanks, and so on. Whatever doesn't blow up will at least stop working.

**DEEP CUTS ARE NECESSARY TO ESCAPE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WINTER.**


Very roughly, the level of the world strategic arsenals necessary to induce the climatic catastrophe seems to be somewhere around 500 to 2,000 warheads, an estimate that may be somewhat high for airbursts over cities, and somewhat low for high-yield ground bursts. The intrinsic uncertainty in this number is itself of strategic importance, and prudent policy would assume a value below the low end of the plausible range. National or global inventories above this rough threshold move the world arsenals into a region that might be called the "Doomsday Zone." If the world arsenals were well below this rough threshold, no concatenation of computer malfunction, carelessness, unauthorized acts, communications failure, miscalculation and madness in high office could unleash the nuclear winter. When global arsenals are above the threshold, such a catastrophe is at least possible. The further above threshold we are, the more likely it is that a major exchange would trigger the climatic catastrophe.
**Iran**

**WAR IN IRAN WILL GO GLOBAL – PREVENTING ESCALATION IS IMPOSSIBLE.**


Humanity is at a dangerous crossroads. War preparations to attack Iran are in "an advanced state of readiness". Hi tech weapons systems including nuclear warheads are fully deployed. This military adventure has been on the Pentagon's drawing board since the mid-1990s. First Iraq, then Iran according to a declassified 1995 US Central Command document. Escalation is part of the military agenda. While Iran, is the next target together with Syria and Lebanon, this strategic military deployment also threatens North Korea, China and Russia. Since 2005, the US and its allies, including America's NATO partners and Israel, have been involved in the extensive deployment and stockpiling of advanced weapons systems. The air defense systems of the US, NATO member countries and Israel are fully integrated. This is a coordinated endeavor of the Pentagon, NATO, Israel's Defense Force (IDF), with the active military involvement of several non-NATO partner countries including the frontline Arab states (members of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia, among others. (NATO consists of 28 NATO member states. Another 21 countries are members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative include ten Arab countries plus Israel.) The roles of Egypt, the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia (within the extended military alliance) is of particular relevance. Egypt controls the transit of war ships and oil tankers through the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States occupy the South Western coastlines of the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. In early June, "Egypt reportedly allowed one Israeli and eleven U.S. ships to pass through the Suez Canal in ....an apparent signal to Iran. ... On June 12, regional press outlets reported that the Saudis had granted Israel the right to fly over its airspace..." (Muriel Mirak Weissbach, Israel's Insane War on Iran Must Be Prevented., Global Research, July 31, 2010) In post 9/11 military doctrine, this massive deployment of military hardware has been defined as part of the so-called "Global War on Terrorism", targeting "non-State" terrorist organizations including al Qaeda and so-called "State sponsors of terrorism," including Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan. The setting up of new US military bases, the stockpiling of advanced weapons systems including tactical nuclear weapons, etc. were implemented as part of the pre-emptive defensive military doctrine under the umbrella of the "Global War on Terrorism".
IRAN IS THE KEY TEST FOR NON-PROLIFERATION - FAILURE MEANS THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST GOES NUCLEAR, ENSURING ESCALATORY REGIONAL WAR

(Dennis Ross, Former Director of Policy Planning in the State Department and White House special Middle East coordinator, 04/23/2007, The New Republic, “Squeeze play, the Case For Doing Nothing”)

Consider this scenario: The Saudis have gone nuclear. So have the Egyptians. Both countries had been signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but that agreement is now dissolved. Riyadh and Cairo acquired their weapons from Pakistan, a Sunni ally, in response to the nuclear threat from Shia Iran. Meanwhile, Iraq continues to fester, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far from settled, and Iranian proxies remain firmly entrenched within Lebanon's combustible sectarian mix—a mix that pits Sunni against Shia and just so happens to exist on Israel's northern border. In short, all the key players in the Middle East--Sunni, Shia, Israeli--now have nuclear weapons at a moment when the simmering and, in some cases, quite open conflicts between the region's states, sects, and ethnicities are almost too numerous to count. If that situation sounds terrifying, it should. And it may well come to pass if Iran is allowed to go nuclear.

This past December, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Saud Al Faisal, declared that Riyadh, in conjunction with surrounding Gulf states, might seek to develop nuclear power. He insisted the program would be used only for peaceful purposes, but, to many, Faisal’s words sounded like a threat: Since Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, maybe we will, too. If that happens, Egypt probably won't be far behind. Senior Egyptian officials have told me that, if we cannot stop Iran from going nuclear, it will spell the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Needless to say, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East would greatly increase the chances of war--between Sunnis and Shia or between Israelis and Muslims--through mistake or miscalculation. For this reason alone, we must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The question is: How?
IRAN IS KEY TO NON PROLIFERATION EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

A conservative Iranian legislator warned Saturday that his country may pull out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in response to a resolution by the United Nations nuclear watchdog censuring Tehran over its nuclear program, a move that could seriously undermine world attempts to prevent Iran from developing atomic weapons. Iran's official news agency quoted a hardline political analyst who made the same point, another indication the idea could be gaining steam. If Iran withdraws from the treaty, its nuclear program would no longer be subject to oversight by the UN nuclear agency. That in turn would be a significant blow to efforts to ensure that no enriched uranium is diverted from use as fuel to warhead development. The lawmaker's threat came a day after the board of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency passed a resolution demanding Tehran immediately stop building its newly revealed nuclear facility near the holy city of Qom and freeze uranium enrichment. "The parliament, in its first reaction to this illegal and politically-motivated resolution, can consider the issue of withdrawing from NPT," Karamirad was quoted as saying by the official IRNA news agency, referring to the treaty. "The parliament ... can [also] block the entry of IAEA inspectors to the country," he said. Karamirad, a member of parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said Iran was determined to continue its nuclear activities. Karamirad does not speak for the government but his statements reflect hardline thinking that the government usually pursues. Iranian lawmakers threatened to pull the country out of the nonproliferation treaty in 2006, during another time of increased pressure by the UN over Tehran's nuclear program. Iran backed down, and the government has said in the past that it has no intention of withdrawing from the treaty. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, also dismissed the IAEA's fresh demands, saying Saturday on state television that "Iran will limit its cooperation with the UN. agency to its treaty obligations and will not cooperate beyond that." "Our first reaction to this resolution is that they [IAEA] should not expect us to do what we did several times in the past few months when we cooperated beyond our obligations to remove ambiguities," Soltanieh said. Soltanieh stressed the resolution won't stop Iran from continuing to enrich uranium. He said the country's nuclear activities will not be interrupted by resolutions from the UN nuclear agency's board, the UN Security Council or even the threat of military strikes against the facilities. Friday's resolution - and the resulting vote of the IAEA's 35-nation decision-making board - were significant on several counts. Iranian officials have shrugged off the resolution's approval by 25 members of the 35-nation board, including the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany. The vote marked a rare measure of unity from the six world powers on Iran. Moscow and Beijing have traditionally cautioned against efforts to punish Iran for its defiance over its nuclear program, either preventing new Security Council sanctions or watering down their potency. The IAEA resolution criticized Iran for defying a UN Security Council ban on uranium enrichment - the source of both nuclear fuel and the fissile core of warheads. It also censured Iran for secretly building a uranium enrichment facility, known as Fordo, and demanded that it immediately suspend further construction. The resolution noted that IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei cannot confirm that Tehran's nuclear program is exclusively geared toward peaceful uses, and expressed serious concern that Iranian stonewalling of an IAEA probe means the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program cannot be excluded.
China

CHINA IS A THREAT TO THE ENTIRETY OF ASIA. WILL CATALYZE SOUTHEAST ASIAN PROLIFERATION.
(Elizabeth Economy-Fellow for China and Deputy Director of the Asia Studies Program at the Council of Foreign Relations-and Michel Oksenberg-Senior Fellow at the Asia Pacific Research Center @ Stanford University, Professor of Political Science, “China joins the World: Progress and prospects, ed. By Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, p.91, 1999)

Until the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) takes force, China is not constrained by any extant international arms control regime from modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces, unlike the United States and Russia. However, China can obstruct or advance many important arms control processes. Indeed, although it has shown signs of positive support for nonproliferation measures in recent years, until signing the CTBT in 1996, it continued nuclear testing at a time when the other nuclear powers—with the exception of France—were observing an informal test moratorium. China was also a source of some of the roadblocks to the speedy conclusion of the treaty. It is not particularly enthusiastic about a fissile material production cutoff, even less so if this cutoff were to reduce existing stockpiles. Moreover, China's support is essential in future efforts to reach agreement among the five declared nuclear powers to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons stockpiles drastically. But it is not clear whether the conditions China might demand would facilitate or hinder agreement.

CHINA IS QUICKLY STRIVING TO BECOME A DOMINANT GLOBAL POWER BOTH WITH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
(Elizabeth Economy-Fellow for China and Deputy Director of the Asia Studies Program at the Council of Foreign Relations-and Michel Oksenberg-Senior Fellow at the Asia Pacific Research Center @ Stanford University, Professor of Political Science, “China joins the World: Progress and prospects, ed. By Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, p.92-93, 1999)

Our analysis indicates that overall Chinese views and behavior toward both conventional and unconventional weapons development are motivated primarily by a relatively hard realpolitik, state-centered, balance-of-power calculus centered on maintaining and increasing China's relative economic, technological, and military power. This calculus assumes that China is a weak state in most areas relevant to the development of a modern military force, especially when compared with major potential competitors in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the United States and Japan. Given this perceived weakness, Chinese leaders believe their country therefore must modernize its conventional and strategic force structure; they also believe that improving China's relative power will not only enhance its security vis-à-vis other major powers in the region, but also will contribute to greater regional and international status. China's strategic weapons development program suggests that its military might be diversifying its approach to the use of nuclear weapons in ways that could complicate various current and future arms control efforts. Our analysis also shows that China's greatly expanded participation in various forms of arms control has consisted primarily of efforts to adapt its weak-state, realpolitik approach to a changing international arms control agenda while at the same time trying to minimize constraints on its own military capabilities. Evidence that China's leaders accept security concepts based, for instance, on a recognition of the security dilemma or on the concept of common security is still hard to come by, although these concepts do seem to be influencing how some Chinese arms control specialists in the policy process think about security.
CHINESE READINESS IS HIGH, THEY CAN’T BE DETERRED.
(Elizabeth Economy-Fellow for China and Deputy Director of the Asia Studies Program at the Council of Foreign Relations-and Michel Oksenberg-Senior Fellow at the Asia Pacific Research Center @ Stanford University, Professor of Political Science, “China joins the World: Progress and prospects, ed. By Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, p.96-97, 1999)

However, as Appendix A indicates, China recently has sought to "improve the survivability of its missile forces by reducing the prelaunch time period, to find less vulnerable basing modes, and to make general improvements in accuracy, range, guidance, and control. In general, China's nuclear weapons modernization program emphasizes (1) the development of land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with improved range, accuracy, survivability, and penetration against limited missile defense; (2) the development of a new generation of solid-fuel, short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles; (3) the apparent development of smaller warheads, which theoretically would allow a multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warhead capability; and (4) an improvement in China's nuclear weapons CHI through the advancement of space capabilities and the continued importation of advanced communication technologies, such as fiber optics, and microwave equipment. These initiatives may reflect changing assumptions about the utility of nuclear weapons and hence Chinese nuclear strategy. In the past, China's nuclear doctrine and deterrence theory comprised what often has been referred to as minimum deterrence (mei di zveishe). This concept hinges on the belief that China's limited number of high-yield nuclear warheads constitute a credible deterrent because they can inflict what is perceived to be unacceptable damage on a handful of enemy cities with a simple, undifferentiated countervalue second strike (a so-called city-busting capability). Under minimum deterrence, there is no need for nuclear force levels beyond what can inflict unacceptable damage is these developments suggest that there are strategists in China who advocate the development of a new nuclear strategy, specifically a version of what is usually called limited deterrence (youxian weishe). Similarities exist between this concept and the American doctrine of flexible response, which posits a range of strategic and sub-strategic capabilities to deter or defeat highly damaging or overwhelming conventional attacks, deter any level of nuclear conflict, and in a nuclear war contain escalatory pressures.

CHINA COULD DESTROY THE UNITED STATES
(Victor N Corpus, ex-chief of the intelligence service, “If it Comes to a Shooting War”, April 20-2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD20Ad03.html)
Supersonic cruise missiles constitute China’s third deadly "trump card" against the US – part of the so-called assassin's mace. These unstoppable cruise missiles may be armed with 440-lb to 750-lb conventional warheads (or 200-kiloton tactical nuclear warheads 10 times stronger than Hiroshima) traveling at more than twice the speed of sound (or faster than a rifle bullet). The cruise missiles, together with the SRBMs and MRBMs (short and medium-range ballistic missiles) may also be armed with radio frequency weapons that can simulate the electro-magnetic pulse of nuclear explosions to fry computer chips, or fuel-air explosives that can annihilate the personnel in aircraft carriers and battleships without destroying the platforms. Their effective range varies from less than 100 to 1,800 kilometers from stand-off positions. Delivered by long-range fighter-bombers and submarines, their range can be extended even further. In fact, stealthy Chinese and Russian submarines can deliver such nuclear payloads to the US mainland itself. No US defense vs supersonic cruise missiles The US and UK aircraft carrier battle groups do not have any known defense against the new supersonic missiles of their adversaries. The Phalanx and Aegis ship defense systems may be effective against subsonic cruise missiles like the Exocets or Tomahawks, or exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles, but they are inadequate against the sea-skimming and supersonic Granits, Moskits and Yakhonts or similar types (Shipwreck, Sunburn and Onyx - North Atlantic Treaty Organization codenames) of modern anti-ship missiles in China's inventory.
NPT fails

THE NPT IS TOO OLD TO HANDLE THE PERILS OF THE MODERN AGE, IT IS OUTDATED.

It has been more than forty years since the Nonproliferation Treaty went into effect. What is your impression now of that treaty? The treaty was meant to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states, disarm those that had these weapons, and ensure that peaceful nuclear technology was accessible to all. These are commendable goals even if we had to start with some states being nuclear armed and others not. Forty years later we have more nuclear weapon states and a larger number of nuclear warheads, continuous proliferation concerns and inaccessible peaceful nuclear technology. This is truly disappointing, and it is petty to say we expected worse. The treaty is still important. However, it is becoming stale and could become irrelevant if not nurtured with real disarmament measures and greater equity. Cooperation is required if it is to meet the challenges of our time, particularly the emergence of new nuclear states, non-state parties, and the dissemination of technology.

THE NPT IS FUELING ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENTS
(Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australian Journal of International Affairs, September, 2005, “It’s Time To Scrap the NPT,” EBSCO, p.283-284)

As the dramatic revelations of the nature and extent of the A. Q. Khan network showed, some states undertaking opaque proliferation have been prepared to rely on transnational smuggling networks to gain vital components, materials and knowledge. Quite apart from the incapacity of the NPT regime to deal with this new form of proliferation (Clary 2004), such non-state networks raise very real risks that for the right price, criminals or other facilitators could pass nuclear materials to terrorist groups or extortionists (Albright and Hinderstein 2005). Both through its inadequacies and its obsessive focus on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT could be contributing to the ultimate nightmare: terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons.

THE NPT HAS NO CREDIBILITY, IT CAN’T STOP PROLIFERATION
(Bob Rigg, former chairman of the New Zealand National Consultative Committee on Disarmament, Smoke and mirrors in nuclear Middle East, The Dominion Post, 12-18-09)

Iran co-operates with the IAEA, which is barred from inspecting Israel’s nuclear facilities, while the prime minister of Israel, whose country is not a party to the NPT, recently visited key world leaders urging them to require Iran to fulfil its NPT obligations. This grotesque and discriminatory state of affairs will persist until Israel ratifies the NPT and joins all other Middle Eastern states, including Iran, that have declared their support for a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. Interestingly, amidst the most recent sensational allegations against Iran, once again based on intelligence that has yet to be independently validated, Saudi Arabia kept its eye on the ball by describing Israel as a huge obstacle to the peace-making process, and called for a regional nuclear weapons free zone to include Israel. The credibility of the NPT regime is at rock bottom. In today's increasingly atomised world the probability of nuclear proliferation and nuclear conflict will continue to increase as the credibility of the NPT is frittered away.
THE NPT INCREASES PROLIFERATION AND UNCERTAINTY.

(Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australian Journal of International Affairs, September 2005, “It’s Time To Scrap the NPT,” EBSCO, p.283-284)

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states. Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya) that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original). And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of assistance (Pregenzer 2003)

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PROLIFERATION DON’T SOLVE

(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010 5-3, http://www.sipri.org/media/pres releases/100503NPTbriefing/?searchterm=Turkey)

Some states, such as Germany, have proposed solutions for multilateral ownership or management of the fuel cycle. Others, such as Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Algeria, Turkey and Indonesia, are more cautious or hostile towards the idea. While the latter group understands and supports the need to strengthen the NPT’s capacity concerning non-proliferation, they would expect this to be combined with a strengthening of the disarmament pillar. There is also a strong scepticism towards the different multilateral nuclear approaches, such as a multilateral fuel cycle or international fuel bank. These proposals are seen as creating more burdens for the NNWS that are already in compliance with the treaty, that it will for the second time divide states between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ in the NPT, and that they are asked to give up some of the sovereign rights that they have under the treaty without getting anything in return. If any of the various proposals to multilateralize or internationalize the nuclear fuel cycle is to receive support it will not only need to be accompanied by disarmament efforts, but also need to be drafted in a non-mandatory way, allowing for incentives to stay away from the fuel cycle. These are necessary even if most states parties to the NPT will not exercise their right to develop a fuel cycle for peaceful purposes. On issues related to Article X - which spells out the right of NPT parties to withdraw from the treaty - there are proposals on how to prohibit or make it more difficult for a state party that withdraws from the NPT to keep the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities (i.e., for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation) that were put in place as part of civil nuclear energy programmes; these facilities are inherently dual-use in nature and can be used for producing nuclear weapons.
NPT INCREASES ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPON TECHNOLOGY MEAN AN INCREASE IN PROLIF

(Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australian Journal of International Affairs, September, 2005, "It's Time To Scrap the NPT,"

Some of the causes of the NPT’s declining effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation have been rehearsed above. However the main cause of its ineffectiveness is structural: as Frank Barnaby observes, ‘The problem is that military and peaceful nuclear programs are, for the most part, virtually identical’ (1993: 126). This directly erodes the viability of the deal that lies at the heart of the NPT: that non-nuclear weapons states agree not to try to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance with peaceful nuclear programs, should they want them. The NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are thus simultaneously engaged in promoting and controlling two types of nuclear technology that are virtually indistinguishable until a point very close to the threshold of assembling the components of a nuclear weapon. For many states that have contemplated the nuclear option, adherence to the NPT thus actually makes it easier to obtain cutting edge nuclear technology and dual-use components that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program (Dunn 1991: 23). As Barnaby argues, ‘Under [Article X of] the NPT, a country can legally manufacture the components of a nuclear weapon, notify the IAEA and the UN Security Council that it is withdrawing from the Treaty, and then assemble its nuclear weapons’(1993: 124). Although the IAEA’s inspections role has been strengthened during the course of the 1990s, there is little prospect that its powers will be increased to such a level that it will be able to counter the highly sophisticated deception programs mounted by most covert proliferators. The only remedy to this dilemma has been to question the need of states such as Iran for peaceful nuclear power and to doubt the veracity of their statements that they do not intend to acquire nuclear weapons. This only further opens the regime up to charges of selectivity, unfairness and politicisation (Jones 1998).

THE NPT IS A LOST CAUSE

(Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australian Journal of International Affairs, September, 2005, “It's Time To Scrap the NPT,”)

The failure of the 2005 Review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to reach agreement on even a ‘single matter of substance’ only confirms that global efforts to control weapons of mass destruction have reached a dangerous precipice (Nason 2005; Cubby 2005). As two observers of the 2003 PrepCom (Preparatory Committee) meeting commented, ‘the NPT review process is under such severe strain that it has been sedated: interaction over difficult issues has been put on hold’ (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 48). Yet an overwhelming majority of states and commentators advocate persisting with the NPT regime, despite its numerous shortcomings. They do so in the fearful but misguided belief that it represents our ‘last chance’ (Epstein 1976) to ensure a world that is safe from the use or threat of nuclear weapons. The danger in this obsessive focus on the NPT, while failing to acknowledge and confront its fundamental weaknesses, is that states will lose sight of the ultimate objective*/preventing the threat or use of nuclear weapons*/and thereby gradually lose their capacity to ensure this objective. My intention here is to provoke debate about the utility of keeping the NPT on life support, as opposed to replacing it with a regime that acknowledges contemporary realities, while developing a more effective compact against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.
THE NPT WORSENS PROLIFERATION ABROAD
(Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australian Journal of International Affairs, September, 2005, “It’s Time To Scrap the NPT,”)

My central argument is that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons will probably continue at the rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade, whether or not the NPT is retained. Persisting with the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous than if the NPT is replaced with a more practical regime. I argue that the NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. On the other hand, scrapping the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons.
Missile defense fails

BECAUSE OF EXTENSIVE DELAYS, THE BMD IS UNTESTED AND NOT RELIABLE
The present authors are certainly not the first to draw attention to the limited amount of verification that now seems acceptable before a new system is deployed. Bradley Graham, in a major review of missile defense plans, noted in September 2004 that several key components have fallen years behind schedule and that flight tests, plagued by delays, have yet to advance beyond elementary, highly scripted events. Yet, in spite of these obvious problems, when during early 2005 the House and Senate Armed Services Committees prepared their input to the 2006 Defense Authorization Act, they generally supported the Pentagon’s missile defense work, merely noting that questions remained about testing plans. The lawmakers seemed to have forgotten their demands of only a year earlier. When approving a $10B budget for MDA for the 2005 authorization, they had demanded that defense officials come up with a clear test plan and stick to it. The possibility remains that, given all the advanced plans being pursued within MDA to try to enhance the initial ground-based system into one with global capabilities, insufficient funds remain to undertake a vigorous testing program. If costs are indeed a factor in this prioritization, then the balance is wrong. As explained earlier, it is essential to know the capabilities and limitations of the initial system if sensible enhancements are to be added. Furthermore, without significantly more testing, it is not possible to produce the reliability data upon which military users of the system normally depend to design their tactics.

BECAUSE IT IS UNTESTED, THE BMD HAS NO DETERRENCE VALUE TO POTENTIAL ENEMIES
The provision of the BMD was never meant to replace deterrence through the threat of overwhelming retaliation, but to provide additional deterrence and also to add layers of protection should deterrence fail. To work well in any of these roles, the BMD has to be highly effective and, moreover, that high degree of efficiency has to be demonstrated to potential opponents. This does not mean that an initial deployment has to meet these high standards; but if it is to be enhanced it will be important to know precisely what capabilities it does have and how these capabilities can be improved. Thus, although an effective BMD remains essential, we consider several aspects of the development to have been rushed and to remain unfinished. It is remarkable that Congress has not made stronger efforts to demand answers to the question of why a system that was claimed by the Administration to be close to operational at the end of 2004 has not been tested and remains in early 2006 as neither a test bed nor an operational system. These facts do little to add to the image of an effective system, and are hardly such as will induce allies to get involved with a program that gives every indication of being handled in a cavalier manner.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE DOES NOT WORK; IT IS NO PROTECTION AGAINST A FIRST-STRIKE
Timothy Bradley, Univ. of IL Urbana, Mar. '06, “Why a ballistic missile defense program is the wrong path to US national security,” Defense & Security Analysis, p. 95-96
The simplest reason to abort the ballistic missile defense program is that it is not technically feasible. One reason to believe that the program is not going well is that the past two tests (December 2004 and February 2005) were complete failures, with the interceptor failing to launch.' What makes this more disappointing is that, when the program started. President Bush made a promise that it would be finished and operational by the end of 2004. A likely verdict is that this was a political ploy to bolster popularity before the presidential election in November 2004. In this case, politics got in the way of common sense. The current state of the program is ailing, with a former Pentagon chief of testing, Philip Coyle, stating: "Of course we don't have any capability to do that [stop a ballistic missile attack]. For the president to sort of dare them [to fire missiles] is really misleading and even reckless". The fact that current tests have been unsuccessful in specifically controlled environments does not foster hope for the program to succeed in an unpredictable military engagement. The type of engagement that the program would be facing is another issue. Currently, North Korea does not appear to have long-range ballistic missile ability, though it could in the next 10-15 years. In that case, even if the missile defense program were operational, it would stand no chance of interception. Any nuclear ballistic missile attack on the US from forces such as North Korea, China or, possibly, Russia would consist of massive strikes, containing numerous missiles. Even an operational system would not be able to stop all of these projectiles, and only a few missiles need to hit their targets to cause major damage to the US's infrastructure. Some argue that it is better to have some sort of system, even if it is not necessarily guaranteed to work. This argument simply does not hold water. We are dealing with many thermonuclear warheads being launched at dense US populations; if ten missiles are fired from North Korea, and seven are intercepted and destroyed, that still leaves the possibility of cities such as Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle all being destroyed completely. The fact is, the chance of hitting even seven out of often incoming missiles is extremely rare.
AT Disarmament creates nuclear waste

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS DETERMINED THAT NUCLEAR WASTE SITES ARE SECURE ENOUGH TO PREVENT ENVIRONMENT OR HEALTH DAMAGES

D. Warner North 1998 (the author works for Decision Focus Incorporated, "Nuclear waste management: shifting the paradigm" Reliability Engineer and System Safety 59, pg. 123-128

A positive aspect of five years service on the NWTRB was a demonstration that highly complex technical issues could be examined in public meetings. In addition to receiving presentations from DOE staff and contractors on the Yucca Mountain project, NWTRB often invited other experts in relevant disciplines to participate in technical reviews on specific topics. Representatives from the State of Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office and a variety of other interested and affected parties often made helpful technical contributions at NWTRB’s public meetings. The public meetings helped NWTRB to identify many problems with the DOE plans for site characterization and repository design, and DOE has altered its plans in response to NWTRB recommendations. For example, the original plan of using vertical shafts was replaced by the use of shallow ramps excavated by a tunnel boring machine. Five years of intensive technical education on Yucca Mountain did not persuade the author that Yucca Mountain should be disqualified as an unsuitable site. It is not clear that any other site in the U.S. for a geological HLW repository would be an improvement over Yucca Mountain.
THE HEALTH AFFECTS ARE MINIMAL GIVEN THE LOW LEVEL OF RADIATION THAT WOULD OCCUR AND WOULD DEVELOP SLOWLY OVER TIME.
Douglas Holdstock, Lis Waterston 2000 (Phd working for Meact, "Nuclear weapons, a continuing threat to health" Lancet 2000; 355: 1544–47

Epidemiological studies do not prove that the leukaemia clusters are due to release of radioactivity. On conventional models of radiation carcinogenesis the exposures seem too small to account for the effects observed. It has been suggested that preconceptual irradiation might be to blame, but other studies have failed to confirm this, and the finding is currently ascribed to chance.26 A large study of cancer in the children of radiation workers found increased cancer, but no correlation with parental radiation dosage.27 Radiation doses in such studies are generally expressed as effective whole-body dose, but recent research raises the possibility that inhaled or ingested radioisotopes, particularly alpha-emitters such as plutonium, may have a disproportionate effect. Irradiation of human borne marrow with _-particles (which have high linear-energy-transfer) causes “genomic instability” resulting in diverse aberrations in the progeny of some stem cells many cell divisions later.28 The UK’s Committee on Medical Aspect of Radiation in the Environment remains unconvinced of the relevance of this work to the Sellafield cluster.29 If the relative biological effectiveness of absorbed a-emitters is high enough to explain the excess leukaemia around Sellafield, COMARE estimates that natural background sources would induce more cases of leukaemia and non-Hodgkin lymphoma than are actually observed, but accepts that further research is needed on effects in the embryo and fetus and on germ and stem cells. Since the publication of the 1996 COMARE report, evidence has appeared suggesting that genomic instability can be transmitted to a later generation.30 Mice were treated with plutonium-239 and the offspring were given a carcinogen, methylthioinosinatea. Significantly more of the offspring of irradiated male parents developed leukaemia and lymphoma, than those of untreated parents; there are many more cell divisions in spermatogenesis than ovogenesis. The pathological consequences of low-level internal radiation, particularly from _-emitters, and the concept of genomic instability are beginning to suggest that standard models of radiation effects need updating.

RESEARCH IS INCONCLUSIVE ON THE AFFECTS OF RADIATION
Douglas Holdstock, Lis Waterston 2000 (Phd working for Meact, "Nuclear weapons, a continuing threat to health" Lancet 2000; 355: 1544–47

Radioactive materials have been released from some at least of these sites. Furthermore, information about releases has not always been reliable;24 and standards of handling waste have been ignored at Dounreay (where reprocessing has now ceased) and have been appalling at the Russian complex at Mayak,25 where Lake Karachay may be the most radioactively contaminated site on earth. Leaks of strontium-90 and caesium-137 are over five times the combined releases of these isotopes from atmospheric nuclear testing, Chernobyl, and Sellafield taken together. In the 1957 Kyshtym accident in this region of the Urals high-level waste was dispersed by a chemical explosion in a storage tank, and a later report will describe environmental and health effects around the Mayak site.
WE WON’T KNOW THE TRUE CONSEQUENCES FOR YEARS TO COME
Allison Macfarlane 2003 (Associate Professor of International Affairs and Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at the Georgia Institute of Technology, "Underlying Yucca Mountain: The Interplay of Geology and Policy in Nuclear Waste Disposal" Social Studies of Science 33/5(October 2003) 783–807)

The situation of nuclear waste disposal is unique in some respects. Because of the long time-span (tens of thousands to millions of years) of geologic processes that would deliver radioactivity to human beings and the environment, it is highly likely that we will never know if the repository ‘worked’. The processes to be analyzed and evaluated in a geologic repository are complex and comprise a combination of scientific understanding of geologic processes and engineering design. They fit Perrow’s definition of a normal accident waiting to happen, that is, tightly coupled events interacting in incomprehensible ways to produce an accident (Perrow, 1999). Because of the lack of predictability in the disposal of nuclear waste and the consequences of an accident or failure of the system, any proposed solution deserves serious consideration, not only from the technical and policy community, but from the science studies community as well.

DESPITE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT STORAGE FACILITIES, THE TECHNOLOGY IS IMPROVING

THE SECOND BIG OBSTACLE that a nuclear renaissance faces is the problem of waste management. No country in the world has yet implemented a system for permanently disposing of the spent fuel and other radioactive waste produced by nuclear power plants. The most widely favored approach is geologic disposal, in which waste is stored in chambers hundreds of meters underground. The goal is to prevent leakage of the waste for many millennia through a combination of engineered barriers (for example, the waste containers) and geologic ones (the natural rock structure where the chamber has been excavated and the favorable characteristics of the hydrogeologic basin). Decades of studies support the geologic disposal option. Scientists have a good understanding of the processes and events that could transport radionuclides from the repository to the biosphere. Despite this scientific confidence, the process of approving a geologic site remains fraught with difficulties. A prime case in point is the proposed facility at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, which has been under consideration for two decades. Recently the site was found to have considerably more water than anticipated. It remains uncertain whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will license the site.
NEW TECHNOLOGY ALLOWS NUCLEAR WASTE TO BE REUSED IN NUCLEAR ENERGY PLANTS THAT WOULD DRASTICALLY REDUCE THE RADIOACTIVE LIFETIME OF THE MATERIALS.


The idea is to send this material back into a reactor. There it will generate more energy. And in the process, the long-lived radioactive materials will break down into elements with much shorter lifetimes. The resulting experimental fuel pellets look like bullets. "These are the first pellets that have been produced from commercial nuclear fuel," Greene says, "in which we did not produce any pure separated plutonium in the process." Greene says if waste weren't such a hot-button issue, nuclear power would actually look pretty attractive. One person's lifetime nuclear waste would fit in a Coke can — which is tiny, compared with the many tons of carbon dioxide the average American dumps into the atmosphere each and every year. And even on a national scale, Greene says it's not as much as you might think. "If I put in one place all of the spent fuel generated by all of the commercial power plants in the United States throughout history," he says, "all of that spent fuel could be fit into a pool of water 25 feet deep and 300 feet on a side." The size of a football field. Right now, that pool would need to remain reliable for a million years — which is one reason even putting it in Yucca Mountain seemed like less than a sure thing. Reprocessing the waste wouldn't reduce its volume — but it would dramatically reduce its radioactive lifetime. And that could make waste storage a much easier problem to solve.
AT Dual use

THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS “PEACEFUL” NUKE WEAPONS USE – ALL USES GIVE INFORMATION ON HOW TO BETTER DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
M.D. Nordyke [Professor of Nuclear Physics @ University of Arizona] “The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions,” USDOE, September 1, 2000

The fundamental problem posed by permitting PNEs to be carried out under a ban on all testing of nuclear weapons devices is how to prevent nuclear explosions earned out for peaceful purposes from contributing knowledge useful to the development of nuclear weapons. Whereas PNE and weapon devices could well have different design requirements in terms of size, weight, radiation output, and residual radioactivity, learning how to design better PNE devices would directly contribute to designing better weapons. Development of “cleaner” explosives with much lower fission-to-fission ratios were essential for nuclear excavation applications. How could the side conducting PNEs be prevented from testing new device design ideas, with or without diagnostic measurements of device performance, even if such improvements were prohibited? The final yield or radiochemical analysis of microscopic particles of the debris from a PNE explosive could provide sufficient proof of the validity of many new ideas, but only to those who designed the device.

BAD DEFLECTION HURTS, ALSO EXPLOSIONS MAKE IT A SHOTGUN EFFECT.
Ed Lu [President @ B612 Foundation, ‘04] “Near-Earth Objects,” testimony before the Committee on Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, April 7, 2004

If the asteroid is not deflected in a controlled manner, we risk simply making the problem worse. Nuclear explosives for example risk breaking up the asteroid into pieces, thus turning a speeding bullet into a shotgun blast of smaller but still possibly deadly fragments. Explosions also have the drawback that we cannot accurately predict the resultant velocity of the asteroid not a good situation when trying to avert a catastrophe. Conversely, moving an asteroid in a controlled fashion also opens up the possibility of using the same technology to manipulate other asteroids for the purposes of resource utilization.
THERE ARE NO THREATENING ASTEROIDS, AND NUKES ARE BAD AT DEFLECTING THEM.


What is more, the report emphasized the effectiveness of nuclear explosions in providing the force to deflect an NEO from a collision course, but it completely neglected the need for precision in such a procedure.

This analysis is seriously flawed. It is important not only to deflect an NEO from a collision course with Earth (primary deflection) but also to avoid knocking the object into a potential return orbit that would cause it to come back a few years later (secondary deflection). Nuclear explosions are not controllable in this way. But a nonnuclear kinetic impact—that is, simply smashing a spacecraft into an NEO—can provide the primary deflection for the vast majority of objects, and a precise secondary deflection, if necessary, could be performed by an accompanying gravity-tractor spacecraft, which would be needed in any event to observe the NEO deflection and its aftermath [see "Gravitational Tractor for Towing Asteroids," by Edward T. Lu and Stanley G. Love, in Nature; November 10, 2005]. Nuclear explosives would be needed only for deflecting the largest NEOs, which are the least common and most easily detectable objects. Scientists are not concerned about a collision with an extremely large NEO—say, 10 kilometers in diameter—because all these objects have been discovered and none currently threatens Earth. Big things are easy for astronomers to find; the smaller objects are what we have to worry about. Of the estimated 4,000 NEOs with diameters of 400 meters or more—which includes all objects that might conceivably require nuclear explosives to divert them—researchers have so far identified about 1,500. And if NASA meets the search goals mandated by Congress, it will locate 98 percent of these objects and calculate 100-year projections of their orbits by 2020. As NASA continues to find big NEOs, the calculations of risk change accordingly. A decade ago, before astronomers began to systematically locate NEOs larger than 400 meters in diameter, they estimated that we faced a statistical risk of being struck by such an object once every 100,000 years. But now that researchers have identified and are tracking about 37 percent of these NEOs, the frequency of being hit by one of the remaining large objects has dropped to once in 160,000 years. Unless NASA finds a large NEO on an immediate collision course by 2020 (a very unlikely event), the frequency of a collision with one of the 80 still undiscovered objects (2 percent of 4,000) will drop to once every five million years.

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS ARE A RIDICULOUS SOLUTION TO OIL SPILLS.


Stephanie Mueller, a spokeswoman for the Energy Department, said that neither Energy Secretary Steven Chu nor anyone else was thinking about a nuclear blast under the gulf. The nuclear option was not — and never had been — on the table, federal officials said. “It’s crazy,” one senior official said. Government and private nuclear experts agreed that using a nuclear bomb would be not only risky technically, with unknown and possibly disastrous consequences from radiation, but also unwise geopolitically — it would violate arms treaties that the United States has signed and championed over the decades and do so at a time when President Obama is pushing for global nuclear disarmament.
ASTEROID DESTRUCTION BY NUKE IS DANGEROUS AND IMPrACTICAL.
International Academy of Astronautics [NGO Recognized by UN, '09] “Dealing with the Threat To Earth From Asteroids and Comets" January 2009
There is a persistent notion in lay circles that the way to deal with a dangerous NEO is to simply hit it with an ICBM and vaporize it in space. Unfortunately, reality is far removed from this illusion. While it is likely that we may be able to rapidly reconfigure an ICBM computer guidance system to intercept a point or object in near-Earth space, ICBM propulsion system performance is insufficient to enable intercept beyond a few hundred kilometers above the Earth’s surface. Stages must be added to an ICBM to enable it to achieve the necessary escape velocity and to place the weapon on an intercept trajectory with a NEO. While these upper stage technologies are space qualified, such a system would have too low a reliability for the NEO intercept mission given the potentially horrendous consequences of an Earth impact, and might thus require many sequential launches of several such vehicles to have any reasonable chance of successfully deflecting a NEO. Such attempts would be part of a dedicated “campaign” utilizing several different launch vehicle types, designed with different upper stages, using different end game techniques, and different nuclear warhead types, in order to obtain a high probability of success. Furthermore at least one failed launch attempt is likely if many are required, and with a nuclear payload this could result in serious environmental effects in and of itself. Thus, it is clear that for the nuclear concept several dedicated designs of a inherently highly reliable launch vehicles and multi-stage interceptors would be extremely desirable to loft the nuclear warheads, and thus the use of existing ICBMs, even if outfitted with current technology upper stages, is highly undesirable if not essentially ruled out.

USING NUKES TO STOP OIL SPILLS WOULD EMIT RADIATION INTO THE AIR.
Not everybody is so sanguine about the Soviet experience. Speaking on condition of anonymity, an expert from Russia's largest oil exporter Rosneft, urges the United States to ignore calls for the atomic option. "That would bring Chernobyl to America," he says. Vladimir Chuprov from Greenpeace’s Moscow office is even more insistent that BP not heed the advice of the veteran Soviet physicists. Chuprov disputes the veterans' accounts of the peaceful explosions and says several of the gas leaks reappeared later. "What was praised as a success and a breakthrough by the Soviet Union is in essence a lie," he says. "I would recommend that the international community not listen to the Russians. Especially those of them that offer crazy ideas. Russians are keen on offering things, especially insane things." Former Minister Mikhailov agrees that the USSR had to give up its program because of problems it presented. "I ended the program because I knew how worthless this all was," he says with a sigh. "Radioactive material was still seeping through cracks in the ground and spreading into the air. It wasn't worth it."
IF ALIENS WANT US DEAD, WE WILL HAVE NO CHANCE. PREPARATION IS A WASTE OF TIME.

George Dvorsky [Board Member @ Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, ‘07] “How not to prepare for an alien invasion,” Sentient Developments, April 27, 2007

The idea of the United States defending the planet with guerrilla tactics reminds me of one of the most absurd films of all-time, Independence Day. In this movie, America experiences a supreme ass kicking until the alien invaders are thwarted by the Fresh Prince and his Apple Newton (remember those?). Okay, time for a 21st century reality check. And let me put it this way: setting aside hand-waving dismissals of the Fermi Paradox (and that's a BIG caveat), if an advanced space-faring intelligence were to arrive at Earth with hostile intentions, their attack would be over before we could say, "E.T. phone home." Specifically, I'm imagining a post-Singularity machine intelligence with access to artificial superintelligence, advanced robotics, genetically designed phages, and Drexlerian nanotechnology (if not femtotechnology). It would be like the Terminator and Matrix worlds on steroids. And that's if they want a planet to recover; the use of anti-matter weapons would make quick work of our planet should they want to destroy it. Alternately they could set the atmosphere aflame using grey-goo nano. Or how about robotic locust swarms, autonomous hunter-killers, and neurowarfare? Moreover, malevolent ETIs wouldn't even need to visit the Earth -- they could send their forces by proxy in the form of Von Neumann probes, or what has also been dubbed berserker probes. These are self-replicating space-craft that could conceivably reproduce and travel across the Galaxy at an exponential rate. These devices could carry a number of nasty weapons with them for their attack. As an aside, the theoretical prospect of berserkers poses a conundrum that's related to the Fermi Paradox. Any malevolent or misguided advanced intelligence could spawn a fleet of these probes to sterilize the Galaxy in fairly short order. That said, we clearly don't live in a sterile Galaxy as witnessed by our ongoing existence. We appear to live in a Galaxy that's devoid of berserkers for non-obvious reasons. So, my advice on preparing for an alien invasion? Simple: don't bother -- you won't even know what hit you.
Imperialism

THE NPT IS THE ROOT OF THE NUCLEAR DOMINATION OF THE THIRD WORLD.


Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric – designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995). Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem."
THE THIRD WORLD POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS DESCRIBED IN PATRIARCHAL TERMS.


Third World nations acquiring nuclear weapons are also described in terms of passions escaping control. In Western discourse the passionate, or instinctual, has long been identified with women and animals and implicitly contrasted with male human rationality (Haraway 1990; Merchant 1980; Rosaldo 1974). Thus certain recurrent figures of speech in the Western discourse on proliferation cast proliferant nations in the Third World in imagery that carries a subtle feminine or subhuman connotation. Whereas the United States is spoken of as having "vital interests" and "legitimate security needs," Third World nations have "passions," "longings," and "yearnings" for nuclear weapons which must be controlled and contained by the strong male and adult hand of America. Pakistan has "an evident ardor for the Bomb," says a New York Times editorial (1987a:A34). Peter Rosenfeld, writing in the Washington Post, worries that the United States cannot forever "stifle [Pakistan's] nuclear longings" (1987:A27). Representative Ed Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts), agreeing, warns in a letter to the Washington Post that America's weakness in its relationship with Pakistan means that the Pakistanis "can feed nuclear passions at home and still receive massive military aid from America" (1987:A22). The image is of the unfaithful wife sponging off her cuckolded husband. But throwing the woman out may cause even more disorder: the Washington Post editorial page, having described Pakistan's nuclear weapons program-in an allusion to the ultimate symbol of Muslim femininity—as concealed "behind a veil of secrecy," goes on to warn that there are "advantages to . . . having Pakistan stay in a close and constraining security relationship with the United States rather than be cast out by an aid cutoff into a loneliness in which its passion could only grow" (1987:A22). Thus, even though American intelligence had by 1986 concluded that the Pakistani uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta "had gone all the way" (Smith 1988:104), and even though the president can no longer, as he is required by law, "certify Pakistan's nuclear purity" (Molander 1986), the disobedient, emotive femininity of Pakistan is likely to be less disruptive if it is kept within the bounds of its uneasy relationship with the United States.

THE THIRD WORLD POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS DESCRIBED IN PATERNAL TERMS.


Third World nations are also often portrayed as children, and the United States, as a parental figure. The message is succinctly conveyed by one newspaper headline: "India, Pakistan Told to Put Weapons Away" (Marshall 1998a). Ben Sanders praises the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a means to "protect the atomically innocent" (1990:25). But what about when innocence is lost? Steve Chapman, speaking of India and Pakistan, argues that "it's fine to counsel teen-agers against having sex. But once they have produced a baby, another approach is in order" (1998:21). New York Times editorials speak of U.S. "scoldings" of Pakistan and "U.S. demands for good Pakistani behavior from now on (1987a:A34). Some commentators fear that the U.S. parental style is too permissive and will encourage misbehavior by Pakistan's naughty siblings: "those who advocated an aid cutoff said the time had come for the United States to set an example for other would-be nuclear nations" (Smith 1988:106). Warning that American parental credibility is on the line, the New York Times says that "all manner of reason and arguments have been tried with Pakistani leaders. It's time for stronger steps" (1987a:A34).
THE DISCOURSE SURROUNDING THIRD WORLD POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS OPPRESSIVE.
These metaphorical representations of threshold nuclear nations as criminals, women, and children assimilate the relationship between the West and the Third World to other hierarchies of dominance within Western culture. They use the symbolic force of domestic hierarchies-police over criminals, men over women, and adults over children—to buttress and construct the global hierarchy of nations, telling us that, like women, children, and criminals, Third World nations have their proper place. The sense in the West that Third World nations have their proper place at the bottom of a global order in which nuclear weapons are the status symbols of the powerful alone—that nuclear proliferation is transgressing important symbolic hierarchies—is nicely conveyed by the condescending reactions in the Western media to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests of 1998. Here many commentators sounded like secretaries of exclusive members-only clubs blackballing applications from the nouveau riche. "With scant regard for the admonitions of other members of the [nuclear] group, India has abruptly and loudly elbowed itself from the bottom into the top tier of this privileged elite," said one commentator (Smith 1998:A12). Putting the upstarts back in their place, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright said that it was "clear that what the Indians and Pakistanis did was unacceptable and that they are not now members of the nuclear club" (Marshall 1998b:A12). The same sentiment was expressed in stronger terms on the op-ed page of the New York Times by former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, whose characterization of India draws on classic orientalist imagery to make its point that the Indians are not "our" kind of people: "We must make clear to the Indian government that it is today what it was two weeks ago, an arrogant, overreaching cabal that, by its devotion to the caste system, political and economic disenfranchisement of its people and its religious intolerance, is unworthy of membership in any club" (1998:13).

THE DISCOURSE ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND POSSESSION BLAMES THE WRONG PEOPLE.
The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination while presenting the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining their nuclear monopoly as if they were equally beneficial to all the nations of the globe. And, ironically, the discourse on nonproliferation presents these subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world. This is another case of blaming the victim. The discourse on nuclear proliferation is structured around a rigid segregation of "their" problems from "ours." In fact, however, we are linked to developing nations by a world system, and many of the problems that, we claim, render these nations ineligible to own nuclear weapons have a lot to do with the West and the system it dominates.
EXTINCTION SCENARIOS FROM NUCLEAR WAR ARE CHAUVINISTIC.
Brian Martin [Professor of Social Sciences @ University of Wollongong, '84] “Extinction Politics”
SANA Update (Scientists Against Nuclear Arms Newsletter), number 16, May 1984, pp. 5-6.
There are quite a number of reasons why people may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive. Here I will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world. Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer witness fresh fish being airfreighted from Bangladesh to Europe. A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor, nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing.
“Civilian resistance” alternative

CIVILIAN RESISTANCE EXPLAINED
p. 56.
Civilian resistance focuses upon the defense of a nation's basic social institutions, culture, and ideological beliefs by training the civilian population in organized nonviolent resistance and noncompliance. In addition to protecting human lives, a national defense must successfully protect a way of life: the institutions, rights, and principles that form the stable framework for life and provide a group with an organized expression of conscious preferences and commitments. Civilian resistance therefore seeks to deter aggression by making it clear to any potential invader that he could not control and dominate the political and social life of the nation he seeks to invade. He would see that military occupation would not by itself give him political control and would not be experienced by the population as defeat; rather it would mean an extension of the contest of will and ideology.

CIVILIAN RESISTANCE BEST DETERS A NUCLEAR ATTACK
p. 57.
Civilian resistance, which unlike nuclear forces can be used only for defensive purposes, would remove that danger and thereby reduce the chances of annihilation. In addition, while there remain some circumstances under which a nuclear attack might seem rational, given present deterrence policies, there appear to be no circumstances under which a nuclear attack on an unarmed nation would appear rational. It will surely be objected that civilian resistance could not save a nation from a maniacal opponent. However, since no one can predict what a maniac would do, there is no more reason to suppose that he would respond rationally to nuclear threats than that he would pointlessly devastate an unarmed and unthreatening country.

CIVILIAN RESISTANCE DOES NOT RELY MERELY ON GUILT
p. 57.
Walzer has objected that while nuclear deterrence depends upon inspiring fear in the adversary, in nonviolent defense the adversary would experience no fear, but at best only guilt, shame, and remorse. "The success of the defense [would be] entirely dependent upon the moral convictions and sensibilities of the enemy soldiers,"39 But this presumption appears mistaken. First, it has been noted that inhibitions of a political, social, and cultural nature are normally more decisive than fear in holding back the hand on the trigger.40 Second, there is no reason to suppose that nonviolent deterrence must depend more than nuclear deterrence upon the moral sensibilities of the adversary. All deterrence policies must depend upon the adversary's calculations that the costs of aggression would outweigh the benefits, and this would be true no less for nonviolent defense than for nuclear deterrence.
IF DETERRENCE IS MORAL BECAUSE OF ITS NECESSITY, CIVILIAN RESISTANCE MUST BE GRAPPLED WITH TO DECLARE IT MORAL


The case for nonviolent defense has not been completed, but serious and intelligent criticism has also hardly begun. Civilian resistance has not received the attention it deserves. It may turn out that a nonviolent national defense would be impossible, or if possible, less acceptable morally than nuclear deterrence. But nonviolent defense is not foolish on its face, nor is it merely pacifism or unilateral disarmament under a different guise. Its apparent moral superiority to nuclear deterrence obligates us to give it our careful attention. Indeed if threats of nuclear retaliation are morally permissible, then they are permissible only because deterrence is absolutely necessary, and nuclear threats are the only means of effecting this deterrence. Thus even those who argue for the moral superiority of nuclear deterrence, if they are earnest and sincere, must attempt to demonstrate the moral inadequacy of civilian resistance.
NUCLEAR POWER IS TOO RISKY AND IS BASED ON THE UNRELIABLE METHOD OF TRIAL-AND-ERROR.
First, we must have good reasons for believing that the errors, if they occur, will be small. Otherwise the lessons may be far too costly. Some nuclear mishaps will no doubt be modest. But for the same reasons small accidents are possible so too are large ones, and some of the errors resulting in failure of nuclear reactor safeguards may be very costly indeed. This makes trial and error inappropriate in that setting (Weinberg 1972a, pp. 210-11; Hafle 1974). Second, errors must be immediately recognizable and correctable (Goodin and Waldner 1979). The impact of radioactive emissions from operating plants or of leaks of radioactive waste products from storage sites upon human populations or the natural environment may well be a "sleeper" effect that does not appear in time for us to revise our original policy accordingly. Finally, learning by doing is a flawed strategy because it is often unclear how to describe the salient features of what you have done in the past and hence what "lessons" to draw from the experience. Models building on "fuzzy set theory" show how complicated the decision problem becomes if the classification of events is in doubt as well as the probabilities of their occurrence.

LEARNING BY DOING IN THE CASE OF NUCLEAR POWER IS DANGEROUS.
No Moral Nukes. Robert E. Goodin. Ethics, Vol. 90, No. 3 (Apr., 1980), pp. 417-449. Published by: The University of Chicago Press. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380581 Precisely this sort of learning by doing has been shown to be responsible for dramatic improvements in the operating efficiency of nuclear reactors (Oskow and Rozanski 1979). That finding, however, is as much a cause for concern as for hope. It is shocking that there is any room at all left for learning in an operational nuclear reactor, given the magnitude of the disaster that might result from ignorance or error in that setting.

NUCLEAR WAR VIOLATES SOVEREIGNTY.
A second, related thing also has to do with the spatial scale. We take for granted in our thinking about war that countries and national boundaries remain in place. In war a country's borders can, of course, be crossed by the armed forces of another, and those countries not at war can be affected by a war going on elsewhere. But once a war begins, the countries not at war can decide whether they will go to war too; and countries at war can choose whether or not to respect national boundaries and keep the war out of uninvolved or neutral countries. Nuclear war is different. Quite apart from the unknown changes in the biosphere that might well be wrought by nuclear explosions, it is apparent that nuclear radiation and fallout are not, and cannot be, respecters of national boundaries, confined in their direct and lethal effects to the inhabitants of the countries engaged in nuclear war. Whether the countries engaging in nuclear war intend it or not, nuclear war in part takes place wherever the winds of that war happen to be blowing at that time.
NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT A PERMISSIBLE FORM OF SELF-DEFENSE.


To use nuclear weapons, in even the most plausible case, as a means of national self-defense against a wrongful, evil, murderous aggressor would still always be monstrously wrong and never in practice justifiable, even as a lesser of awesome and awful evils. For if our ideas about the permissible use of deadly force in national defense are to have any meaningful connection with our ideas about individual self-defense, the individuals against whom deadly force is used in a war of self-defense must have some causal, or closely analogous, connection with the danger at hand before they can rightly be deliberately killed by the weapons used in a war of self-defense. And if, as surely is the case, there are many such individuals in any country (no matter how aggressive) who have no such connections, then the use of weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction against them is not, and cannot be, founded on an intelligible or defensible recourse to ideas of legitimate, national self-defense.

NEITHER SIDE IS JUSTIFIED IN LAUNCHING A NUCLEAR WAR.


To engage in nuclear war by being the first to devastate those living elsewhere would surely be to act too soon in light of the magnitude of the certain murderous slaughter of the innocent that the weapons would produce; to respond to a nuclear onslaught by launching nuclear weapons in return would be to act too late and in an equally murderous way in light of the danger that no longer can be averted. Whether consequences to the innocent can ever justify the murder of other innocent persons can here be left a theoretically open question because in nuclear war the relevant consequences are either too uncertain and anticipatory to license the certain, massive murder inescapably linked to a first nuclear attack or too fixed and already irremediably determined to license the certain, massive murder equally inescapably linked to a second responsive attack.
Negative Evidence

Disarmament impossible

Disarmament is unrealistic. Accept the nuclear state.
To the extent that people find it dangerously unrealistic to cease deterrence and disarm unilaterally and yet are told that this is what morality dictates, they will in fact tend to ignore moral reasoning about nuclear matters altogether. The absolutist argument against deterrence is thus vulnerable to two criticisms. First, the principle in question leads to counterintuitive results: many will simply see the endorsement of unilateral disarmament as a reductio of the absolutist position. Second, in laying down a moral requirement which is so stringent that people will not in fact obey it, the absolutist only weakens peoples' allegiance to morality in general.

Abolishing nuclear weapons is impossible given the current world.
Peace, like an end to nuclear weapons, is the result rather than the cause of the security condition of a regional or global international community. It will take a global political and social order quite different from the current situation to make a world without nuclear weapons possible. One example would be an international order rather like mid–twentieth-century Denmark or Sweden, writ large. Those were rather homogeneous and unitary polities, functioning under the rule of law and with a law-abiding, egalitarian citizenry. A quite different example is seventeenth-century Japan, where firearms were suppressed after having been extensively used during the previous century’s wars. That society was hierarchical, highly disciplined, and extremely intrusive. Neither of those models is at all like the current nature of international relations. Moreover, the assertion that we intend to abolish nuclear weapons is likely to gain less in goodwill and cooperation in nonproliferation programs from others than it will lose when it becomes clear that there is no believable program or prospect of doing so.
FULLY GETTING RID OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS IMPOSSIBLE
(Colin Gray, Professor of International Politics at the University of Hull, “To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies,” Alternative Nuclear Futures, ed. Baylis and O’Neil, 2000, p. 8-9)

Nuclear abolition is impractical because, unless time travel becomes feasible, 'the nuclear discovery' by the Manhattan Project in the Second World War cannot be undone. To argue for a policy that is inherently and permanently impractical has to be foolish, given that it can raise public expectations that cannot be fulfilled, it wastes scarce intellectual effort, and it can serve as a counsel of perfection that destabilizes more sensible nuclear policy.” The idea, or standard, of abolition is not merely irrelevant to the security challenges that attend nuclear armament, however, it is irrelevant in ways that could damage security. Readers may recall that, although the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 was overtaken rapidly by the political events of the meltdown of the Soviet empire, during the years of its negotiation it was a menace to the political legitimacy of NATO’s nuclear dependent defense doctrine." Given that arguments for nuclear abolition plainly are impractical, and that many of those who have associated themselves with abolitionist sentiments are genuinely nuclear experts, one is at a loss to know how to characterize those people’s views other than uncharitably.8 Experts, those whose reputations for expert knowledge lends credibility to a debatable cause, should not advocate a process that looks to accomplish complete nuclear disarmament when they know that that process must fail.
Unilateral disarmament bad

DISARMAMENT COULD LEAD TO NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION.
To disarm unilaterally would be to make ourselves vulnerable to domination and exploitation. Note that to date nuclear weapons have only been used against a nation that did not possess any. It is not to attribute especially malevolent motives to Soviet leaders to believe that they would be willing to do as we did in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
GIVING UP US NUCLEAR DETERRENCE COULD PRECIPITATE THE MOST DANGEROUS WAR IN HISTORY.


According to the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States must maintain a "robust nuclear deterrent, which remains a keystone of U.S. national power." The reason should be self evident—without a nuclear deterrent the United States could be destroyed as an industrial civilization and our conventional forces could be defeated by a state with grossly inferior conventional capability but powerful WMD. We cannot afford to ignore existing and growing threats to the very existence of the United States as a national entity. Missile defenses and conventional strike capabilities, while critically important elements of deterrence and national power, simply can't substitute for nuclear deterrence. In light of the emerging "strategic partnership" between Russia and China and their emphasis on nuclear weapons it would be foolish indeed to size U.S. strategic nuclear forces as if the only threat we face is that of rogue states and discard the requirement that the U.S. nuclear deterrent be "second to none." Ignoring the PRC nuclear threat because of Chinese "no first use" propaganda is just as irresponsible. Absent a nuclear deterrent to their WMD use, rogue states could defeat our forces by the combination of few nuclear EMP weapons and large chemical and biological attacks. The situation would be much worse if they build a more extensive nuclear strike capability as has been reported. Freezing U.S. nuclear forces at the technical level of the Reagan administration will assure that, within two decades, Russia, China, India, and probably others will be technically superior and U.S. deterrence ability against CBW attack will be reduced. United States nuclear forces must be modernized and tailored to enhance deterrence and damage limitation against the rogue WMD threat. WMD capabilities have given otherwise inconsequential states the ability to kill millions of people. The right combination of missile defense and conventional and nuclear strike capabilities provide the best deterrent and damage limiting capability against the rogue state threat. We must not ignore the requirement to provide extended deterrence to our allies. British and French nuclear forces are not large enough, and these nations are not perceived as tough enough, to provide a deterrent for NATO Europe against Russia. In the Far East, there is literally no nuclear deterrent capability against China other than that provided by the United States. Failure to provide a credible deterrent will result in a wave of nuclear proliferation with serious national security implications. When dealing with the rogue states, the issue is not the size of the U.S. nuclear deterrent but the credibility of its use in response to chemical or biological weapons use and its ability to conduct low collateral damage nuclear attacks against WMD capabilities and delivery systems including very hard underground facilities for purposes of damage limitation. We must also have the capability to respond promptly. The United States nuclear guarantee is a major deterrent to proliferation. If we do not honor that guarantee, or devalue it, many more nations will obtain nuclear weapons. If arms control really becomes a substitute for nuclear deterrence and defense, it may very well precipitate the most destructive war in history.
THE US CAN’T FILL THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT GAP WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

Why can’t the United States deter WMD (nuclear, chemical, biological) attack with conventional weapons? The short answer is that conventional weapons can’t deter a WMD attack because of their minuscule destructiveness compared with WMD, which are thousands to millions of times as lethal as conventional weapons. Existing WMD can kill millions to hundreds of millions of people in an hour, and there are national leaders who would use them against us if all they had to fear was a conventional response. The threat of nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack, as assessed by a Congressional Commission in 2004, is so severe that one or at most a handful of EMP attacks could demolish industrial civilization in the United States. The view that conventional weapons can replace nuclear weapons in deterrence or warfighting against a state using WMD is not technically supportable. Precision-guided conventional weapons are fine substitutes for non-precision weapons, but they do not remotely possess the lethality of WMD warheads. Moreover, their effectiveness in some cases can be seriously degraded by counter-measures and they clearly are not effective against most hard and deeply buried facilities that are associated with WMD threats and national leadership protection. If deterrence of WMD attack fails, conventional weapons are unlikely to terminate adversary WMD attacks upon us and our allies or to deter escalation.

U.S. DETERRENCE STOPS PROLIFERATION AMONGST ITS ALLIES

Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon US extended deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite US security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals. So long as the United States maintains adequately strong conventional forces, it does not necessarily need to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a major conventional attack. But long-term US superiority in the conventional military domain cannot be taken for granted and requires continuing attention and investment. Moreover, it is not adequate for deterring nuclear attack. The US deterrent must be both visible and credible, not only to our possible adversaries, but to our allies as well.
**Deterrence/MAD succeeds**

**EVEN IF A NATION IS LED BY SOMEONE DEEMED “IRRATIONAL”**

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WILL KEEP THEM IN


Since the detonations of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons have been considered to be the ultimate weapons, incomparable to any other weapon system. Over time, this understanding largely detached them from the portfolio of conventional military means available to strategists and defence planners and assigned them a symbolic meaning that influenced the identity and norms creation of nations. In most countries today, the development of nuclear weapons is considered morally prohibitive, incompatible with a country’s identity and international outlook. In some states, however, these negative norms are overridden by a positive set of norms, causing nuclear weapons to become either symbols of invulnerability to perceived threats or the regalia of major power status. Despite the vast literature on nuclear proliferation, more in-depth analyses have only recently been conducted to identify the conditions that cause most states to develop a moral aversion to nuclear weapons, yet effectively lead to their glorification in others. The studies on these aspects of nuclear arming behaviour consider the existence of a negative normative predisposition, often referred to as ‘nuclear taboo’¹, as a major factor preventing their acquisition and use. Many do not just acknowledge the existence of a nuclear taboo inhibiting the use of nuclear weapons, but point to the existence of the opposing effect of norms, frequently referred to as ‘nuclear myth’², when it comes to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. At this stage, it is important to note that the emergence of the nuclear myth relates to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, not to their use. The phenomenon that many countries which acquire nuclear weapons still maintain a taboo with regard to their use becomes visible in the self-perception as ‘responsible nuclear power’ which dominates the domestic discourses within these states. The myth emerges when certain symbolic meanings are attached to nuclear weapons, which are perceived to reflect a state’s identity, its self-image and its desired position in the international system. The concept of ‘nuclear myth’ is closely related to

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNIQUELY ALLOW FOR DETERRENCE**


In the 1970s and 1980s more and more emphasis was placed on the need to fight and defend at all levels in order to "deter." The melding of defense, war-fighting, and deterrence overlooks a simple truth about nuclear weapons proclaimed in the book title The Absolute Weapon (Brodie 1946). Nuclear weapons can carry out their deterrent task no matter what other countries do. If one nuclear power were able to destroy almost all of another's strategic warheads with practical certainty or defend against all but a few strategic warheads coming in, nuclear weapons would not be absolute. But because so much explosive power comes in such small packages, the invulnerability of a sufficient number of warheads is easy to achieve and the delivery of fairly large numbers of warheads impossible to thwart, both now and as far into the future as anyone can see. The absolute quality of nuclear weapons sharply sets a nuclear world off from a conventional one.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNIQUELY ALLOW FOR DETERRENCE

The catastrophe promised by nuclear war contrasts sharply with the extreme difficulty of predicting outcomes among conventional competitors. This makes one wonder about the claimed dependence of deterrence on perceptions and the alleged problem of credibility. In conventional competitions, the comparative qualities of troops, weaponry, strategies, and leaders are difficult to predict. Wars start more easily because the uncertainties of their outcomes make it easier for the leaders of states to entertain illusions of victory at supportable cost. In contrast, contemplating war when the use of nuclear weapons is possible focuses one’s attention not on the probability of victory but on the possibility of annihilation. Because catastrophic outcomes of nuclear exchanges are easy to imagine, leaders of states will shrink in horror from initiating them. With nuclear weapons, stability and peace rest on easy calculations of what one country can do to another. Anyone – political leader or man in the street – can see that catastrophe lurks if events spiral out of control and nuclear warheads begin to fly. The problem of the credibility of deterrence, a big worry in a conventional world, disappears in a nuclear one.

EVEN BETWEEN HEAVILY-ARMED STATES, A FULL-BLOWN NUCLEAR WAR IS UNLIKELY

Military actions have to be related to an objective. Because of the awesome power of nuclear weapons, the pressure to use them in ways that achieve the objective at hand while doing and suffering a minimum of destruction would be immense. It is preposterous to think that if a Soviet attack broke through NATO’s defenses, the United States would strike thousands of Soviet military targets or hundreds of Soviet cities. Doing so would serve no purpose. Who would want to make a bad situation worse by launching wantonly destructive attacks on a country that can strike back with comparable force, or, for that matter, on a country that could not do so? In the event, we might strike a target or two – military or industrial – chosen to keep casualties low. If the Soviet Union had run the preposterous risk of attacking the center of Europe believing it could escape retaliation, we would thus show them that more would follow if they persisted. Among countries with abundant nuclear weapons, none can gain an advantage by striking first. The purpose of demonstration shots is simply to remind everyone – should anyone forget – that catastrophe threatens. Some people purport to believe that if a few warheads go off, many will follow. This would seem to be the least likely of all the unlikely possibilities. That no country gains by destroying another’s cities and then seeing a comparable number of its own destroyed in return is obvious to everyone.

ARMS RACES ARE NOT INEVITABLE SINCE A LARGE FORCE IS UNNECESSARY TO DETER

We do not need ever-larger forces to deter. Smaller forces, so long as they are invulnerable, would be quite sufficient. Yet the vulnerability of fixed, land-based missiles has proved worrisome. Those who do the worrying dwell on the vulnerability of one class of weapon. The militarily important question, however, is not about the vulnerability of one class of weapon but about the vulnerability of a whole strategic-weapons system. Submarine-launched missiles make land-based missiles invulnerable since destroying only the latter would leave thousands of strategic warheads intact.
ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES ARE LIKELY
Many of the obstacles to arms reduction among conventional powers disappear or dwindle among nuclear nations. For the former, the careful comparison of the quantities and qualities of forces is important. Because this is not so with nuclear weapons, the problem of verifying agreements largely disappears. Provisions for verification may be necessary in order to persuade the Senate to ratify an agreement, but the possibility of non-compliance is not very worrisome. Agreements that reduce one category of conventional weapons may shift competition to other types of weapons and lead to increases in their numbers and capabilities. Because with nuclear weapons sufficiency is easily defined, there is no military reason for reductions in some weapons to result in increases in others. Conventionally, multiparty agreements are hard to arrive at because each party has to consider how shifting alignments may alter the balance of forces if agreements are reached to reduce them. In a world of second-strike nuclear forces, alliances have little effect on the strategic balance. The Soviet Union's failure to insist that British, French, and Chinese forces be counted in strategic arms negotiations may reflect its appreciation of this point. Finally, conventional powers have to compare weapons of uncertain effectiveness. Arms agreements are difficult to reach because their provisions may bear directly on the prospects for victory or defeat. Because in a nuclear world peace is maintained by the presence of deterrent forces, strategic arms agreements do not have military but economic and political significance. They can benefit countries economically and help to improve their relations.

THE THREATS POSED BY RUSSIA AND CHINA REQUIRE CONTINUED POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The contrast is stark. While Americans wring their hands over the pros and cons of dramatic reductions in U.S. nuclear forces, and even debate whether or not to go to zero nuclear weapons, the Russians and Chinese are modernizing their own nuclear forces. In the case of China, this entails building new missiles and warheads, recently tested. In the case of Russia, whose conventional forces are in desperate condition, nuclear modernization includes not only new missiles but elaborate and extraordinarily hardened command and control facilities. Russian doctrine today places more emphasis on nuclear weapons than did Soviet doctrine, as evidenced by Moscow’s reversal of its long-standing no-first use policy. The obvious point is that, given the inability to control or predict where these two states will be in five or ten years, it is essential to hedge against a reversal in relations. And the best hedge is to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE A STRONG HISTORICAL TRACK RECORD
The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states."
NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE A STRONG HISTORICAL TRACK RECORD
The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN PROVIDE A STRONG MODEL FOR THE CONTINUING ROLE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

IRAN AND NORTH KOREA ARE BOTH SUBJECT TO THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE
Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.
REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS BETTER THAN ABOLITION SINCE IT RETAINS THEIR DETERRENT VALUE
Michael Quinlin. “Nuclear Weapons and the Abolition of War” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 2 (Apr., 1991), pp. 293-301
What I have said during this part of my argument is, in summary, that by former criteria of warfare, nuclear warfare is absurd: and that nuclear weapons have moreover made all substantial warfare between nuclear powers, and not just nuclear warfare between them, absurd. This is in one sense a terrible situation; but in another and very real sense it is a hopeful one. For it means that there should be no rational incentive, in any circumstances at all, for anyone to start a war between nuclear powers. The practical task of strategy, in my view, is not to try to change these facts – it seems to me that they almost certainly cannot be securely and permanently changed – but to recognize them clearly and to exploit them positively, to construct the most effective possible system for what has so evidently become now not just a very desirable objective, as it would have been in the past, but an utterly essential one: the absolute prevention of war between great powers or alliances. The fact is, surely, that we cannot abolish nuclear weapons while maintaining the option, the possibility, of major war; what we have to do is to exploit nuclear weapons so as to abolish such war. That is, after all, to go to the heart of what we must want to do; what we are ultimately against is war itself, not the mere existence of particular instruments. So I do not pretend to see, nor to think that it would be realistically useful to work towards, a future in which the process of negotiated disarmament, within a system still of opposed nations-states with a historical propensity towards war, have removed nuclear weapons from the scene. We seek, instead, a structure in which the irreversible fact of nuclear weapons is the keystone of an arch of freedom from war, built -and this is after all what keystones essentially do-more dependably, more efficiently and more economically than would otherwise be possible. To say the same thing another way, nuclear weapons constitute the reduction to absurdity of war capability, and their arrival is therefore a historical watershed of overwhelming significance.

DETERRENCE PREVENTED WAR BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR.
However, by convincing the Soviet Union that a nuclear attack on it will occur should it do any of these things, the United States can lead the Soviet Union to decide that it is not in its interests so to act. The costs of such an attack on the Soviet Union by the United States simply have to be made perceptibly and decidedly greater than any benefits capable of being realized by the Soviet Union through action that would produce the threatened nuclear response. Thus the nuclear attacks or other aggressive acts by the Soviet Union that might otherwise have occurred are deterred and in that way prevented by the threatened response.
MERE POSSESSION IS SUFFICIENT FOR DETERRENCE.
A variant on this suggestion is the idea that we should retain some nuclear weapons while refraining from threatening, sincerely or insincerely, to use them. It might be argued that our mere possession of them would suffice to deter Soviet nuclear attack even if we did not explicitly threaten to retaliate.' For instance, Israel (it is widely believed) possesses some nuclear weapons. It need not explicitly threaten its adversaries; mere possession of such weapons may be sufficient deterrent against a repetition of 1973.

EVEN AFTER DEEP CUTS, NUKES DETER – AND THE CUTS PREVENT NUCLEAR WINTER.
National security is not a zero sum game. Strategic insecurity of one adversary almost always means strategic insecurity for the other. Conventional pre-1945 wisdom, no matter how deeply felt, is not an adequate guide in an age of apocalyptic weapons. If we are content with world inventories above the threshold, we are saying that it is safe to trust the fate of our global civilization and perhaps our species to all leaders, civilian and military, of all present and future nuclear powers; and to the command and control efficiency and technical reliability in those nations now and in the indefinite future. For myself, I would far rather have a world in which the climatic catastrophe cannot happen, independent of the vicissitudes of leaders, institutions and machines. This seems to me elementary planetary hygiene, as well as elementary patriotism. Something like a thousand warheads (or a few hundred megatons) is of the same order as the arsenals that were publically announced in the 1950s and 1960s as an unmistakable strategic deterrent, and as sufficient to destroy either the United States or the Society Union irrecoverably." Considerably smaller arsenals would, with present improvement in accuracy and reliability, probably suffice. Thus it is possible to contemplate a world in which the global strategic arsenals are below threshold, where mutual deterrence is in effect enough to discourage the use of those surviving warheads, and where, in the unhappy event that some warheads are detonated, there is little likelihood of the climatic catastrophe.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION HELPS MAINTAIN PEACE, AND PREVENTS WAR
Nuclear weapons have been the second force working for peace in the post-war world. They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons. Nuclear weapons have helped maintain peace between the great powers and have not led their few other possessors into military adventures.5 Their further spread, however, causes widespread fear. Much of the writing about the spread of nuclear weapons has this unusual trait: It tells us that what did no, happen in the past is likely to happen in the future, that tomorrow's nuclear states are likely to do to one another what today's nuclear states have not done. A happy nuclear past leads many to expect an unhappy nuclear future. This is odd, and the oddity leads me to believe that we should reconsider how weapons affect the situation of their possessors.
NUCLEAR ACQUISITION PREVENTS CONFLICT AMONGST PROLIFERATING NATIONS


The optimist camp’s first and most important claim is that the presence of nuclear weapons suppresses international conflicts. Nuclear weapons, in this view, differ from conventional military tools in two central ways. First, nuclear weapons carry enormous destructive power. Whereas the targets of conventional weapons necessarily tend to be small in size (for instance, an airfield, communications center, or ammunition depot), the most powerful nuclear weapons can place entire cities at risk. The use of even a few nuclear weapons could destroy hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of human lives in a short span of time. Second, defenders have little control over the level of destruction they endure during a nuclear conflict. Without a reliable means to destroy incoming ballistic missiles or to shield cities from nuclear attack— neither of which exists today— nuclear combatants must rely on an enemy’s restraint to limit the amount of damage they suffer. These two characteristics—colossal destructive capacity and the lack of an effective defense— combine to induce caution among leaders facing the prospect of nuclear retaliation. Leaders will behave less aggressively and will more eagerly seek peaceful solutions to crises, the logic goes, since they do not want to endure even a small risk that a conventional war might become nuclear. These propositions can be evaluated empirically by comparing the rates at which proliferators have participated in interstate conflicts both before and after their acquisition of nuclear weapons. If the optimists are correct, nuclear states should experience fewer conflicts after they acquire nuclear weapons. One way to measure the turbulence of a state’s foreign affairs is to calculate its participation in militarized interstate disputes, defined here as conflicts involving at least one military fatality. Figure 1 considers five proliferators and charts how much their involvement in military conflicts changed after they became nuclear states. Israel, for instance, participated in an average of 1.21 conflicts per year as a nonnuclear state, but entered into only 0.33 conflicts per year after becoming a nuclear state in 1972, so its bar in figure 1 drops below zero to illustrate that Israel has been involved in fewer interstate conflicts since acquiring nuclear weapons. Optimists predict that states will participate in fewer conflicts after going nuclear, since they expect nuclear weapons to deter aggression and dissuade opposing leaders from escalating crises. And indeed, four of the five states examined here participated in fewer interstate conflicts, on average, once they became nuclear states. For example, Israel fought four interstate wars against its neighbors before acquiring nuclear weapons, but just two afterward. India and Pakistan have gone to war against one another four times since achieving independence, but only one of those wars occurred after the two rivals acquired nuclear weapons. Indeed, India and Pakistan saw the average incidence of militarized disputes between them decline by half (from 0.55 disputes per year to 0.27) once both states had acquired nuclear weapons. Only South Africa experienced an increase in its conflict participation rate after achieving nuclear status, although the magnitude of this change (+0.06) was the smallest of the five proliferators considered here. These data tell us that proliferation optimists are right to expect a decline in the frequency of interstate wars as more states acquire nuclear weapons.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE BEING DEVELOPED BY MANY NATIONS AS A SELF DEFENSE MECHANISM.

Ted Galen Carpenter, the Cato Institute's vice president for defense and foreign policy studies, is the author of six books and the editor of 10 books on international affairs. “Not All Forms of Nuclear Proliferation Are Equally Bad” Added to cato.org on November 21, 2004 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2886

America's current nonproliferation policy is the international equivalent of domestic gun control laws, and exhibits the same faulty logic. Gun control laws have had little effect on preventing criminal elements from acquiring weapons. Instead, they disarm honest citizens and make them more vulnerable to armed predators. The nonproliferation system is having a similar perverse effect. Such unsavory states as Iran and North Korea are well along on the path to becoming nuclear powers while their more peaceful neighbors are hamstrung by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from countering those moves. The focus of Washington's nonproliferation policy should substitute discrimination and selectivity for uniformity of treatment. U.S. policymakers must rid themselves of the notion that all forms of proliferation are equally bad. The United States should concentrate on making it difficult for aggressive or unstable regimes to acquire the technology and fissile material needed to develop nuclear weapons. Policymakers must adopt a realistic attitude about the limitations of even that more tightly focused nonproliferation policy. At best, U.S. actions will only delay, not prevent, such states from joining the nuclear weapons club. Washington's nonproliferation efforts should focus on delaying rogue states in their quest for nuclear weapons, not beating up on peaceful states who might want to become nuclear powers for their own protection.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL NOT CAUSE WAR OR A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK

“The Israel Lobby” John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt 23 March 2006 of the University of Chicago's Department of Political Science

As for so-called rogue states in the Middle East, they are not a dire threat to vital US interests, except inasmuch as they are a threat to Israel. Even if these states acquire nuclear weapons – which is obviously undesirable – neither America nor Israel could be blackmailed, because the blackmailer could not carry out the threat without suffering overwhelming retaliation. The danger of a nuclear handover to terrorists is equally remote, because a rogue state could not be sure the transfer would go undetected or that it would not be blamed and punished afterwards. The relationship with Israel actually makes it harder for the US to deal with these states. Israel's nuclear arsenal is one reason some of its neighbours want nuclear weapons, and threatening them with regime change merely increases that desire.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION LEADS TO PEACE
MICHAEL C. DESCH, Review of International Studies (2003), British International Studies Association “It is kind to be cruel: the humanity of American Realist”

Beginning with Waltz’s seminal Adelphi Paper on the consequences of nuclear proliferation, realists have taken the contrary view that ‘more would be better’.49 The logic of this provocative argument is that nuclear proliferation can be stabilizing since nuclear weapons are the absolute deterrent. Once states have a reliable second strike capability, they are more secure than they were before. As more states get nuclear weapons, the less war-prone the international system becomes, according to this line of reasoning.50 Applying this ‘more would be better’ logic to the Indo-Pakistani conflict, Mearsheimer recommended that the United States accept India and Pakistan as legitimate nuclear powers and work with them to construct survivable systems subject to reliable command and control.51 His rationale for doing so was that mutual deterrence would make major war on the sub-continent less likely in the future. In the spring of 2002, India and Pakistan seemed close to the brink of war again over the long festering sore of Kashmir. Unlike previous crises which led to war, this time the two new nuclear states stepped back from the brink. Some analysts attribute this caution and restraint to their possession of the ultimate weapon.52 Thus, the realist argument about the stabilizing effects of mutual assured destruction may ironically provide the means for mitigating the conflict-ridden international system that others thought could only happen through the universal adoption of pacifistic norms.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WILL LEAD TO DECREASED VIOLENCE, AND LESS LIKELINESS OF WAR.

The actors will show more restraint in crises involving more participants with nuclear weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the results demonstrate that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to end without violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved increases, the likelihood of war continues to fall. The results are robust even when controlling for a number of factors including non-nuclear capability. In confirming that nuclear weapons tend to increase restraint in crises, the effect of nuclear weapons on strategic behavior is clarified.
ATOMIC WEAPONS HAVE BROUGHT PEACE, AND EXAMPLE IS THE COLD WAR, OR LONG PEACE
Steve Chapman, February 2003 “Learning to Love the Bombs nuclear proliferation inherently dangerous?”

Anyone looking ahead from 1945, when this standoff began, would have glumly expected that sooner or later the two sides would come to savage blows. But the most striking fact about the Cold War was its peacefulness. Not only did all those nuclear weapons go unused, but American and Soviet soldiers never met on the field of battle. Historian John Lewis Gaddis argued that the period was misnamed: Instead of the Cold War, he said, it may well be remembered by history as the Long Peace. Writing in 1987, he noted that it compared favorably "with some of the longest periods of great power stability in all of modern history." In a century marked by the greatest and most deadly wars ever seen, this era of tense truce came as a surprise, and might be seen as a miracle. But nothing supernatural was involved. Human nature didn't suddenly change. Nations didn't cease to regard each other with suspicion and distrust. But at least one important thing made the postwar world different: the invention of atomic weapons. As the military theorist Bernard Brodie wrote in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now its chief purpose must be to avert them."

PROLIFERATION DETERS LARGE-SCALE REGIONAL WAR

Although this school bases its claims upon the U.S-Soviet Cold War nuclear relationship, it admits of no basic exception to the imperatives of nuclear deterrence. Nothing within the school's thesis is intrinsic solely to the superpower experience. The nuclear "balance of terror" is seen as far from fragile. Nuclear-armed adversaries, regardless of context, should behave toward each other like the superpowers during the Cold War's "nuclear peace." The reason for this near-absolute claim is the supposedly immutable quality of nuclear weapons: their presence is the key variable in any deterrent situation, because fear of their devastating consequences simply overwhelms the operation of all other factors. Martin van Creveld alleges that "the leaders of medium and small powers alike tend to be extremely cautious with regard to the nuclear weapons they possess or with which they are faced—the proof being that, to date, in every region where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale interstate warfare has disappeared." Shai Feldman submits that "it is no longer disputed that the undeclared nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have helped stabilize their relations in recent years. It is difficult to see how escalation of the conflict over Kashmir could have been avoided were it not for the two countries' fear of nuclear escalation." The spread of nuclear weapons technology is thus viewed by optimists as a positive development, so much so that some even advocate its selective abettance by current nuclear powers.”
PROLIFERATION PREVENTS MISCALCULATIONS OF DAMAGE WHICH EMPIRICALLY CAUSES THE BLOODIEST WARS

Certainty about the relative strength of adversaries also makes war less likely. From the late nineteenth century onward, the speed of technological innovation increased the difficulty of estimating relative strengths and predicting the course of campaigns. Since World War II, technological advance has been even faster, but short of a ballistic missile defense breakthrough, this has not mattered. It did not disturb the American-Soviet military equilibrium, because one side’s missiles were not made obsolete by improvements in the other side’s missiles. In 1906, the British Dreadnought, with the greater range and firepower of its guns, made older battleships obsolete. This does not happen to missiles. As Bernard Brodie put it, “Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of the advent of newer and superior types.” They may have to survive their like, but that is a much simpler problem to solve. Many wars might have been avoided had their outcomes been foreseen. “To be sure,” George Simmel wrote, “the most effective presupposition for preventing struggle, the exact knowledge of the comparative strength of the two parties, is very often only to be obtained by the actual fighting out of the conflict.” Miscalculation causes wars. One side expects victory at an affordable price, while the other side hopes to avoid defeat. Here the differences between conventional and nuclear worlds are fundamental. In the former, states are too often tempted to act on advantages that are wishfully discerned and narrowly calculated. In 1914, neither Germany nor France tried very hard to avoid a general war. Both hoped for victory even though they believed the opposing coalitions to be quite evenly matched.

PROLIFERATION MAKES STATES TOO AFRAID OF ESCALATION TO RISK TENSION
Peter Lavoy, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Security Studies, Summer, 1995, p. 707

Also in 1963, Richard Rosecrance claimed that fears about the strategic consequences of nuclear proliferation were exaggerated: “The nth country ‘problem’ may not turn out to be a major ‘problem’.” At the close of the decade, Rosecrance identified what be considered might become another salutary feature of nuclear proliferation: “If each threat of minor war makes the two greatest states redouble their efforts in tandem to prevent major war, it is even conceivable that nuclear dispersion could have a net beneficial impact. Several years later Robert Sandoval advanced what he called a “porcupine theory” of nuclear proliferation. According to this view, states with even modest nuclear capabilities would “walk like a porcupine through the forests of international affairs: no threat to its neighbors, too prickly for predators to swallow.”
Conventional war

THE US AND RUSSIA WANT TO KILL CONVENTIONALLY, BUT ARE SPENDING TOO MUCH ON NUKE'S.


Barack Obama's plan to create additional intervention units of the US army that can be deployed anywhere around the world will cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Actually deploying these forces will cost billions more. For that reason, the US government is looking to save money on nuclear defense. Similarly, Russia is also worried about being overwhelmed by the costs of its atomic weapons program. Moscow feels like its hand is being forced on defense spending, even though it would like to free up more money for its military reforms. The war against Georgia uncovered the glaring weaknesses of Russia’s military, and their eventual win was only possible because of massive advantages in numbers and weapons. The Kremlin now badly needs a professional army capable of meeting the challenges of high tech modern warfare.

Thus what Russia and the USA are discussing now is not disarmament, but only shifting armaments. By financing new conventional weapons, Obama's presidency has raised America's already astronomical defense spending even further. In Russia, the defense budget has grown almost 10 times larger in the last 10 years. In 2009 it is slated to grow by a further 27%. Disarmament seems like a necessity in the face of the global finance and economic crises.

DISARMAMENT FREES UP MONEY TO SPEND ON CONVENTIONAL WAR, ENDANGERING THE WEST.


Until now, the enormous costs of maintaining and updating its nuclear arsenal have stopped Russia from building more powerful conventional forces. The same is true for China. If America and Europe offer this opportunity for these rising countries to focus their resources on conventional armies, the number of bloody conflicts in the world could grow much larger. Even today, Russia and China are already putting pressure on the West through proxy wars in the Middle East and Africa. If mutual disarmament eases the perceived need felt by Moscow and Beijing to spend their money on nuclear weapons, it could seriously endanger the security of the West.

ALLOWING LARGE CONVENTIONAL WARS TO RETURN WOULD BE A CATASTROPHE


The more particular fact that the world faces a phase of highly uncertain political development reinforces the general argument [against disposing of all nuclear weapons]. Put another way, that argument is that the world community need not and should not allow circumstances to arise in which there could be any temptation to revert to the illusion that major war could be dependably held to tolerable levels of destructiveness and so could again be an option for settling serious differences among advanced military powers. Nor do we want circumstances to arise in which a state with a risk-taking leadership (or one feeling under especial threat) might be tempted to gamble on a clandestine dash to seize advantage through a period of sole nuclear possession. We cannot tell precisely how high such risks are; our concern must be to avoid ever having to find out the hard way.
ESCALATION IS MORE LIKELY IN A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CONVENTIONAL WARS AREN’’T AS BLOODY IN A WORLD WITH THE BOMB.

Victor Asal, Dept Poly Sci @ SUNY, and Kyle Beardsley, Dept Poly Sci @ Emory, 2007 (Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44 No. 2, pp. 139-155)

Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving super-powers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of full-scale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the out- comes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman- type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction. While dyad- year datasets
have often been employed to similar ends, the key independent variable here, which is specific to crises as the unit of analysis, does not lend itself to a dyadic setup. Moreover, selection bias concerns are likely not valid in disputing the claims of this analysis. If selection bias were present, it would tend to bias the effect of nuclear weapons downward, because the set of observed crises with nuclear actors likely has a disproportionate share of resolved actors that have chosen to take their chances against a nuclear opponent. Despite this potential mitigating bias, the results are statistically significant, which strengthens the case for the explanations provided in this study.
Chemical/biological weapons

NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN ALSO SERVE TO DETER HOSTILE STATES FROM USING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
The primary purpose of nuclear weapons is and will remain the deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons by others. But this is not, nor has it ever been, the only rationale for these weapons. As noted, nuclear weapons were a key in NATO's planning to deter a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. Today, nuclear forces also contribute to the deterrence of states that possess the full spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons, such as Iraq in the Gulf War. Use of nuclear weapons against such states is not inconceivable, given sufficient provocation and threat. Conventional weapons may not be able to induce the shock and potential decisiveness of a nuclear weapon. A plausible hypothetical makes the point: Given clear intelligence that an adversary was making immediate preparations to launch biological agents against U.S. forces or population centers from a remote, deeply buried site, would not the president be prudent to explore a nuclear option, inasmuch as immediate, complete, and certain destruction of the target would be beyond the ability of even the most advanced conventional weapons?

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETER CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USES
Turning to the contribution of nuclear weapons in a counter proliferation role, one can draw on the real world case of Desert Storm. Iraqi leaders attribute their decision not to use chemical weapons--and we now know biological agents as well--to the coalition's nuclear capabilities and warning of catastrophic consequences if Iraq were to use such weapons. General Wafic Sammarai, former head of Iraqi military intelligence, has stated that Iraq did not arm its Scud missiles with chemical weapons "because the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high."[9] In retrospect, it appears that Saddam Hussein simply could not count on the United States (or perhaps Israel) refraining from responding with nuclear weapons, especially given his view of the world and demonstrated absence of constraints in the use of force to achieve his personal objectives.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS’ DETERRENT VALUE


Nuclear weapons can deter because they have characteristics that allow them to create a predictable, rapid, and certain destruction of the target, and therefore are capable of inflicting “unacceptable damage.” Biological weapons, on the other hand, may have a hard time upholding a deterrence strategy against a nuclear weapons state. Although biological weapons can create a very different form of “unacceptable damage,” they do not guarantee that outcome. For example, a report made in 1993 by the Office of Technology Assessment estimated that the release of 100 kilograms of anthrax spores could cause as much as three million casualties. That number shows beyond any doubt that biological weapons can inflict “unacceptable damage” on the opponent. The problem is that this estimate is based on perfect weather conditions (“clear, calm night”) for the dissemination of anthrax spores. For a biological weapon state to deter a nuclear weapons opponent, its biological arsenal cannot be dependent on weather conditions or any other factors. The lack of mission assurance associated with biological weapons comes from the invisibility, delay, and uncertainty of the dissemination effects.
PROLIFERATION PREVENTS BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE

(Dr. Keith B. Payne, April 1998 “Why We Must Sustain Nuclear Deterrence,”

A single illustration of the lethality of biological weapons will clarify why the U.S. capability to deter regional challengers is of paramount importance: a single undeterred attacker employing as little as 20 kilograms of dispersed anthrax drifting downwind could, under the proper conditions, cause the deaths of 50 percent of the unprotected population in an area of more than 150 square miles. Such a biological attack against the unprotected populations of ten large U.S. urban areas could kill on the order of 20 million Americans. To risk understatement, deterrence is not less important in this post-Cold War period. In the absence of a revived great power competition, the most taxing likely role for U.S. deterrence policy will be deterring the use of WMD by hostile regional powers. What is the future role for nuclear weapons in regional deterrence? There are numerous recent confident assertions by prominent persons that U.S. conventional forces can reliably replace nuclear forces for deterrence of all but nuclear threats. Consequently, they conclude that nuclear weapons are largely unnecessary for regional deterrence. Such assertions ring hollow; they are speculative and unsupported by actual evidence. The evidence that does exist, including recent history, suggests strongly that when a challenger is highly motivated, and cost- and risk- tolerant, nuclear weapons can be essential to deterring WMD attacks. What, for example, was the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence in the Gulf War? By Iraqi accounts, nuclear deterrence prevented Iraq's use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) that could have inflicted horrendous civilian and military casualties on us and our allies. Senior Iraqi wartime leaders have explained that while U.S. conventional threats were insufficient to deter, implicit U.S. nuclear threats did deter Saddam Hussein's use of chemical and biological weapons. As the then-head of Iraqi military intelligence, Gen. Waffic al Sammarai, has stated, Saddam Hussein did not use chemical or biological weapons during the war, "because the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high." Immediately following the Gulf War many prominent U.S. military commentators, such as former Secretary of Defense McNamara, claimed that nuclear weapons were "incredible" and therefore "irrelevant" to the war.1 This assessment-that U.S. nuclear weapons are irrelevant to regional challengers-is at the heart of the various nuclear disarmament proposals; it also is gravely mistaken. The continuing proliferation of CBW can only increase our need for nuclear deterrence. The United States has given up chemical and biological weapons, and has thus given up the option of deterring chemical and biological threats with like capabilities. In some tough cases conventional forces alone are likely to be inadequate to deter CBW threats. Consequently, as CBW proliferates our nuclear capabilities become more, not less important for regional deterrence.
**Rearmament**

**TAKING AWAY NUKES DOESN’T TAKE AWAY THE INCENTIVE FOR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.**
Brian Martin [Professor of Social Sciences @ University of Wollongong, ‘86] “Nuclear disarmament is not enough” Peace Studies, No. 3, June/July 1986, pp. 36-39.
The basic problem with focusing on nuclear weapons is that they are only one product of the war system. The history of modern warfare is one of recurrent technical innovation to increase the killing power of weaponry. This process has been routinised in the past century through the heavy sponsorship of science and technology by the state. In effect, much of the knowledge and skills produced and used by science and technology is tied to the military aims of separate states. It so happens that nuclear weapons are currently the most prominent of technological threats to human life. But the driving force behind the development of weapons of mass destruction is the state-technology system, not the weapons themselves.

**DISARMING DOES NOT PREVENT OTHERS FROM WANTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS**
In the past decade, the United States and Russia have already made radical reductions in their strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals, but proliferant states have shown little sign of restraint. To argue that these states will give up their nuclear ambitions if only the United States and other declared weapon states would go to zero is wishful thinking. As evident in the examples of the five declared nuclear powers, as well as the unacknowledged nuclear weapon states, motives for acquisition of nuclear weapons are complex and varied, ranging from security to prestige. The new proliferants—the Iraqs, Irans, and North Koreas—seek weapons of mass destruction as instruments of coercion and aggression and are not going to be persuaded to forego these tools as a consequence of others disarming. In fact, radical nuclear disarmament by the United States might promote proliferation by emboldening these states to seek relative parity with the United States (especially in a regional context).

**DISARMING MAY LEAD STATES UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN WEAPONS**
Drastic reductions might also have a deleterious effect on the security calculations of U.S. allies who have long depended on the American nuclear umbrella. In an uncertain future, perhaps in the face of an aggressive China or resurgent Russia, the insecurities perceived by today’s allies could compel them to develop their own nuclear deterrent capabilities or accommodate themselves to the threat in the absence of a credible American nuclear force.[6] The defection of even one major ally—Japan for instance—could have profoundly negative implications for global stability and U.S. security interests.
WE CANNOT EVER TRULY ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS – THE KNOWLEDGE REMAINS. THE CAPABILITY OF BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE UNLEARNED, POSING PROBLEMS IN A NUCLEAR FREE WORLD STRUCTURE.


It is a truism that the scientific and technical knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons cannot be forgotten. We simply do not have the option of returning to a condition of pre-nuclear innocence (if innocence is an apt way of describing the mindsets and conditions which produced the two world wars). For the rest of history humanity has to live with the reality that almost all substantial and reasonably advanced independent nation could eventually, if it so chose and was forcibly not prevented by others, construct a nuclear armoury to support its external goals, be they offensive or defensive. The case for building such a armoury might be especially compelling if the state found itself engaged in, or imminently facing, military conflict where the stakes were of an order it was minded to regard as vital.

IF THE US NUCLEAR UMBRELLA COLLAPSES, GERMANY AND JAPAN MAY PROLIFERATE.

Michael Mandelbaum [Director of American Foreign Policy @ Johns Hopkins University, ‘97] “US Foreign Policy And Nuclear Weapons Today” SAIS Review 17.1 (1997), pp. 73-92

Indeed, the attention the American government lavished on reinforcing the credibility of "extended deterrence"--the protection of countries on the other side of the Atlantic, with all the risks involved in convincing Moscow that the United States was "coupled" to Western Europe--was seen during the Cold War as a substitute for, and thus a way of avoiding, German acquisition of nuclear weapons. While the commitment to defend Germany with American nuclear weapons might have been subject to doubt, the commitment to defend Germany with German nuclear arms would not have been. Both Americans and Germans believed, however, that it was important that the German Federal Republic not have nuclear weapons of its own, for that would have been regarded by the Soviet Union, which deployed a large army on German territory, as a provocation. With the end of the Cold War, both the need for either German or Japanese nuclear weapons and the anxieties generated by the prospect that either would acquire them are in decline. Yet neither is entirely extinct. To be sure, neither country wants nuclear weapons. Both much prefer to retain the status of non-nuclear weapon states if at all possible. Indeed, the German and Japanese publics are strongly allergic to such arms. This is the legacy of their experiences in World War II--Germany's experience as an aggressor and Japan's experience as the victim of history's only two nuclear attacks. Yet for all their aversion to them, these countries might feel compelled to acquire nuclear weapons if they found themselves without US nuclear protection. In such circumstances, they would be at a disadvantage in dealing with their large, nuclear-armed neighbors, Russia and China. For purely defensive reasons, they could come to regard the possession of their own nuclear weapons as necessary for their safety.
Disarmament creates nuclear waste

NUCLEAR BOMBS CONTAIN MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF PLUTONIUM-
SEPARATED PLUTONIUM IS EXTREMELY INSECURE.

Civilian plutonium stockpiles also pose a risk for use in nuclear weapons. Although some experts continue to doubt the feasibility of employing reactor-grade plutonium in nuclear bombs, scientific authorities such as the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences have stated that this material is weapons-usable. More than a dozen countries hold more than 230 metric tons of plutonium that have been separated from spent nuclear fuel. In this separated form, plutonium is less secure than plutonium embedded in spent fuel. Because spent nuclear fuel tends to be highly radioactive, it provides a protective barrier to acquisition by terrorists or criminals who do not have access to special handling gear. Globally, more than thirteen hundred metric tons of plutonium are contained in spent nuclear fuel. The rate of reprocessing this spent fuel to separate plutonium exceeds the rate of consumption of the plutonium as reactor fuel. Based on the latest unofficial estimate, the global stockpile of civilian plutonium in separated form is growing at the rate of ten metric tons per year. This translates into hundreds of terrorist- or state-constructed nuclear bombs per year.

CURRENT MEANS OF DEALING WITH NUCLEAR WASTE ARE
INADEQUATE – COST, GEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS AND KNOWLEDGE
Mohamed ElBaradei 2003 (Noble Prize winner and former IAEA Inspector General, "Towards a safer world" The Economist October 16, pg. Online

Third, we should consider multinational approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. More than 50 countries have spent fuel stored in temporary sites, awaiting reprocessing or disposal. Not all countries have the right geology to store waste underground and, for many countries with small nuclear programmes for electricity generation or for research, the costs of such a facility are prohibitive. Considerable advantages—in cost, safety, security and non-proliferation—would be gained from international co-operation in these stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. These initiatives would not simply add more non-proliferation controls, to limit access to weapon-usable nuclear material; they would also provide access to the benefits of nuclear technology for more people in more countries.
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS DECAY OVER THOUSANDS OF YEARS
MAKING NUCLEAR RADIATION A LONG TERM HEALTH RISK
James Flynn, Roger Kasperson, Howard Knureuther, and Paul Slovic 1992 (senior researcher with Decision Research, prof of govt and geography and associate of CENTED at Clark University; Prof of decision sciences insurance, public policy, and management and the Director of Risk and Decision Process Center at the Wharton School @ Upenn; president of Decision research and prof of psychology at the University of Oregon; "Time to Rethink Nuclear Waste Storage" Issues in Science and Technology Vol 8 No 4, pg. 43

High-level radioactive waste includes IWO major components; spent fuel from reactors at nuclear power plants and the various byproducts of nuclear weapons production. Although spent fuel accounts for less than one percent of the volume of all the high- and low level radioactive Wastes generated in the United States, it produces 95 percent of the radioactivity. Some of its radioisotopes pose grave dangers for hundreds, even thousands of years. For instance, the half-life (the time required for half the original radioactivity to decay) of plutonium-239 is 24,400 years.

CURRENT TECHNOLOGY IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONTAIN NUCLEAR WASTE
James Flynn, Roger Kasperson, Howard Knureuther, and Paul Slovic 1992 (senior researcher with Decision Research, prof of govt and geography and associate of CENTED at Clark University; Prof of decision sciences insurance, public policy, and management and the Director of Risk and Decision Process Center at the Wharton School @ Upenn; president of Decision research and prof of psychology at the University of Oregon; "Time to Rethink Nuclear Waste Storage" Issues in Science and Technology Vol 8 No 4, pg. 43

The problems of handling spent fuel pale in comparison with the waste problems at nuclear weapon production facilities. DOE has been embarrassed by huge leaks of radioactive wastes and other difficulties at its plants at Hanford, Washington: ROCKY Flats, Colorado: and elsewhere. The storage and cleanup problems are considered so difficult and expensive that some experts have argued that certain areas of facilities such as Hanford should be permanently cordoned off. Mismanagement of the waste situation at the weapons plants has done much to discredit DOE's role in siting a permanent civilian repository. Whatever the difficulties posed by temporary storage, they are dwarfed by the immense challenges involved in siting a permanent repository. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, charged by Congress with setting performance standards, has told DOE that it must provide assurances that human and environmental exposure to radioactive elements will not exceed stringent standards for 10,000 years. This long period--twice that of recorded human history creates serious uncertainties in every area of scientific study. If a IO,000-year warranty is necessary, no wonder the public has grave doubts about the reliability of a permanent repository.
PLUTONIUM AND OTHER NUCLEAR MATERIALS ARE EXTREMELY TOXIC
Douglas Holdstock, Lis Waterston 2000 (Phd working for Meact, "Nuclear weapons, a continuing threat to health" Lancet 2000; 355: 1544–47

The toxicity of plutonium arises mainly from its radiological effect.20 Plutonium delivers a negligible external radiation dose to the skin because it emits mainly alpha particles. Inhaled plutonium will irradiate the lung, ingested plutonium the walls of the gastrointestinal tract. Weight for weight, inhaled plutonium is more toxic than ingested and reactor grade plutonium more toxic than military.21 By extrapolation from experiments in dogs, inhalation of 100 mg weapons-grade plutonium might cause deaths in humans from acute respiratory failure within a week, and 3 mg could result in fatal pulmonary fibrosis within months. Inhalation of a few micrograms leads to lung cancer several years later.

EVEN WHERE SAFETY STANDARDS EXIST, THEY ARE RARELY FOLLOWED
Douglas Holdstock, Lis Waterston 2000 (Phd working for Meact, "Nuclear weapons, a continuing threat to health" Lancet 2000; 355: 1544–47

Radioactive materials have been released from some at least of these sites. Furthermore, information about releases has not always been reliable;24 and standards of handling waste have been ignored at Dounreay (where reprocessing has now ceased) and have been appalling at the Russian complex at Mayak,25 where Lake Karachay may be the most radioactively contaminated site on earth. Leaks of strontium-90 and caesium-137 are over five times the combined releases of these isotopes from atmospheric nuclear testing, Chernobyl, and Sellafield taken together. In the 1957 Kyshtym accident in this region of the Urals high-level waste was dispersed by a chemical explosion in a storage tank, and a later report will describe environmental and health effects around the Mayak site.

THERE IS ALREADY A LOT OF NUCLEAR WASTE TO BE DISPOSED OF – CREATING MORE WOULD POSE EVEN GREATER ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

The amount of HLNW to be managed and disposed of depends on future nuclear power generation and production of nuclear weapons. Current estimates, assuming no new nuclear power plant construction, are for about 100,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) from commercial reactors and perhaps the equivalent of 15,000 MTHM from the nuclear weapons complex (1). Commercial spent fuel is now stored at more than 70 sites, the majority located east of the Mississippi River. The lack of a HLNW program acceptable to the public has been repeatedly cited as one of the major reasons for the current moribund condition of the nuclear power industry and its poor prospects for the future. The possibility that HLNW might be stored for extended periods at or near the reactors where it was produced, in lieu of an operating waste facility, has motivated the communities and states near these reactors to call for prompt and effective actions to remove those wastes.
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF CURRENT PROCEDURE, THERE IS NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF STORAGE

In the most optimistic view, the program at Yucca Mountain must be seen as a troubled and high-risk effort. The federal government is gambling that Yucca Mountain will be suitable and acceptable. Success is possible, but serious doubts remain about this site. And there is no alternative site, creating more doubts about the HLNW repository program. According to the director of the DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), no contingency plan exists in the event Yucca Mountain is found unsuitable. The director characterized this as a great deficiency because DOE must return to Congress for new instructions if it finds that Yucca Mountain will not do. For all practical purposes, returning to Congress means starting over, and choosing, studying, and developing another site could take several decades (2).

NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES ARE NOT POPULAR WITH THE PUBLIC

At the same time, this program had the unfortunate effect of linking the civilian nuclear industry's HLNW problems with the nuclear weapons complex, just when revelations of past practices at the weapons complex became sensational stories in the news media. These stories included reports of hazardous conditions at places such as Hanford, Washington, Fernald, Ohio, Rocky Hats, Colorado, and Savannah, Georgia. News accounts of accidental and deliberate releases of radioactivity from these weapons sites during the Cold War were broadcast widely. These stories damaged the reputation of DOE and its claims to provide expert management of radioactive processes and wastes (20).
**AT Nuclear weapons immoral**

NUCLEAR WEAPONS LIKELY SAVED MANY LIVES DURING THE COLD WAR
Looking back, one might even argue that those who condemned nuclear weapons as immoral were simply wrong. The Western alliance's nuclear weapons were in fact the moral weapon of choice. They worked precisely as intended by deterring an immoral totalitarian state from attacking Western Europe and undermining the peace, values, and freedom which the democracies cherished. Indeed, given the tens of millions of innocent noncombatants killed in two world wars, one can argue that the possession of nuclear weapons to deter yet another outbreak of mass slaughter by conventional weapons, either in Europe or Asia, was squarely in the just war tradition.

EVEN AFTER THE COLD WAR, NUCLEAR WEAPONS STILL SERVE TO SAVE MANY LIVES
The argument that the external environment has changed so much with the end of the Cold War that no ethical or moral basis for nuclear arms remains is likewise unconvincing. American lives and interests remain threatened. In fact, the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons have made the likelihood of conflict and the prospect of the use of weapons of mass destruction even greater than in the past in several key regions. But just as before, sound public and defense policy will emerge only from a prudent calculation of risks and benefits, not from sweeping generalizations about the morality or immorality of possession or use of nuclear weapons.
THE WRONGFUL INTENTIONS PRINCIPLE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO DETERRENT INTENTIONS BECAUSE OF A DISCONNECT BETWEEN INTENT AND DESIRE


This argument, if sound, would establish the truth of (P1'), and hence (P1), in contradiction with WIP. It suggests that WIP should not be applied to deterrent intentions, i.e., those conditional intentions whose existence is based on the agent's desire to thereby deter others from actualizing the antecedent condition of the intention. Such intentions are rather strange. They are, by nature, self-stultifying: if a deterrent intention fulfills the agent's purpose, it ensures that the intended (and possibly evil) act is not performed, by preventing the circumstances of performance from arising. The unique nature of such intentions can be further explicated by noting the distinction between intending to do something, and desiring (or intending) to intend to do it. Normally, an agent will form the intention to do something because he either desires doing that thing as an end in itself, or as a means to other ends. In such cases, little importance attaches to the distinction between intending and desiring to intend. But, in the case of deterrent intentions, the ground of the desire to form the intention is entirely distinct from any desire to carry it out. Thus, what may be inferred about the agent who seeks to form such an intention is this. He desires having the intention as a means of deterrence. Also, he is willing, in order to prevent the offense, to accept a certain risk that, in the end, he will apply the sanction. But this is entirely consistent with his having a strong desire not to apply the sanction, and no desire at all to apply it. Thus, while the object of his deterrent intention might be an evil act, it does not follow that, in desiring to adopt that intention, he desires to do evil, either as an end or as a means.

INTENTS MAY HAVE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT CONSEQUENCES, RENDERING THE INTENT TO DO SOMETHING IMMORAL MORAL.


WIP ties the morality of an intention exclusively to the moral qualities of its object (i.e., the intended act). This is not unreasonable since, typically, the only significant effects of intentions are the acts of the agent (and the consequences of these acts) which flow from these intentions. However, in certain cases, intentions may have autonomous effects that are independent of the intended act's actually being performed. In particular, intentions to act may influence the conduct of other agents. When an intention has important autonomous effects, these effects must be incorporated into any adequate moral analysis of it. The first paradox arises because the autonomous effects of the relevant deterrent intention are dominant in the moral analysis of an SDS, but the extremely plausible WIP ignores such effects.
IF THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION AGAINST CONDITIONAL INTENTS, THE DEONTOLOGICAL OBJECTION TO DETERRENCE COLLAPSES TO CONSEQUENTIALISM


The dilemma which the defender of the Deontologist's Argument faces concerns the question whether the prohibition on conditionally intending to use nuclear weapons is an absolute prohibition. As it is normally understood by proponents of the Deontologist's Argument, the prohibition on actually using nuclear weapons (at least in ways which would violate just war criteria) is absolute. (For the consequentialist, too, the ban on using nuclear weapons is arguably absolute for all practical purposes, for there may be no realistic conditions in which the use of nuclear weapons would be justifiable in consequentialist terms.) The question, then, is whether the absolute prohibition on the act extends also to the intention to act. Suppose that we think it does not and thus that, while it is wrong conditionally to intend to use nuclear weapons, it is not absolutely forbidden, even though it is absolutely forbidden actually to use nuclear weapons. If this is our view, it then becomes an open question to what extent it is wrong to pursue a policy which involves the conditional intention to use nuclear weapons, and the consideration of consequences becomes relevant in determining whether it is permissible to pursue such a policy. It is then open to defenders of nuclear deterrence to claim that the policy is the lesser of two evils: that, while having the conditional intention to use nuclear weapons is an evil and thus would normally be wrong, nevertheless having it is "a morally acceptable price to pay" to secure the benefits of peace and freedom.4 This objection has been well stated by Anthony Kenny: "Defenders of the deterrent will argue that the conditional willingness to engage in massacre which is an essential element of the policy is a slight and almost metaphysical evil to weigh in the balance against the good of preserving peace. The moral blemish which this may taint us with in the eyes of the fastidious is at best [sic] something to be put on the debit side, along with the financial cost of the weapons system, against the massive credit of maintaining our independence and our security from nuclear attack."5 Kenny rejects this reply; but if it is not absolutely forbidden conditionally to intend to use nuclear weapons, and if the policy of nuclear deterrence does, as many people believe, offer the best hope of maintaining both peace and freedom, then the reply seems quite cogent. (Of course, the deontologist can argue that this objection rests on a mistaken assessment of the comparative expected consequences of nuclear deterrence and the alternative to it; but then he will be pressing a consequentialist objection to deterrence, in which case his own argument may seem superfluous.)6
IF THERE IS AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION AGAINST CONDITIONAL INTENTS, THE DEONTOLOGIST'S ARGUMENT EQUATES THREATENING TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH ACTUALLY USING THEM


The act of using nuclear weapons would be worse than the successful pursuit of deterrence because its probable consequences would be worse. It would also be more evil, or more culpable, in that it would indicate a greater degree of moral corruption or depravity in the agent. Both a concern with consequences and a concern with the evaluation of agents are, moreover, certainly relevant to any moral comparison between using nuclear weapons and running a deterrent strategy. These modes of evaluation are accessible to the deontologist and are compatible with his view. But they are extraneous to the core of that view. Deontology, and a fortiori the Deontologist's Argument, are concerned with the intrinsic moral character of action. And in this respect—that is, in terms of their intrinsic natures—using nuclear weapons and running a successful deterrent strategy are held by the argument to be morally equivalent. This conclusion alone is sufficiently absurd to condemn the absolutist version of the Deontologist's Argument. That this implication of the argument is unacceptable is attested to by the fact that many of the argument's own defenders do not seem to accept it. Their inability to accept the implication is, I think, evident in the more startling fact that they do not even embrace the explicit conclusion of the argument—namely, that the policy of nuclear deterrence is ruled out absolutely. The argument's defenders are formally committed to support unilateral nuclear disarmament, not just as a long-term goal, but as an immediate imperative, beginning with an announcement by the government that it will not use its nuclear weapons for retaliatory or any other purposes. Any other stance on the question of deterrence admits the relevance of consequences in determining what ought to be done, and this is inconsistent with the absolute character of the prohibition implied by the argument.

THE DEONTOLOGIST'S ARGUMENT IS INCORRECT IN FOCUSING ON THE INTENT INSTEAD OF ACTUAL RISKS


This example brings out quite vividly the way in which the Deontologist's Argument has gone wrong. It shows, I think, that it is a mistake to locate the wrongness of deterrence in the supposed intrinsic wrongness of the conditional intention rather than in the fact that following a policy of deterrence normally entails a risk of deliberately using nuclear weapons. Thus the argument implies that nuclear deterrence is wrong in cases, such as the present one, in which there is no possibility that possessing nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence will lead to their being used, while it does not imply that the policy is wrong in other cases, such as that of Incertia, even though in those cases the policy carries a substantial risk that the weapons will be deliberately used.
EVEN UNDER DEONTOLOGY, THE RIGHT TO NOT BE THREATENED MAY BE OVERRIDDEN BY OTHER CONCERNS
There is, though, a better way of understanding this situation. One could view the obligation not to threaten innocent persons as a prima facie principle, one which is outweighed in the present circumstances by the duty to preserve the lives and liberties of the innocent (assuming, what is widely believed, that reliance on nuclear deterrence has accomplished this). The difference is that one would be saying that deterrence is justified, all things considered, rather than that criminal conduct is tolerated out of necessity. Given that overridden prima facie duties continue to exert some moral weight, one would still be obliged to endeavor strenuously to extricate oneself from a situation in which the duty not to threaten had to be overridden in order to fulfill a more stringent duty. Walzer's construal of the situation places us, implausibly, in a continual state of moral emergency in which moral norms, rather than being over- ridden by other moral principles, are simply disregarded because of consequentialist considerations that are external to his deontological framework. Moreover, Walzer himself should prefer this characterization of deterrence since an important theme of Just and Unjust Wars is that those who condemn war absolutely leave themselves with no guidelines when they are forced to fight, thus opening the door to all sorts of atrocities. One must not suppose, Walzer rightly argues, that war suspends all moral judgments and thus refuse to draw moral distinctions on the battlefield. Yet to repudiate morally nuclear deterrence, only to tolerate it as a practical necessity, is to countenance too quickly the suspension of ethical principle in this realm.

ONLY UNDER AN ABSURDIST DEONTOLOGY WOULD THREATS BE IMMORAL AND PREVENT ACTION FROM BEING TAKEN TO SAVE LIVES.
Threats are, after all, one thing, and actions, the real things, -quite another. Using nuclear weapons and thereby killing millions or hundreds of millions of citizens of the Soviet Union and other countries would be wrong even if threatening to use them is not. If the United States can prevent something as awful as nuclear devastation from occurring to its citizens (or to those of any other country) by threatening to use its nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, it is surely a most fastidiously unattractive deontological morality that insists that the mere threat, by itself, is forbidden even when introduced to prevent such a morally wrong outcome. Policies of threats that work to prevent massive indiscriminate nuclear destruction are in such a context morally proper.
DETERRENCE NOT EQUIVALENT TO HOSTAGE-TAKING.


The mere pointing of French ICBMs at Soviet cities, scary as it may be, restricts no Soviet citizen's liberty. Soviet civilians are not being tied to bumpers or wired to explosives; their lives of joy and sorrow will unfold much the same whether or not they are "held hostage." Second, McCoy need not claim a "right" to threaten the Hatfield child (let alone to kidnap him), in the sense of putting Hatfield under an obligation not to remove his child from that threat. Rather, McCoy need only advance the weaker claim that he has no obligation not to threaten conduct harmful to Hatfield's child in order to dissuade Hatfield from an immoral action. Does Hatfield's child have some right, which could furnish the ground of this putative obligation, not to have his life made the basis of a threat directed at his father (indeed the child himself may not know about the threat), or do the denizens of Leningrad have a right not to have French missiles pointed their way? Talk of rights is frequently rather loose these days, but even so it is hard to see what would be the basis of these supposed rights.

DETERRENCE NOT IMMORAL BECAUSE LIVES ARE THE MORE MORALLY IMPORTANT THAN NOT BEING THREATENED.


One could view the obligation not to threaten innocent persons as a prima facie principle, one which is outweighed in the present circumstances by the duty to preserve the lives and liberties of the innocent (assuming, what is widely believed, that reliance on nuclear deterrence has accomplished this). The difference is that one would be saying that deterrence is justified, all things considered, rather than that criminal conduct is tolerated out of necessity. Given that overridden prima facie duties continue to exert some moral weight, one would still be obliged to endeavor strenuously to extricate oneself from a situation in which the duty not to threaten had to be overridden in order to fulfill a more stringent duty. Walzer's construal of the situation places us, implausibly, in a continual state of moral emergency in which moral norms, rather than being overridden by other moral principles, are simply disregarded because of consequentialist considerations that are external to his deontological framework.
NUCLEAR STATES WILL NOT GIVE WEAPONS TO TERRORISTS
“Give nukes a chance Can the spread of nuclear weapons make us safer?” By Drake Bennett I March 20, 2005 named a 2007 Barry M. Goldwater Scholar. Bennett was one of 317 Goldwater Scholars who were selected on the basis of academic merit from a field of 1,110 mathematics, science and engineering students nominated by the faculties of colleges and universities nationwide.
John J. Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago and another preeminent realist thinker, describes himself as closer to Waltz than to Allison on the issue. Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz, for example, that nuclear states, no matter how "rogue," are unlikely to give their weapons to terrorists. Whatever its sympathies, Mearsheimer argues, "Iran is highly unlikely to give nuclear weapons to terrorists, in large part because they would be putting weapons into the hands of people who they ultimately did not control, and there's a reasonably good chance that they would get Iran incinerated" if the weapon was traced back to the regime in Tehran. "Any country that gave [nuclear weapons] to terrorists who would use them against the US," Mearsheimer adds, "would disappear from the face of the earth."

AL QAEDA DOESN'T WANT NUKEs.
But the Afghanistan invasion seems to have cut any schemes off at the knees. As analyst Anne Stenersen notes, evidence from an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan when the group beat a hasty retreat indicates that only some $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for WMD research, and that was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. For comparison, she points out that the Japanese millennial terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, appears to have invested $30 million in its sarin gas manufacturing program. Milton Leitenberg of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland-College Park quotes Ayman al-Zawahiri as saying that the project was "wasted time and effort."

EVEN THOUGH PLANS ARE ON THE INTERNET, THEY'RE INADEQUATE AND PEOPLE STILL CAN'T BUILD THEM RIGHT.
An editorialist in Nature, the esteemed scientific journal, did apply that characterization to the manufacture of uranium bombs, as opposed to plutonium bombs, last January, but even that seems an absurd exaggeration. Younger, the former Los Alamos research director, has expressed his amazement at how "self-declared 'nuclear weapons experts,' many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon," continue to "hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive." Uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine," he points out, and "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed." Special technology is required, and even the simplest weapons require precise tolerances. Information on the general idea for building a bomb is available online, but none of it, Younger says, is detailed enough to "enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive."
RUSSIA’S NUKEs ARE SECURE.


In 1998, a peak year for loose nuke stories, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command made several visits to Russian military bases and pointedly reported, ”I want to put to bed this concern that there are loose nukes in Russia. My observations are that the Russians are indeed very serious about security.” Physicists Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak have reported, however, that this forceful firsthand testimony failed to persuade the intelligence community ”perhaps because it[had] access to varied sources of information.” A decade later, with no credible reports of purloined Russian weapons, it rather looks like it was the general, not the spooks, who had it right. By all reports (including Allison’s), Russian nukes have become even more secure in recent years.

THE CHANCE OF A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK IS LOW- TERRORISTS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE INTERESTED IN WMD’S AND EVEN IF THEY WERE WOULD NOT GET STATE SUPPORT.

John Mueller 2007 (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science, “Radioactive Hype” The National Interest September/October pg. 59-65

HERE IS another favorite fantasy of the alarmists: A newly nuclear country will pass a bomb or two to friendly terrorists for delivery abroad. Yet as William Langewiesche stresses in Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, this is highly improbable. There would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists. If the ultimate source of the weapon were discovered--whether before or after detonation--international retribution could be unfathomably fierce. Potential detection as a nuclear-terrorist abettor carries too high a price. Moreover, no state is likely to trust Al-Qaeda-most are already on its extensive enemies list. Since they are unlikely to be aided by an established state, terrorists would need to buy or steal the crucial fissile material and then manufacture the device themselves. On this front, there is much rumor but little substance. Even though Bin Laden sometimes appears to talk a good game, the degree to which Al-Qaeda has pursued a nuclear-weapons program may have been exaggerated by the arch-terrorist himself, as well as by the same slam-dunkers who packaged Saddam’s WMD-development scare. The 9/11 Commission, media and various threat-mongers have trotted out evidence ranging from the ludicrous to the merely dubious when it comes to Al-Qaeda’s nuclear intentions. One particularly well-worn tale-based on the testimony of an embezzling Al-Qaeda operative who later defected-describes Bin Laden’s efforts to obtain some uranium while in Sudan in 1993. For his prize-winning book, The Looming Tower, Lawrence Wright interviewed two relevant people--including the man who supposedly made the purchase--and both say the episode never happened. Then there are the two sympathetic Pakistani nuclear scientists who met with top Al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan in August 2001. Pakistani intelligence officers say the scientists found Bin Laden to be "intensely interested" in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, but insist that the talks were wide-ranging and "academic", likely rendering little critical help on bomb design. In what would seem to be other frightening news, a hand-written 25-page document entitled "Superbomb" was found in the home of an Al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan. But according to physicist David Albright, some sections are sophisticated while others are "remarkably inaccurate and naive." Many critical steps for making a nuclear weapon are missing; the bomb design figures, "not credible." In short, the entire program seems "relatively primitive."
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PROVING AL QAEDA IS MAKING NUKEs AND THEY WOULD NEVER HAVE THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO DO SO.
John Mueller 2007 (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science, "Radioactive Hype" The National Interest September/October pg. 59-65

When in full-on fantasyland, we even worry about decade-old reports of Al-Qaeda's purchase of twenty nuclear warheads from Chechen mobsters for $30 million and two tons of opium. And then there's the supposed acquisition of nuclear suitcase bombs in Russia, asserted by Al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, on the eve of Al-Qaeda's collapse in Afghanistan. Given the circumstances, this seems a desperate bluff, and it has been much disputed by Moscow officials and experts on the Russian program. Even if they still exist, these Soviet-era bombs have a short shelf life and today are nothing more than "radioactive scrap metal." Of course, absence of evidence, we need hardly be reminded, is not evidence of absence. Thus, Allison reports that, when no abandoned nuclear-weapons material was found in Afghanistan, some intelligence analysts responded: "We haven't found most of Al-Qaeda's leadership either, and we know that they exist." Since we know Mount Rushmore exists, maybe the tooth fairy does as well. Even if there is some desire for the bomb, fulfilling that desire is another matter. Though Allison assures us that it would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material, we see how difficult it is for states to acquire these capabilities (it took Pakistan 27 years)--let alone the Lone Ranger. Al-Qaeda would need people with great technical skills, a bevy of corrupted but utterly reliable co-conspirators and an implausible amount of luck to go undetected for months, if not years while developing and delivering their capabilities. Perhaps aware of these monumental difficulties, terrorists around the world seem in effect to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an Al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available . . . rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach." That is, "Keep it simple, stupid."
NUCLEAR TERRORISM IS TRULY A WORST-CASE SCENARIO- WE ARE WASTING TIME AND RESOURCES BY TRYING TO PREVENT AN ATTACK.

John Mueller 2007 (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science, “ THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF EFFORTS TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION” Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, August 28-31, 2008, pg. 8-9

Nonetheless, terrorism analyses tend to focus on lurid worst-case scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction, a concept that, especially after the Cold War, has been expanded to embrace chemical and biological and sometimes radiological weapons as well as nuclear ones.42 As Bruce Hoffman laments, "Many academic terrorism analyses are self-limited to mostly lurid hypotheses of worst-case scenarios, almost exclusively involving CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) weapons, as opposed to trying to understand why— with the exception of September 11—terrorists have only rarely realized their true killing potential."43 Relatedly, William Arkin has issued a sustained lament about what he calls "the devastating consequences associated with the universal and unchallenged assumption of nuclear terrorism." Among these consequences have been not only the war in Iraq, but the single-minded attention to WMD that seduced federal agencies "to prepare for the wrong disaster before Katrina," the rise of "preemption," and the "resurgence of American nuclear capability and missile defenses."44 Concerns about atomic terrorism have led to a special focus on port security driven by the assumptions, apparently, 1) that after manufacturing their device at great expense and effort overseas, the terrorists would supply a return address and then entrust their precious product to the tender mercies of the commercial delivery system, and 2) that Randall Larsen is incorrect to conclude that "anyone smart enough to obtain a nuclear device will be smart enough to put half an inch of lead around it."45 As a result, with bipartisan support, huge amounts of money have been hurled in that direction to inspect and to install radiation detectors. The amazing, hugely costly, and, it would appear, quite unwarranted, even quixotic, preoccupation about detecting radioactive parcels in materials arriving at U.S. ports currently triggers 500 false alarms daily at the Los Angeles/Long Beach port alone generated by such substances as kitty litter and bananas.46 This preoccupation is impressive as well because there seems to be no evidence that any terrorist has indicated any interest in, or even much knowledge about, using transnational containers to transport much of anything.47 Perhaps, as some suggest, some of the concern was inspired by the bizarre dispute that erupted in 2006 about having a Dubai-related firm in charge of U.S. port security.48
A NON-STATE GROUP IS INCAPABLE OF CREATING A BOMB- IF AL- QAEDA HAD A BOMB THEY WOULD HAVE USED IT ALREADY.

John Mueller 2010 (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science, “Nuclear Bunkum: Don’t panic: bin Laden’s WMD are mythical, too” American Conservative January/February pg. 20-21)

To show al-Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations that took place in Afghanistan in August 2001 between two Pakistani nuclear scientists, bin Laden, and three other al-Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic.” Reports suggest that bin Laden may have had access to some radiological material—acquired for him by radical Islamists in Uzbekistan—but the scientists told him that he could not manufacture a weapon with it. Bin Laden’s questions do not seem to have been very sophisticated. The scientists were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in processing fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a non-state group. Nonetheless, some U.S. intelligence agencies convinced themselves that the scientists provided al-Qaeda with a “blueprint” for constructing nuclear weapons. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, reportedly said that al-Qaeda’s atom-bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined information uncovered in Afghanistan and came to similar conclusions. They found no credible proof that al-Qaeda had obtained fissile material or a nuclear weapon and no evidence of “any radioactive material suitable for weapons.” They did uncover, however, a “nuclear related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons related issues.” Physicist and weapons expert David Albright concludes that any al-Qaeda atomic efforts were “seriously disrupted”—indeed, “nipped in the bud”—by the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. After that, the “chance of al-Qaeda detonating a nuclear explosive appears on reflection to be low.” Rumors and reports that al-Qaeda has managed to purchase an atomic bomb, or several, have been around now for over a decade. One story alleges that bin Laden gave a group of Chechens $30 million in cash and two tons of opium in exchange for 20 nuclear warheads. If any of these reports were true, one might think the terrorist group (or its supposed Chechen suppliers) would have tried to set off one of those things by now or that al-Qaeda would have left some trace of the weapons behind in Afghanistan after its hasty exit in 2001. Yet absence of evidence, we need hardly be reminded, is not evidence of absence. Some intelligence analysts defensively assert that although they haven’t found most of al-Qaeda’s leadership, they know it exists. Since we know Mount Rushmore exists, maybe the tooth fairy does as well. A Pakistani journalist was brought in to interview bin Laden just a day or two before al-Qaeda fled Afghanistan. The published texts of what was said vary, but in one transcript bin Laden supposedly asserted, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Bin Laden declined to discuss the weapons’ origins, but his second-in-command separately explained, “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and ... dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available. They have contacted us ... and we purchased some suitcase bombs.” Given the military pressure that they were under at the time, and taking into account the evidence of the primitive nature of al-Qaeda’s nuclear program—if it could be said to have had one at all—these reported assertions were clearly a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has pronounced on nuclear weapons a few other times, talking about an Islamic “duty” or “right” to obtain them for defense. Some of these oft-quoted statements can be seen as threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps an interest, not any capability. And as political scientist Louise Richardson concludes in What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, “statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them ... this in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” When
examined, the signs of al-Qaeda’s desire to go atomic and its progress in accomplishing that exceedingly difficult task are remarkably vague, if not negligible. After an exhaustive study of available materials, Stenersen finds that, although al-Qaeda central may have considered nuclear and other non-conventional weapons, there “is little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” There is no reason to believe, moreover, that the group’s chances improved after they were forcefully expelled from their comparatively unembattled base in Afghanistan.

THE THEFT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE- MOST ARE LOCATED IN THE US AND RUSSIA AND ARE EXTREMELY SECURE.

With about twenty-seven thousand nuclear weapons in the arsenals of eight nations (Britain, China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States), terrorists appear to have a target-rich environment. All but about one thousand of these weapons reside in two countries: Russia and the United States. The theft of a nuclear weapon is a staple of movies such as The Peacemaker and television shows such as 24. In practice, such thefts are difficult to carry out. Often considered the “crown jewels” of a nuclear-armed nation’s security, nuclear weapons are usually rigorously guarded. But being difficult to steal does not mean impossible. In particular, transporting and deploying nuclear weapons outside of highly secure, central storage sites can increase susceptibility to theft. In December 2004, the U.S. National Intelligence Council warned, “Russian authorities twice thwarted terrorist efforts to reconnoiter nuclear weapon storage sites in 2002” and that terrorists inside Russia also “showed a suspicious amount of interest in the transportation of nuclear munitions.”

NUKES FEATURE NUMEROUS SAFEGUARDS- TERRORISTS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET ACCESS.

Thus far terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists on the issue, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. It is highly improbable that a would-be atomic terrorist would be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state because the donor could not control its use and because the ultimate source of the weapon might be discovered. Although there has been great worry about terrorists illicitly stealing or purchasing a nuclear weapon, it seems likely that neither “loose nukes” nor a market in illicit nuclear materials exists. Moreover, finished bombs have been outfitted with an array of locks and safety devices. There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in full disarray. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory, would still have locks, and could probably be followed and hunted down by an alarmed international community.
STATES WILL NOT HELP TERRORISTS- IT IS WAY TOO RISKY AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR BACKLASH IS HIGH.


One route a would-be atomic terrorist might take would be to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. This is highly improbable, however, because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered. As one prominent analyst, Matthew Bunn, puts it, “A dictator or oligarch bent on maintaining power is highly unlikely to take the immense risk of transferring such a devastating capability to terrorists they cannot control, given the ever-present possibility that the material would be traced back to its origin.” Important in this last consideration are deterrent safeguards afforded by “nuclear forensics,” the rapidly developing science (and art) of connecting nuclear materials to their sources even after a bomb has been exploded.6 Moreover, there is a very considerable danger to the donor that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery, or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve—including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.7

INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAVE EFFECTIVELY STOPPED TERRORIST OPERATIONS.


There could be some danger that terrorists would be aided by private (or semi-private) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, Khan’s activities were easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down when it seemed to be the right time.8 Moreover, the aid he tendered was entirely to states with return addresses whose chief aim in possessing nuclear weapons would be to deter or to gain prestige—he did not aid stateless terrorist groups whose goal presumably would be actually to set the weapons off. In addition, al-Qaeda is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone. As one observer has pointed out, the terrorist group’s explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don’t share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn’t get along all that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban government.9
AL-QAEDA HAS A TON OF ENEMIES- THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO GET THE OUTSIDE SUPPORT NEEDED TO CARRY OUT AN ACT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM.


In addition, al Qaeda--the chief demon group--is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone. As Peter Bergen (2007, 19) has pointed out, the terrorist group's explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn't get along all that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban government (Burke 2003, 150, 164-65; Wright 2006, 230-1, 287-88; Cullison 2004).

WEAPONS ARE EQUIPPED WITH HIGH-TECH SECURITY SYSTEMS THAT TERRORISTS CAN'T BYPASS.


Even if a nuclear weapon is stolen, terrorists must find a way to activate it. Security and arming devices on most nuclear weapons may block terrorists from using these weapons. For example, specialized security codes called permissive action links (PALs) are required to unlock U.S. nuclear weapons. These electronic locks allow only a limited number of tries to enter the correct code before the weapon disables itself. The more advanced nuclear weapon states of Britain, China, France, and Russia reportedly use similar security systems. Although most Russian nuclear weapons are believed to be equipped with PALs, an unknown number of older Russian tactical nuclear arms may not have this security system. Most of these weapons may have been dismantled or are scheduled for dismantlement, but some may still be deployed. It is unknown whether India, Israel, and Pakistan use PALs, although the United States in recent years may have provided PAL assistance to Pakistan.
LOOSE NUKES ARE NOT A LEGITIMATE THREAT- ALL NUKES ARE ACCOUNTED FOR.

There has also been great worry about “loose nukes,” especially in post-Communist Russia—weapons, “suitcase bombs” in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, both Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs have adamantly denied that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought such weapons. They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years, after which they become “radioactive scrap metal.” Similarly, a careful assessment conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they (like all nuclear weapons) require continual maintenance. Even some of those most alarmed by the prospect of atomic terrorism have concluded that “It is probably true that there are no ‘loose nukes’, transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way.”

NATIONS HAVE A HIGH INTEREST IN KEEPING THEIR WEAPONS SECURE.

It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly Chechen ones of course, with whom it has been waging a vicious on-and-off war for well over a decade. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by terrorists, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material—and scientists. Notes Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.”
NO THREAT OF A LOOSE NUKE BEING DETONATED – BOMBS ARE OUTFITTED WITH SECURITY MEASURES


Even if a finished bomb were somehow lifted somewhere, the loss would soon be noted and a worldwide pursuit launched. And most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by sensors in the hands of pursuers.12 Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been outfitted with devices that will trigger a nonnuclear explosion that will destroy the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate highsecurity vaults, and things can be organized so that two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb, but to store, to maintain, and to deploy it. If the terrorists seek to enlist (or force) the services of someone who already knows how to set off the bomb, they would find, as Younger stresses, that "only few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon." Weapons designers know how a weapon works, he explains, but not the multiple types of signals necessary to set it off, and maintenance personnel are trained only in a limited set of functions.13

THE PROBABILITY OF A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK IS LOW


Allison's bold, imaginative, and alarming prediction of 2004 may, unlike the one he issued in 1995, prove right. But it also might end up there with that of the imaginative scientist/novelist who assured us nearly 50 years ago that if "the nuclear arms race between the United States and the U.S.S.R. not only continues but accelerates...within, at the most, ten years, some of those bombs are going off" (Snow 1961, 259); or with that of the imaginative University of Chicago political scientist who in 1979 proclaimed, "The world is moving ineluctably towards a third world war--a strategic nuclear war" (Hans J. Morgenthau in Boyle 1985, 73); or with that of the imaginative Harvard pundit who confidently assured us in May 2004 that "we can confidently expect that terrorists will attempt to tamper with our election in November" (Ignatieff 2004, 48). As this experience suggests, it is clearly possible to have a surfeit of imagination and to become obsessed with what Bernard Brodie once labeled in somewhat different context, "worst case fantasies" (1978, 68). Peter Zimmerman and Jeffrey Lewis pointedly conclude a 2006 article by declaring, "just because a nuclear terrorist attack hasn't happened shouldn't give us the false comfort of thinking it won't" (2006, 39). However, just because something terrible is possible shouldn't send us into hysteric thinking it will surely come about.
THERE IS TOO MUCH RISK FOR ANY COUNTRY TO CONSIDER GIVING BOMBS TO TERRORISTS.


A favorite fantasy of imaginative alarmists envisions that a newly nuclear country will palm off a bomb or two to friendly terrorists for delivery abroad. As Langewiesche stresses, however, this is highly improbable because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered (2007, 20). Moreover, there is a very considerable danger the bomb and its donor would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve (including on the donor itself). It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state—even a close ally, much less a terrorist group—a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently. For example, during the Cold War, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused (Oberdorfer 2005; see also Pillar 2003, xxiv). There could be some danger from private (or semi-private) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, its activities were rather easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down in 2004 (Langewiesche 2007, 169-72).

BOMBS HAVE A SHORT LIFESPAN, HAD ANY BEEN STOLEN IN THE PAST, THEY WOULD NO LONGER BE USEFUL.


There has been a lot of worry about "loose nukes," particularly in post-Communist Russia—"suitcase bombs" in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, when asked, Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs "adamantly deny that al Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought Soviet-made suitcase nukes." They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal" (Badken 2004). Similarly, a careful assessment of the concern conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they require continual maintenance (2002, 4, 12; see also Langewiesche 2007, 19).
RUSSIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE A HIGH INTEREST IN KEEPING THEIR WEAPONS SECURE.


It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade. Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Langewiesche 2007, 19; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off.

EMPIRICALLY ATTEMPTS AT GETTING LOOSE NUKES HAVE FAILED MISERABLY.


One group that tried, in the early 1990s, was the Japanese apocalyptic group, Aum Shinrikyo. Unlike al Qaeda, it was not under siege, and it had money, expertise, a remote and secluded haven in which to set up shop, even a private uranium mine. But it made dozens of mistakes in judgment, planning, and execution (Linzer 2004). Chagrined, it turned to biological weapons which, as it happened, didn't work either, and finally to chemical ones, resulting eventually in a somewhat botched release of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that managed to kill a total of 12 people. Even if there is some desire for the bomb by terrorists, fulfillment of that desire is obviously another matter, and it might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how "not impossible" their task is. After all, all sorts of things are "not impossible." A colliding meteor or comet could destroy the earth, Vladimir Putin or the British could decide one morning to launch a few nuclear weapons at Massachusetts, George Bush could become a transvestite or decide to bomb Hollywood or do both simultaneously, an underwater volcano could erupt to cause a civilization-ending tidal wave, Osama bin Laden could convert to Judaism, declare himself to be the Messiah, and fly in a gaggle of mafioso hit men from Rome to have himself publicly crucified.
MOST NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS ARE NOT CAPABLE OF SINGLE-HANDEDLY CONSTRUCTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.


It is possible to believe that the two scientists "provided detailed responses to bin Laden's technical questions about the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons," as another Washington Post report puts it (Kahn 2001). But the questions do not seem to be very sophisticated, and as the scientists themselves have reportedly put it, it seems that the discussion was wide ranging and academic (even rather basic) and that they provided no material or specific plans (Kahn and Moore 2001). Pakistani officials stressed to Khan and Moore that Mahmood "had experience in uranium enrichment and plutonium production but was not involved in bomb-building," and therefore that he "had neither the knowledge nor the experience to assist in the construction of any type of nuclear weapon," nor were the scientists "believed to be experts in chemical or biological weaponry" (see also Albright and Higgins 2003, 49, 51; Baker 2002). Therefore, they likely were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was in not in bomb design, which might be useful to fabricate a terrorist device, but rather in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. As a Pakistani nuclear scientist working at Princeton put it, Mahmood "may not actually have much more knowledge than you would get from an undergraduate degree in nuclear physics. My suspicion is if you gave him a bucket full of plutonium he wouldn't know what to do with it, because he never worked with nuclear weapons, as far as we know" (Baker 2002). Nonetheless, reports Allison, U.S. intelligence agencies have convinced themselves that the two errant Pakistani scientists provided al Qaeda with a "blueprint" for constructing nuclear weapons (2004, 24).

AL-QAEDA HAS NOT BOUGHT ANY SUITCASE NUKES.


Allison also reports a claim by Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir that Zawahiri told him in 2001 "If you have $30 million, go to the black market in central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and...dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available. They have contacted us, we sent our people to Moscow, to Tashkent, to other states, and they negotiated, and we purchased some suitcase bombs" (2004, 27). As he acknowledges in a note, Allison gets this alarming, even incendiary, quote from a San Francisco Chronicle article that is entitled, "Al Qaeda bluffing about having suitcase nukes, experts say; Russians claim terrorists couldn't have bought them." The portion of that article that apparently did not interest Allison notes, as discussed earlier, that Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs "adamantly" deny that al Qaeda or other terrorist groups could have bought Soviet-made suitcase nukes (Badken 2004).
THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK ARE OVERBLOWN.

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation.

AQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISN'T IN THE AGENDA OF TERRORIST GROUPS

An apparent lack of interest on the part of terrorist groups in acquiring unconventional weapons also helps explain why unconventional weapons attacks are so rare. In the case studies on the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the FARC, and Hamas, political vision, practical military utility, and moral codes all restrained them in part from seeking and using unconventional weapons. In some cases, group leaders indicated to members that the use of chemical or biological weapons would not be legitimate to their struggle. Hamas leader Abu Shannab, for one, stated that the use of poison was contrary to Islamic teachings. Although Hamas is a religiously based organization to establish a Palestinian state on Israeli territory and to eliminate Israel as a state is decidedly political.

EVEN IF TERRORISTS GOT A BOMB, THEY COULDN'T DETONATE IT.

However, even if a terrorist organization managed – perhaps by working with illegal arms dealers – to obtain complete nuclear weapons from ex-Soviet stocks, it could not necessarily detonate that weapon. Apart from the fact that most nuclear weapons would be highly unsuitable for terrorist use – due to their size and difficult of transporting them – nuclear weapons have a series of built-in technical and security safeguards, including self-destruct mechanism that can be overridden only by a small and specially trained circle of technicians.
**AT Impacts**

**NUKES WOULDN'T TANK THE ECONOMY.**
A nuclear explosion in, say, New York City -- as Obama so darkly invoked -- would obviously be a tremendous calamity that would roil markets and cause great economic hardship, but would it extinguish the rest of the country? Would farmers cease plowing? Would manufacturers close their assembly lines? Would all businesses, governmental structures, and community groups evaporate? Americans are highly unlikely to react to an atomic explosion, however disastrous, by immolating themselves and their economy. In 1945, Japan weathered not only two nuclear attacks but intense nationwide conventional bombing; the horrific experience did not destroy Japan as a society or even as an economy. Nor has persistent, albeit nonnuclear, terrorism in Israel caused that state to disappear -- or to abandon democracy. Even the notion that an act of nuclear terrorism would cause the American people to lose confidence in the government is belied by the traumatic experience of Sept. 11, 2001, when expressed confidence in America's leaders paradoxically soared. And it contradicts decades of disaster research that documents how socially responsible behavior increases under such conditions -- seen yet again in the response of those evacuating the World Trade Center on 9/11.

**SCHELL EXAGGERATES – HUMANS CAN SURVIVE A NUCLEAR WAR.**
Brian Martin [Professor of Social Sciences @ University of Wollongong, ’84] "Extinction Politics" SANA Update (Scientists Against Nuclear Arms Newsletter), number 16, May 1984, pp. 5-6.
Opponents of war, including scientists, have often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack is inevitably followed by a firestorm or conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the potential for ecological resilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in several of the scientific studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoid examination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at possibilities for migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked at people changing their diets away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby greatly extending reserves of food.

**NUCLEAR WAR ONLY KILLS MOST OF THE GLOBE, NOT ALL OF HUMAN LIFE.**
Patrick Hodder and Brian Martin [Faculty of Arts @ University of Wollongong, '09] “Climate Crisis? The Politics of Emergency Framing” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 36, 5 September 2009, pp. 53-60.
There is another disadvantage of seeing nuclear war as an all-or-nothing struggle, as either preventing nuclear war or suffering the ultimate catastrophe. It means peace activists are not prepared for the aftermath of an actual nuclear war (Martin 1982c). It is possible that a nuclear exchange could be limited, for example a few bombs exploded in a hot spot such as the Middle East or South Asia, an attack by terrorists who have acquired weapons, or an accidental launch of nuclear missiles. The result could be massive loss of life --from tens of thousands of people to a few million, for example --but still far from putting human survival at risk, indeed less than some previous wars.
Asteroids

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT AN ASTEROID STRIKE WILL HAPPEN AGAIN – GAMBLING ISN’T AN OPTION.

Consequently, it is easy to dismiss the hazard as negligible or to ridicule those who suggest that it be treated seriously. On the other hand, as has been explained, when such impacts do occur, they are capable of producing destruction and casualties on a scale that far exceeds any other natural disasters; the results of impact by an object the size of a small mountain exceed the imagined holocaust of a full-scale nuclear war... Even the worst storms or floods or earthquakes inflict only local damage, while a large enough impact could have global consequences and place all of society at risk... Impacts are, at once, the least likely but the most dreadful of known natural catastrophes. What is the most prudent course of action when one is confronted with an extremely rare yet enormously destructive risk? Some may be tempted to do nothing, in essence gambling on the odds. But because the consequences of guessing wrong may be so severe as to mean the end of virtually all life on planet Earth, the wiser course of action would be to take reasonable steps to confront the problem. Ultimately, rare though these space strikes are, there is no doubt that they will happen again, sooner or later. [Ellipses in original text]

THERE ARE 200 ASTEROIDS READY TO HIT EARTH, AND THEY HAVE ALREADY ENDED LIFE SIX TIMES.

Currently, astronomers estimate that at least 200 asteroids are in orbits that cross the Earth's orbit, and the number of such known asteroids is rapidly increasing as detection methods improve. Most of these asteroids are larger than 500 meters in diameter (several times larger than the Tunguska asteroid) and would cause massive damage if they were to collide with this planet. In addition, long-period comets, although less numerous than asteroids, pose a significant threat due to their greater velocities relative to Earth. The history of life on Earth includes several devastating periods of mass extinction during which the vast majority of species then in existence became extinct within a relatively short span of time. The best known of these mass extinctions found the dinosaurs tumbling all the way from their throne as the kings of all living things to the bone pile of archeological history. No less significant, however, were the extinction spasms that wiped out approximately 70 and 90 percent of marine species, respectively. Even the species that survived often experienced catastrophic reductions in their populations. Several scientific studies have linked mass extinctions to collisions between Earth and large objects from space. The hypothesis that these extinction spasms were caused by these collisions and their aftershocks is supported (1) by the discovery of the now well-documented large impact event at the [Cretaceous/Tertiary] boundary...; (2) by calculations relating to the catastrophic nature of the environmental effects in the aftermath of large impacts; (3) by the discovery of several additional layers of impact debris or possible impact material at, or close to, geologic boundary/extinction events; (4) by evidence that a number of extinctions were abrupt and perhaps catastrophic; and (5) by the accumulation of data on impact craters and astronomical data on comets and asteroids that provide estimates of collision rates of such large bodies with the Earth on long time scales. There are at least six mass extinctions that have been linked with large impacts on Earth from space.
ASTEROID STRIKES ARE LIKE NUCLEAR WINTER… ONLY WORSE.


The impact of a sufficiently large object on land may cause a blackout scenario in which dust raised by the impact prevents sunlight from reaching the surface of the Earth for several months. Lack of sunlight terminates photosynthesis, prevents creatures from foraging for food, and leads to precipitous temperature declines. Obviously even much smaller impacts would have the potential to seriously damage human civilization, perhaps irreparably. In addition to the dust raised from the initial impact, smoke and particulate matter from vast, uncontrollable fires may greatly exacerbate this blackout effect. A large space object generates tremendous heat, regardless of whether it is destroyed in the atmosphere or physically hits the surface of the Earth. These fires can reach far beyond the impact area, due to atmospheric phenomena associated with the entry of a huge, ultra-high speed object. A huge mass of dust, smoke, and soot lofted into Earth's atmosphere could lead to effects similar to those associated with the “nuclear winter” theory, but on a much larger, much more deadly scale. Such effects are now widely believed to have been a major factor contributing to the mass extinction spasms. These cataclysmic effects may have been worsened still further by other collateral phenomena associated with the impact. For example, acid rain, pronounced depletion of the ozone layer, and massive injections of water vapor into the upper atmosphere may be indirect effects, each with its own negative consequences for life on Earth.

THIS IS STILL A RELEVANT HARM – THERE ARE ABOUT 20,000 DEADLY ASTEROIDS NEAR EARTH.


These standard assumptions—that remaining space rocks are few, and that encounters with planets were mainly confined to the past—are being upended. On March 18, 2004, for instance, a 30-meter asteroid designated 2004 FH—a hunk potentially large enough to obliterate a city—shot past Earth, not far above the orbit occupied by telecommunications satellites. (Enter “2004 FH” in the search box at Wikipedia and you can watch film of that asteroid passing through the night sky.) Looking at the broader picture, in 1992 the astronomers David Jewitt, of the University of Hawaii, and Jane Luu, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, discovered the Kuiper Belt, a region of asteroids and comets that starts near the orbit of Neptune and extends for immense distances outward. At least 1,000 objects big enough to be seen from Earth have already been located there. These objects are 100 kilometers across or larger, much bigger than whatever dispatched the dinosaurs; space rocks this size are referred to as “planet killers” because their impact would likely end life on Earth. Investigation of the Kuiper Belt has just begun, but there appear to be substantially more asteroids in this region than in the asteroid belt, which may need a new name…. In 1980, only 86 near-Earth asteroids and comets were known to exist. By 1990, the figure had risen to 170; by 2000, it was 921; as of this writing, it is 5,388. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, part of NASA, keeps a running tally at www.neo.jpl.nasa.gov/stats. Ten years ago, 244 near-Earth space rocks one kilometer across or more—the size that would cause global calamity—were known to exist; now 741 are. Of the recently discovered nearby space objects, NASA has classified 186 as “impact risks” (details about these rocks are at www.neo.jpl.nasa.gov/risk). And because most space-rock searches to date have been low-budget affairs, conducted with equipment designed to look deep into the heavens, not at nearby space, the actual number of impact risks is undoubtedly much higher. Extrapolating from recent discoveries, NASA estimates that there are perhaps 20,000 potentially hazardous asteroids and comets in the general vicinity of Earth.
BECAUSE THE IMPACT OF ASTEROIDS IS SO GREAT, THE LOW PROBABILITY DOESN'T MATTER.


Even if space strikes are likely only once every million years, that doesn't mean a million years will pass before the next impact—the sky could suddenly darken tomorrow. Equally important, improbable but cataclysmic dangers ought to command attention because of their scope. A tornado is far more likely than an asteroid strike, but humanity is sure to survive the former. The chances that any one person will die in an airline crash are minute, but this does not prevent us from caring about aviation safety. And as Nathan Myhrvold, the former chief technology officer of Microsoft, put it, “The odds of a space-object strike during your lifetime may be no more than the odds you will die in a plane crash—but with space rocks, it’s like the entire human race is riding on the plane.”
Oil spills

USE NUKES TO STOP OIL SPILLS.
Decades ago, the Soviet Union reportedly used nuclear blasts to successfully seal off runaway gas wells, inserting a bomb deep underground and letting its fiery heat melt the surrounding rock to shut off the flow. Why not try it here?
The idea has gained fans with each failed attempt to stem the leak and each new setback — on Wednesday, the latest rescue effort stalled when a wire saw being used to slice through the riser pipe got stuck.
“Probably the only thing we can do is create a weapon system and send it down 18,000 feet and detonate it, hopefully encasing the oil,” Matt Simmons, a Houston energy expert and investment banker, told Bloomberg News on Friday, attributing the nuclear idea to “all the best scientists.”

NUKES CAN STOP OIL SPILLS.
In theory, the nuclear option seems attractive because the extreme heat might create a tough seal. An exploding atom bomb generates temperatures hotter than the surface of the sun and, detonated underground, can turn acres of porous rock into a glassy plug, much like a huge stopper in a leaky bottle.
Michael E. Webber, a mechanical engineer at the University of Texas, Austin, wrote to Dot Earth, a New York Times blog, in early May that he had surprised himself by considering what once seemed unthinkable. “Seafloor nuclear detonation,” he wrote, “is starting to sound surprisingly feasible and appropriate.”

THE SOVIETS USED NUKES TO STOP OIL SPILLS, SO CAN OTHER NATIONS.
Much of the enthusiasm for an atomic approach is based on reports that the Soviet Union succeeded in using nuclear blasts to seal off gas wells. Milo D. Nordyke, in a 2000 technical paper for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., described five Soviet blasts from 1966 to 1981.
All but the last blast were successful. The 1966 explosion put out a gas well fire that had raged uncontrolled for three years. But the last blast of the series, Mr. Nordyke wrote, “did not seal the well,” perhaps because the nuclear engineers had poor geological data on the exact location of the borehole.
A 20% CHANCE OF FAILURE AND LITTLE EFFECTS OF RADIATION MAKE NUKING SOUND LIKE A FEASIBLE WAY TO STOP OIL SPILLS.


Komsomoloskaya Pravda suggested that the United States might as well take a chance with a nuke, based on the historical 20-percent failure rate. Still, the Soviet experience with nuking underground gas wells could prove easier in retrospect than trying to seal the Gulf of Mexico’s oil well disaster that’s taking place 5,000 feet below the surface. The Russians were using nukes to extinguish gas well fires in natural gas fields, not sealing oil wells gushing liquid, so there are big differences, and this method has never been tested in such conditions. Besides the possibility of failure, there are always risks when dealing with radiation, though material from the DOE report suggests these are minimal since the radiation would be far underground.

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS ARE A TIME TESTED WAY OF STOPPING OIL SPILLS.


Some people fear that a nuclear explosion would set the oil spill on fire. But Soviet Russia has used subterranean nuclear blasts as much as 169 times and the number would add up to more than 1,000 if all the tests by different countries are taken into account. And since the explosion would be underwater and in the absence of oxygen there is no chance of the well burning up. But yes, an explosion close to the surface can contaminate the water due to radioactivity but this spill warrants an explosion underground. The oil is beneath the rock and since there is no air in an underground nuclear explosion, the energy released would overheat and melt the surrounding rock, thus shutting the spill.

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WILL HAVE MINIMAL EFFECT ON THE ENVIRONMENT AT SUCH A LEVEL.


So that takes us to the next criticism-possible effects on the flora, particularly the phytoplankton and the marine organisms including fishes. But the spill itself, if unchecked, could cause more damage than the results of the explosion. Further, many tests have been carried underwater and no serious damage has been reported. Another blocker for the nuke option is that it would have to be government operated and a final solution. This goes against capitalism. There is much more money to be made by funding cleaning operations which have no end in sight. As dire times call for drastic steps, the better option is a nuclear explosion or be prepared to see carcass of innocent animals washed ashore.
ENERGY EXPERTS RECOMMEND NUKES FAST WAY TO SOLVE OIL SPILLS.


One prominent energy expert known for predicting the oil price spike of 2008 says sending a small nuclear bomb down the leaking well is “probably the only thing we can do” to stop the leak. Matt Simmons, founder of energy investment bank Simmons & Company, also says that there is evidence of a second oil leak about five to seven miles from the initial leak that BP has focused on fixing. That second leak, he says, is so large that the initial one is “minor” in comparison.

NUKES WILL BE TOO DEEP TO CAUSE HARM UNLIKE THE OIL SPILL THAT WILL DESTROY THE OCEAN ENVIRONMENT.


Simmons also told Bloomberg that the idea to use radical measures like a nuclear bomb to seal the leak is probably not being contemplated by decision-makers “because BP is still totally in charge of the news and they have everyone focused on the top kill.”

Asked by a Bloomberg reporter about the risks involved in setting off a nuclear bomb off the coast of Louisiana, Simmons argued that a nuclear explosion deep inside a well bore would have little effect on surrounding areas.

“If you’re 18,000 feet under the sea bed, it basically won't do anything [on the surface],” he said.

THE SOVIETS SUCCESSFULLY USED NUKES COMPARABLE TO THE ONES USED ON JAPAN TO SEAL OIL WELLS.


It was September of 1966, and gas was gushing uncontrollably from the wells in the Bukhara province of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. But the Reds, at the height of their industrial might, had a novel solution. They drilled nearly four miles into the sand and rock of the Kyzyl Kum Desert, and lowered a 30-kiloton nuclear warhead — more than half-again as large as “Little Boy,” the crude uranium bomb dropped over Hiroshima — to the depths beneath the wellhead. With the pull of a lever, a fistful of plutonium was introduced to itself under enormous pressure, setting off the chain reaction that starts with E = MC2 and ends in Kaboom! The ensuing blast collapsed the drill channel in on itself, sealing off the well.

RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT WILL BE MINIMAL FOR NUKES USED TO SEAL OIL SPILLS.


That is why Obama should be discussing the possibility of using an atomic weapon to seal the leak. Before the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the United States successfully detonated nuclear devices both on land and under water, and two potential delivery paths for a nuke are already in place in the form of the partially completed relief wells. Assuming the bomb could be delivered close enough to the drill channel, the yield required would be relatively small. Moreover, well-established formulae establish the burial-depth-to-yield ratios that make it possible to trap virtually all of the radioactive fallout within the sub-oceanic bedrock.
OIL TAR HARMING HUNDREDS OF ANIMALS AND COASTAL RESIDENTS IS MUCH WORSE THAN LIMITED RADIOACTIVE HARM IN SUBOCEANIC BEDROCK.


Of course, the risks of an atomic blast — not just of catastrophic malfunction or ineffectiveness, but of post-blast “venting” or “seeping” of radioactive gases from cracks in the ocean floor — have to be measured against those of the alternatives. But it seems a reasonable conjecture that the dissipation of a limited amount of radioactive material across the vast Gulf is preferable to the blanketing of thousands of miles of American coastline in ribbons of tar.

NUKES WERE USED TO STOP A GAS LEAK IN UZBEKISTAN ONCE.

M.D. Nordyke [Professor of Nuclear Physics @ University of Arizona] “The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions," USDOE, September 1, 2000

On December 1, 1963, while drilling gas Well No. 11 in the Urtabulak gas field in Southern Uzbekistan about 80 km southeast of Bukhara, control of the well was lost at a depth of 2450 m. This resulted in the loss of more than 12 million m3 of gas per day through an 8-inch casing, enough gas to supply the needs of a large city, such as St. Petersburg. Formation pressures were about 27@300 atmospheres. Over the next three years, many attempts were made using a variety of techniques to cap the well at the surface or to reduce the flow and extinguish the flames. However, because the bottom 1000 m of the casing had not yet been cemented, such attempts led to diversion of the gas into nearby wells and to serious personnel safety problems because of the high HzS content of the gas. Underground attempts were hampered by the fact that the location of the lower portion of the hole had not been logged at the time control was lost.

Finally, in the fall of 1966, a decision was made to attempt closing the well with the use of a nuclear explosive. It was believed that a nuclear explosion would squeeze close any hole located within 25-50 m of the explosion, depending on the yield. Two 44.5-cm (13.5-in) diameter slant wells, Holes No. 1c and 2c, were drilled simultaneously. They were aimed to come as close as possible to Hole No. 11 at a depth of about 1500 m in the middle of a 200-m-thick clay zone. This depth was considered sufficient to contain the 300-atmosphere pressure in the gas formation below. A number of acoustic and electromagnetic techniques were used to estimate the distance between Hole No 11 and inclined explosive emplacement hole at 1450 m. The final estimate for the closest distance between Hole No. 11 and Hole No. 1C was 35 + 10 m. The location for the explosive in Hole 1c was cooled to bring it down to a temperature the explosive could withstand. A special 30-ktnuclear explosive developed by the Arzamas nuclear weapons laboratory for this event was emplaced in Hole 1c and stemmed. It was detonated on September 30, 1966. Twenty-three seconds later the flame went out, and the well was sealed.
Aliens

ALIENS WANT NATIONS TO DISARM.

Could it be that aliens, aside from repudiating nuclear energy themselves, are opposed to its use -- not to mention that of nuclear weapons -- by other civilizations? At about the same time as Hill’s book was published, a man named Robert Salas wrote about his experiences 30 years earlier when he was with the Air Force Strategic Air Command. His job was to operate, maintain, and protect a Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile base in central Montana. Salas writes: On March 16 1967, Captain Eric Carlson and First Lieutenant Walt Figel. . . were below ground in the. . . Launch Control Center[while missile] maintenance crews and security teams were camped out[above ground]. During the early morning hours, more than one report came in from[them] that they had seen UFOs. A UFO was reported directly above one of the. . . silos. Around 8:30 a.m., Figel. . . was briefing Carlson. . . when the alarm horn sounded. One of the Minuteman missiles they supervised had gone off alert. ... Within seconds, the entire flight of ten ICBMs was down! ... Power had not been lost to the sites; the missiles simply were not operational because, for some unexplainable reason, each of their guidance and control systems had malfunctioned. ... When we were relieved by our scheduled replacement crew later that morning the missiles had still not been brought on line by on-site maintenance teams. ... Robert Kaminski[who] was the Boeing Company engineering team leader for[a subsequent investigation stated]: "There were no significant failures, engineering data or findings that would explain how ten missiles were knocked off alert. . .”

ALIENS WANT NATIONS TO DISARM.

Obama’s intent to take steps towards a nuclear weapons free world has already been welcomed by many scientists, elder statesmen and national security organizations. If a select group of former military whistleblowers are to be believed, there are also others that will be happy to see the eradication of nuclear weapons -- extraterrestrial occupants of UFOs. Dr. Salla then cites whistleblowers, including Salas, who. . . concluded that UFOs are vitally interested in nuclear weapons and have actively interfered with these in an apparent effort to deter the US and other countries from ever using them. This is supported by the testimony of[others] such as Colonel Ross Dedrickson (ret.) who had worked with the US Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission[and who claimed]: "After retiring from the Air Force I joined the Boeing company and was responsible for accounting for all of the nuclear fleet of Minuteman missiles. In[one] incident they actually photographed the UFO following the missile as it climbed into space and, shining a beam on it, neutralized the missile. I also learned of a number of incidents[in which] nuclear weapons sent into space were destroyed by the extraterrestrials.” Raise your hand if you knew ICBMs, some with nuclear warheads, had been launched into space. (Me neither.) More recently, you may recall an episode of the Bush administration’s that gained a lot of mileage on the Web -- the Divine Strake, which was a test of a 700-pound bomb planned for spring 2006 in the Nevada desert. Dr. Salla explains that, based on statements by officials in the public record, the test might have been intended as a simulation -- proxy might be a better word -- of a test of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) -- a nuclear "bunker buster." He writes:[The] delay of Divine Strake may consequently have been a result of . . . generals opposed to a nuclear bombing campaign against Iran. There is, however,[another] explanation,[Extraterrestrials may have given] warnings through their communications with individuals and military officials of impending action to prevent the possible use of nuclear weapons.
ALIENS EXIST – EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY SHOULDN’T BE DISMISSED.
Most UFO reports consist primarily of eyewitness testimony. Although all observation is in a sense testimonial, by itself testimony cannot ground a scientific claim unless it can be replicated independently, which UFO testimony cannot. Such testimony is problematic in other respects as well. It reports seemingly impossible things, much is of poor quality, witnesses may have incentives to lie, honest observers may lack knowledge, and even experts can make mistakes. In view of these problems skeptics dismiss UFO testimony as meaningless. Problems notwithstanding, this conclusion is unwarranted. First, testimony should not be dismissed lightly, since none of us can verify for ourselves even a fraction of the knowledge we take for granted.36 In both law and social science, testimony has considerable epistemic weight in determining the facts. While sometimes wrong, given its importance in society, testimony is rejected only if there are strong reasons to do so. Second, there is a very large volume of UFO testimony, with some events witnessed by literally thousands of people. Third, some of these people were “expert witnesses”—civilian and military pilots, air traffic controllers, astronauts, astronomers, and other scientists. Finally, some of this testimony is corroborated by physical evidence, as in “radar/visual” cases. In short, the empirical evidence alone does not warrant rejecting the ETH. It does not warrant acceptance either, but this sets the bar too high.

ALIENS EXIST, AND WE SHOULD AVOID THEM.
The aliens are out there and Earth had better watch out, at least according to Stephen Hawking. He has suggested that extraterrestrials are almost certain to exist — but that instead of seeking them out, humanity should be doing all it that can to avoid any contact. The suggestions come in a new documentary series in which Hawking, one of the world’s leading scientists, will set out his latest thinking on some of the universe’s greatest mysteries. Alien life, he will suggest, is almost certain to exist in many other parts of the universe: not just in planets, but perhaps in the centre of stars or even floating in interplanetary space. Hawking’s logic on aliens is, for him, unusually simple. The universe, he points out, has 100 billion galaxies, each containing hundreds of millions of stars. In such a big place, Earth is unlikely to be the only planet where life has evolved. “To my mathematical brain, the numbers alone make thinking about aliens perfectly rational,” he said.

CONTACT WITH ALIENS IS SURE TO BE HOSTILE.
Such scenes are speculative, but Hawking uses them to lead on to a serious point: that a few life forms could be intelligent and pose a threat. Hawking believes that contact with such a species could be devastating for humanity. He suggests that aliens might simply raid Earth for its resources and then move on: “We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn’t want to meet. I imagine they might exist in massive ships, having used up all the resources from their home planet. Such advanced aliens would perhaps become nomads, looking to conquer and colonise whatever planets they can reach.” He concludes that trying to make contact with alien races is “a little too risky”. He said: “If aliens ever visit us, I think the outcome would be much as when Christopher Columbus first landed in America, which didn’t turn out very well for the Native Americans.”
LET IRAN HAVE NUKES TO DETER US INVASION.


Glenn Greenwald points out an exciting new call for war with Iran by former senators Daniel Coats and Chuck Robb in the Washington Post, in particular this section:

[A]n Islamic Republic of Iran with nuclear weapons capability would be strategically untenable. It would threaten U.S. national security...While a nuclear attack is the worst-case scenario, Iran would not need to employ a nuclear arsenal to threaten U.S. interests. Simply obtaining the ability to quickly assemble a nuclear weapon would effectively give Iran a nuclear deterrent...While this seems crazy to the uninitiated, it's long been the view of US foreign policy elites that other countries must not have the power to deter us from attacking them. They must always be vulnerable to being attacked by us. And if they may have the power to deter us from attacking them in the future, that means we must attack them right now. For instance, here's a little-noticed January, 2001 memo by Donald Rumseld:

Several of these [small enemy nations] are intensely hostile to the United States and are arming to deter us from bringing our conventional or nuclear power to bear in a regional crisis...

[U]niversally available [WMD] technologies can be used to create "asymmetric" responses that cannot defeat our forces, but can deny access to critical areas in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia..."asymmetric" approaches can limit our ability to apply military power. Another example is found in a September, 2002 speech by Philip Zelikow, executive director of the 9/11 Commission and author of the 2002 National Security Strategy, about the threat posed by Iraq. Once again, this threat is not that Iraq will attack us, but that their WMD will make it possible for someone to deter us (and Israel):

I criticise the [Bush] administration a little, because the argument that they make over and over again is that this is about a threat to the United States...

Now, if the danger [from Iraq] is a biological weapon handed to Hamas, then what's the American alternative then? Especially if those weapons have developed to the point where they now can deter us from attacking them, because they really can retaliate against us, by then.
ISRAEL MUST HAVE NUKES TO SECURE ITSELF FROM IRANIAN THREAT.


Iran had previously insisted that its plant at Natanz, which is open to international inspection, was the only one involved in enrichment. The new revelation sharply raises the stakes at a time when Israel has been signalling that military strikes against Iran are on the table.

Iran's first response was one of familiar defiance. "If I were Obama's adviser, I would definitely advise him to refrain from making this statement because it is definitely a mistake," President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in an interview with Time magazine in New York. Western sources said the plant at Qom, 120 miles south-west of Tehran, is not yet operational. But it is designed to hold about 3,000 centrifuge machines, which would provide the uranium needed to produce one atomic bomb a year. "Iran has enough uranium to go the whole way," one Western diplomat said. A senior US official said that number of centrifuges could not produce enough uranium to make sense commercially for power generation. "But if you want to use the facility to produce a small amount of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a bomb or two a year, it's the right size."

IRAN IS NOT FANATICAL; IT CAN HANDLE THE NUKE.


The president of Iran is not the regime. Ahmadinejad has almost no control over Iran's nuclear program; that power rests in the hands of the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei alone commands Iran's military and dictates its foreign policy. Through intermediaries such as Vice President Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaei, Khamenei has adopted a much softer tone than Ahmadinejad on nuclear negotiations with the West. As Rahim-Mashaei recently put it, according to Iranian news agencies, "Iran wants no war with any country, and today Iran is a friend of the United States and even Israel."

IRAN NEEDS NUKES TO DETER ISRAELI ATTACK, NOT CAUSE IT.


The Iranian regime is not a suicide bomber. The idea that one fine morning Iran will incinerate Tel Aviv is madness; Morris's description of the mullahs' "fundamentalist, self-sacrificial mindset," echoed by others, is a caricature. The Iranian regime knows full well that Israel has an arsenal widely thought to include as many as 200 nuclear warheads as well as missiles, submarines, strategic bombers and enough apocalyptic psyches to retaliate. Do Israelis seriously believe that Iranians hate them (on behalf of the Palestinians, who would be poisoned by the fallout) more than they love their children -- or, for that matter, the historic cities of Tehran, Qom and Esfahan?
IRAN WILL NOT ENGAGE IN MASS MURDER IF IT ACQUIRES NUKEs.

The regime wants to survive. The mullahs, let us remember, have managed to remain in power for three decades, despite international isolation, a devastating eight-year war with Iraq and the loathing of the vast majority of the country's citizens. In times of economic frustration, they rely on anti-Israeli and anti-American gambits to distract attention from domestic hardship; we should view their nuclear program in this context. This is a country that sits atop the world's third-largest proven reserves of oil, according to the CIA, yet imports about 40 percent of its gasoline -- simply because it doesn't have the resources or the know-how to update its refineries to pump more. We have greater reason to assume that, in time, the mullahs will bow to internal pressure and open their country to global intellectual capital than to think that they will engage in an ecstasy of suicidal mass murder.

IRANIAN NUKEs ARE NECESSARY TO SECURE THE NATION FROM EXTERNAL THREATS.

The Iranian nuclear program is daring but not crazy. Consider the view from Tehran. The United States overthrew Iran's government in 1953 to obtain Iranian oil, and the country is now surrounded by U.S. troops -- in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. This surely argues for prudence from Tehran. Besides, the regime has probably learned a valuable lesson from another member of the "axis of evil": Nuclear North Korea was never attacked; it was offered hundreds of millions of dollars to give up its bombs. Nuclear diplomacy, the mullahs have probably concluded, enhances the international prestige of what would otherwise be a Third World country.

An Iranian bomb need not precipitate a regional nuclear arms race. Israel's bomb -- developed by the Middle Eastern power most hated and feared by its neighbors -- hasn't.

IRANIAN BOMB DOES NOT HARM ISRAELI DETERRENCE.

An Iranian bomb will not "degrade Israel's deterrence." Tens of thousands of conventional missiles in southern Lebanon, Syria, Gaza -- and Iran -- have already done that. Hezbollah knows that it can bombard Israel and survive, as it did during its summer 2006 war with Israel. If an Iranian bomb would provide cover for Hezbollah, Hamas and their state sponsors to launch these missiles at some indefinite point in the future, but a preemptive Israeli attack on Iran would make Iran's proxies launch them now (as Hezbollah did two years ago), how exactly does the logic of regaining Israeli "deterrence" work?
AN IRANIAN NUKE IS NECESSARY TO DETER A US NUCLEAR STRIKE IN THE REGION.


Despite years of denials, a secret planning document issued by the U.S. military's nuclear-weapons command in 2003 ordered preparations for nuclear strikes on countries seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including Iran, Saddam Hussein-era Iraq, Libya and Syria. A briefing (pdf) on the document obtained by the Federation of American Scientists, showed that the document itself was created to flesh out a 2001 Bush administration revision of long-standing nuclear-weapons policy, known as the Nuclear Posture Review. That review was a Defense Department-led attempt to wean nuclear policy off a Cold-War focus on Russia and China, but the shift raised questions about what purpose nuclear forces would serve apart from deterring an attack. In March 2002, leaks indicated that the review would recommend preparations for nuclear attacks against WMD-aspirant states. Arms Control Today pointed out at the time that planning to attack non-nuclear states that were signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty reversed decades of U.S. nuclear policy.

IRAN MUST GO NUCLEAR TO SAVE ITSELF FROM A NUCLEAR ISRAEL, A NUCLEAR RUSSIA, AND A NUCLEAR AMERICA OCCUPYING TWO COUNTRIES SURROUNDING IT.


I would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it. Iran is a proud country that sits between nuclear Pakistan and India to its east, a nuclear Russia to its north and a nuclear Israel to its west. Adjacent Afghanistan and Iraq are occupied at will by a nuclear America, which backed Saddam Hussein in his 1980 invasion of Iran. How can we say such a country has "no right" to nuclear defence?
THE ONLY IMPLICATION TO IRANIAN PROLIFERATION IS STABILITY.
Waltz, Professor of political science, UC Berkley, 07
(Ken, “A nuclear Iran”, Journal of international affairs, Spring/summer 2007, Vol. 60 Issue 2, RSW)

Why would Iran want to have nuclear weapons? There are two very simple ways to answer that question. One is by looking at a map. To the east, Iran borders Pakistan and Afghanistan--countries that do not look greatly stable, and countries that might make any neighbor feel uneasy about what is going to happen next. To the west, Iran borders Iraq. And for eight bloody years in the 1980s, Iran fought a war against Iraq and Saddam Hussein. I wonder if Iran really feels more comfortable now that it's not Saddam Hussein but instead the United States who represents the great military force in Iraq. If I were ruling Iran, I certainly wouldn't think this region of the world is safe. Two, if the president of the United States says three countries form an axis of evil--which George Bush said in 2002--and he then proceeds to invade one of them--Iraq--what are Iran and North Korea to think? We talk about dangerous rogue states that are hard to deter. But what state is in fact the biggest rogue state in the world? For countries that think the United States constitutes a threat, how should they react? In effect, there is no way to deter the United States other than by having nuclear weapons. No country can do that conventionally. The United States can overwhelm other countries conventionally If you were making decisions for Iran, would you say, "We don't want nuclear weapons," or, "Let's do everything we can to get a small number of nuclear weapons and get them just as quickly as we possibly can"? It would be strange if Iran did not strive to get nuclear weapons, and I don't think we have to worry if they do. Because deterrence has worked 100 percent of the time. We can deter small nuclear powers--after all, we have deterred big nuclear powers like the Soviet Union and China. So sleep well.>
**Miscellaneous**

**THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FULFILLS THE NEEDS OF A PROLIFERATING STATE.**


This is why nuclear proliferation does not increase the risk of either an atomic clash or an accident - save in the interval when the "young" powers could be tempted to make a nondeterrent, "real" use of it (as the Americans did in Hiroshima - but precisely only they had a right to this "use value" of the bomb, all of those who have acquired it since will be deterred from using it by the very fact of possessing it). Entry into the atomic club, so prettily named, very quickly effaces (as unionization does in the working world) any inclination toward violent intervention. Responsibility, control, censure, self-deterrence always grow more rapidly than the forces or the weapons at our disposal: this is the secret of the social order. Thus the very possibility of paralyzing a whole country by flicking a switch makes it so that the electrical engineers will never use this weapon: the whole myth of the total and revolutionary strike crumbles at the very moment when the means are available - but alas precisely because those means are available. Therein lies the whole process of deterrence.

**FOCUS ON THE HORROR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE TRANSFERS AGENCY TO THE BOMB.**


Novel though it may be, the re-siting of agency taking place at the heart of the RMA does not bring subjectivity fully into view. Claims made on behalf of PGMs have yet to go so far as to suggest that the weapons decide on the terms of their own use – though the crucial role of those who actually despatch them is mystified, it is not denied. Key to how imaginaries founded in and sustained by briefing videos and like (re)presentations depoliticize war, then, is that the effect has been to cast weapons as agents, but without completing the anthropomorphic turn that would inscribe them also as sites of ethical responsibility. However, this does not merely imply a bifurcation of the subject, the sum of which is nevertheless as visible as divisible. Rather, the severed whole has become something less than the sum of its parts in the alienation of the purposive subject from the operant site of agency: a crucial element of whole subjectivity is lost to the extent that a deep ambivalence about responsibility is engendered. A cruise missile, it should be remembered, intends nothing. Our gaze is therefore fixed on a weapon-agent that can be no more than a grammatical subject separated from ethical subjecht in what appears at first as a profoundly depoliticizing move. But more than this, the mystified site of ethical subjecht is insulated from responsibility for any dire consequences that might be visited upon noncombatants. Read through the imaginaries of the RMA, such events become the exceptions in which something has gone awry. ‘Responsibility’ consequently lacks for an intelligible tether to either the weapon-agent or the fragmented subjectivity associated with it, but does not fully become a free floating signifier since it may yet plausibly attach to the victims.
DON’T BLAME THE BOMB.

No matter their undeniably impressive capabilities or other sources of their emergent construction as agents, the weapons of the RMA are nothing of the sort. Where this comes most fully into relief is in considering how the ascribed agency of weapons puts out of sight the vitally important role of human operators who, at some point, select targets, input guidance information, and make the crucial decision to fire. Inquiring into this reveals at once the inherently political bases of the rendering of weapon-agents inasmuch as it has the effect of obfuscating an important cause of indeterminacy in PGM use: human fallibility (see McKenna 2005). Moreover, even bearing ascriptions of agency, weapons neither are nor are expected to be ethical subjects; they simply perform their assigned missions as though those were pre-given. This, in turn, forecloses thinking about the political to the extent that it focuses our attention on what is, in effect, after politics. That is, the manner in which agency is ascribed to weapons severs the connection between action and its politico-ethical bases – treating weapons as agents that nevertheless lack these other vital elements of complete subjectivity draws our gaze away from important sites of political and ethical judgment. It erects a discursive ‘firebreak’ between politico-ethical choices and the consequences of those choices as they are visited upon human bodies. This is fast becoming a powerful and yet underappreciated modality of viable recourse to organized political violence. It is also one in which disarmament advocacy risks becoming entangled, as it arguably already has via the rhetorical/discursive strategies employed to such great effect in the campaign for a ban on landmines. While the dominant framings of PGMs and the RMA have worked to depoliticize the dire human consequences of war, the mine ban movement has consciously striven to accomplish precisely the opposite. Its own nominal ascription of agency to weapons, however, reveals a post-political terrain of engagement with many of the same implications.

NMD FAILS TO WORK BECAUSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BE DELIVERED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS

Nuclear weapons are small and light; they are easy to move, easy to hide, and easy to deliver in a variety of ways. Even an unimaginably perfect defense against ballistic missiles would fail to negate nuclear weapons. Such a defense would instead put a premium on the other side’s ability to deliver nuclear weapons in different ways: firing missiles on depressed trajectories, carrying bombs in suitcases placing nuclear warheads on freighters to be anchored in American harbors. Indeed someone has suggested that the Soviet Union can always hide warheads in bales of marijuana, knowing we cannot keep them from crossing our borders. To have even modestly effective defenses we would, among other things, have to become a police state. We would have to go to extraordinary lengths to police our borders and exercise control within them.
NATIONS WILL PURSUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF STATES ALREADY HAVE IT. THEY NEED SECURITY TOO.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264898
If only two nations have nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament by one may provoke nuclear disarmament in the other, producing the ideal result of general nuclear disarmament. But if many nations possess nuclear weapons, disarmament by one can hardly be expected to provoke disarmament by all of the others, and each armed nation, considering the fact that at least some other nations will continue to retain nuclear arms, may feel compelled to keep its weapons in order to deter the hard-core non-cooperators. Even the most ardent supporters of disarmament become disheartened when they consider the difficulties of arranging a simultaneous surrender of nuclear weapons by seven or more independent nation states.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE INCREASED STATES’ SECURITY.
Many people assume that the nuclear era has made our lives more perilous, but if it were the case that the American hydrogen arsenal has prevented not just nuclear war, but a conventional conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that would have occurred in a non-nuclear post-World War II world, then it may actually have increased not only our safety, but the safety of the civilians held "hostage" in the USSR.
NOT ALL FORMS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ARE BAD

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The conventional wisdom is that all instances of nuclear weapons proliferation threaten the stability of the international system and the security interests of the United States. Indeed, that is the underlying logic of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, adopted by the bulk of the international community in the late 1960s, which is the centerpiece of the existing nonproliferation system. Members of the arms control community have over the decades spent an enormous amount of time and energy agonizing over the possibility that stable, democratic status quo powers such as Germany, Japan, Sweden and South Korea might decide to abandon the treaty and develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, they have devoted at least as much attention to that problem as they have to the prospect that unstable or aggressive states might build nuclear arsenals. The recent flap over the small scale (and probably unauthorized) nuclear experiments in South Korea is merely the latest example of such misplaced priorities. The hostility toward all forms of proliferation is not confined to dovish arms control types but extends across the political spectrum. As the North Korean nuclear crisis evolved in 2002 and 2003, some of the most hawkish members of the U.S. foreign policy community became terrified at the prospect that America's democratic allies in East Asia might build their own nuclear deterrents to offset Pyongyang's moves. Neoconservative luminaries Robert Kagan and William Kristol regarded such proliferation with horror: "The possibility that Japan, and perhaps even Taiwan, might respond to North Korea's actions by producing their own nuclear weapons, thus spurring an East Asian nuclear arms race . . . is something that should send chills up the spine of any sensible American strategist." http://www.cato.org/people/ted-galen-carpetThat attitude misconstrues the problem. Nuclear arsenals in the hands of stable, democratic, status quo powers do not threaten the peace of the region.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE ULTIMATE EQUALIZER IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.

(Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Poly Sci at Berkley, 2003 “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed”)
accomplish the mission assigned." Avoidance of total war then does not depend on the "relative strength of the two opposed forces." Instead, it depends on the "absolute power in the hands of each, and in the substantial invulnerability of this power to interdiction." 30 In other words, if no state can launch a disarming attack with high confidence, force comparisons are irrelevant. Strategic arms races are then pointless. Deterrent strategies offer this great advantage: Within wide ranges neither side need respond to increases in the other side's military capabilities. Those who foresee nuclear arms racing among new nuclear states fail to make the distinction between war-fighting and war-determing capabilities. War-fighting forces, because they threaten the forces of others, have to be compared. Superior forces may bring victory to one country; inferior forces may bring defeat to another. Force requirements vary with strategies and not just with the characteristics of weapons. With war-fighting strategies, arms races become hard to avoid. Forces designed for deterrence need not be compared. As Harold Brown said when he was secretary of defense, purely deterrent forces "can be relatively modest, and their size can perhaps be made substantially, though not completely, insensitive to changes in the posture of an opponent." 31 With deterrent strategies, arms races make sense only if a first-strike capability is within reach. Because thwarting a first strike is easy, deterrent forces are quite cheap to build and maintain. Second, deterrent balances are inherently stable. This is another reason for new nuclear states to decrease, rather than increase, their military spending. As Secretary Brown saw, within wide limits one state can be insensitive to changes in another state's forces. French leaders thought this way. France, as President Valery Giscard d'Estaing said, "fixes its security at the level required to maintain, regardless of the way the strategic situation develops in the world, the credibility—in other words, the effectiveness—of its deterrent force." 32 With deterrent forces securely established, no military requirement presses one side to try to surpass the other. Human error and folly may lead some parties involved in deterrent balances to spend more on armaments than is needed, but other parties need not increase their armaments in response, because such excess spending does not threaten them. The logic of deterrence eliminates incentives for strategic-arms racing. This should be easier for lesser nuclear states to understand than it was for the United States and the Soviet Union. Because most of them are economically hard-pressed, they will not want to have more than enough. Allowing for their particular situations, the policies of nuclear states confirm these statements. Britain and France are relatively rich countries, and they have tended to overspend. Their strategic forces were nevertheless modest enough when one considers that they thought that deterring the Soviet Union would be more difficult than deterring states with capabilities comparable to their own. China, of course, faced the same task. These three countries, however, have shown no inclination to engage in nuclear arms races. From 1974, when India tested its peaceful bomb, until 1998, when it resumed testing, India was content to have a nuclear military capability that may or may not have produced deliverable warheads, and Israel long maintained its own ambiguous status. New nuclear states are likely to conform to these patterns and aim for a modest sufficiency rather than vie with one another for a meaningless superiority. Third, because strategic nuclear arms races among lesser powers are unlikely, the interesting question is not whether they will be run but whether countries having strategic nuclear weapons can avoid running conventional races. No more than the United States will new nuclear states want to rely on executing the deterrent threat that risks all. Will not their vulnerability to conventional attack induce them at least to maintain their conventional forces? American policy since the early 1960s again teaches lessons that mislead. From President John F. Kennedy and Secretary Robert S. McNamara onward, the United States followed a policy of flexible response, emphasizing the importance of having a continuum of forces that would enable the United States to fight at any level from irregular to strategic nuclear warfare. A policy that decreases reliance on deterrence by placing more emphasis on conventional forces would seem to increase the chances that wars will be fought. Americans wanted to avoid nuclear war in Europe. Europeans wanted to avoid any war in Europe. Flexible response weakened Europeans' confidence in America's deterrent forces. Their worries were well expressed by a senior British general: "McNamara is practically telling the Soviets that the worst they need expect from an attack on West Germany is a conventional counterattack." 33 Why risk one's own destruction if
one is able to fight on the ground and forego the use of strategic weapons? The policy of flexible response seemed to lessen reliance on deterrence and to increase the chances of fighting a war, although not nearly as much as the unnamed British general thought. Large conventional forces neither add to nor subtract from the credibility of second-strike nuclear forces. Smaller nuclear states are likely to understand this more easily than the United States and the Soviet Union did, if only because few of them can afford to combine deterrent with large war-fighting forces.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION REPLACES OTHER, MORE EXPENSIVE FORMS OF MILITARY GROWTH

Avery Goldstein, Department of Political Science University of Pennsylvania, 2000, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century, p. 54-55

During the Cold War China, Britain, and France deemed nuclear deterrence an attractive strategy for dealing with the superpower threat not only because it is robust but also because it is economical when compared with the most plausible conventional alternatives. The economic attractiveness of nuclear forces is not a reflection of their low cost in an absolute sense. Developing and deploying nuclear forces is not cheap. Especially for a poor country like China, the effort is arduous and requires great sacrifice and a husbanding of scarce resources. The relevant assessment of cost-effectiveness, however, is not the absolute amount spent on nuclear forces, but rather the amount that would have to be spent on conventional forces to achieve comparable levels of security. For a country like China, determined to self-reliantly deal with what it believed were serious superpower threats and dissatisfied with its relatively cheap conventional deterrent (i.e., the people’s war capability), the choice was between burdensome alternatives—a conventional defensive or a nuclear deterrent capability. The latter offered the more plausibly affordable path to enhanced security. Relying on conventional forces for deterrence or defense has an- other economic disadvantage. Conventional deployments usually need to be geared to those of the adversary. The value of an investment in expensive conventional forces depends on ratios of military power (adjusted for qualitative differences) and the skillfulness with which its use is planned. Not only is it difficult to be confident about the outcome of engagements between known forces, but technological change constantly threatens the military value of one’s investment. In addition, one must be prepared to counter quantitative and qualitative improvements in the adversary’s capabilities. Precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, and sophisticated armoring are only some of the elements in the clash of modern conventional forces that made them an increasingly expensive gamble and volatile investment as the Cold War progressed. By contrast, where nuclear weapons are involved the calculus is bluntly simple, not agonizingly complex, and the value of the investment is relatively stable. The enduring ability of the most basic nuclear weapons quickly to annihilate military forces or inflict catastrophic damage on society, even in the teeth of massive deployments of technologically sophisticated defenses, remains unchallenged. Until this changes, nuclear weapons will be an economical hedge against obsolescence for states seeking an affordable way to fulfill the requirements of strategies for dissuading highly capable adversaries.